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Timely as extended by 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
Ziglar 
le Pursuant to a search warrant, respondent's place of business 
was searched for evidence of wagering and· bookmaking activities. In the 
course of the search, evidence of loansharking activities was discovered. 
A special grand jury was convened and respondent was called as a witness. 
When he appeared, respondent invoked his privilege against self-incrimin-
ation. The Government requested the USDC for the ND Ohio (Battisti) -
to grant Calandra immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 2514 as he was not the 
target of the investig~tion. The government acknowledged that the quest-
ions which it intended to put to Calandra were based on the items 
seized 8uring the above-mentioned search. Respondent then filed a reques 
for-postponement of the immunity hearing in order that he could prepare 
Sof'PRt'SS.\o~ 
·a motion to suppress the seized evidence. After thejhearing, the USDC 
determined that respondent was entitled to litigate_the question of 
,. 
-2-
whether the evidence on which the questions were t6 be based had been 
·. l 
obtained in violation of respondent's constitutional protection against 
unlawful search and seizure. The USDC found that the search warrant had 
been issued without probable cause and that the scope of the search 
~ ed • 
authorized was Qverly broad. The USDC order/the evidence to be -
suppressed and retur ned to respondent and further ordered that responden· 
need not answer any grand jury questions based upon the suppressed 
evidence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the USDC finding that the 
warrant was not valid and held that the exclusionary rule should be 
applied in a situation such as this in order to protect respondent 's 
right of privacy and to deter improper police practices. The government 
cqntends that a grand jury witness (for whom the government sought 
transactional immunity) is not entitled to invoke the exclusionary rule 
"\::::) f ormulat ed under the Fourth Amendment by moving to suppress evidence 
intended for use in questioning him before the grand jury, on the 
ground that the evidence was the product of an illegal search and seizur E 
2. FACTS: The pertinent facts are outlined above. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 
AR The government contends (1) the decision below sanctions an 
unwarranted interference with the grand jury process. Citing Costello 
v. U.S., 350 U.S. 359 and a number of other cases decided by this 
Court, the government notes that grand jury witnesses traditionally have 
not been permitted to challenge the evidence that led the grand · jury to 
call them . The government also cites cases from the CAS, CA2 and CA9 
(p. 5 of the petition) which are in conflict with the decision in this 
C) cas.e and which have refused to apply the Fourth Amendment exclusionary 
rule to grand jury proceedings or to permit collateral inquirie~ based 
on the exclusionary rule. The government also contends that the decisior 
I --
-3-
below is inconsistent with the visws expressed by a ma Jority of this 
J Court in Gel bard v. Unit e d States, 408 U.S. 41. The g+ernment cites 
Mr. Justice White's concurring opinion in Gelbard in which he noted 
i 
that the statute involved in that case "unquestionably works a change 
in the law with respect to the rights of grand jury witnesses, but it is 
a change rooted in a complex statute,,,," 408 U.S. at 70; and (2) 
the government contends that the court of appeals has unjustifiably 
expanded the scope of the exclusionary rule by allowing the suppression 
of evidence upon the motion of a person who has been offered immunity 
use. 
from its adverse/ [the government points out that it is not conced i ng 
the unconstitutionality of the search in making this argument.] The 
government points out that in order to invoke the exclusionary rule one 
must be the person against whom the resulting evidence is sought to 
be admitted. In this case the respondent was not seeking to prevent the 
use of seized evidence a gainst himself. Rather, he sought to prevent 
its use against others, a result not dic t ated by the exclusionary rule. 
B. Yhe respondent concedes that the question in this case should 
ultimately be reviewed by this Court and that the issue was expressly 
left open by this Court in Gelbard v. United States, 408 U.S. at 45, n . S 
The respondent contends, however, that the Court should deny cert in 
this case to await empirical evidence as to the impact on grand jury 
proceedings resulting from the decisidn below, Respondent also contends 
that this case is not a good 
1
vehicle for resolving the issue since the 
interruption of the grand jury proceedings 1n this case was not caused 
by respondent ' s assertton· of his Pourth Amendment rights, but the 
government's interruption of the proceedings for the immunity hearing 
and the delay attributable to respondent's right to advance notice unde~ 
Rules S(a)(b) and 6(d) of the Fede~al Rules 'of Civil Procedure. The 
respondent points out that no "full blown suppression hearing" was 
J : 
-4-
required, as the invalidity of the search warrant was determinable from 
the face of the affidavit, and the facts pertaining to the scope of ihe 
search were adduced through uncontroverted affidavits. Respondent 
claims that the above factors distinguish this case from the other 
CA cases cited by the government as in conflict with the decision 
below. 
4. DISCUSSION: The question in this case seems to have been left 
open in Gelbard and there does seem to be a general difference of 
opinion in the circuits. The question is clearly important. 
There is a response. 
1/16/72 ziglar Op CA petn appx. 
• 
.. 
._r:;_ -1-v<~t._ ~ 
I 
J u.. J "VI ""'k L-1;;> o-v r 
~;::..2; ;:n_:\~-+ ~ J . &;-~r 




To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: John J. Buckley 
Re: United States v. Calandra, No. 72-734 
I would reverse the CA 6 decision on the following ------------------------
rationale . First, I think that respondent Calandra has 
standing under Rule 4l(e) to assert his 4th am~ment rights . 7 
Bule 4l(e) is not limited to "parties" or "defendants" but 
extends to a ~ person "aggrieved" . In the present case, Calandra 
was the subject of the illegal search; his 4th amednment rights 
were violated by the Government's unlawful search of his business 
and seizure of his papers . Furthermore , Calandra'will incur 
an additional injury to his right to privacy if compelled to 
testify before the grand jury . Under either Alderman v. United 
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) or Association of Data Processing 
Services Org . v Camp, 387 U. S. 150 (1970), resp has standing . 
It does not follow, however, that Calandra is also entitled 
to supression of the evidence and exclusion of its fruits . Here , it 
is important to distinguish between the constitutional right --
conferred bX the 4th ame~ment an~ the constitutional remedy of 
exclusion . As this Court has often stated, the exclusionary rule -----is not pr imarily intended to repair the injury to the person whose 
4th amednment rights are violated . Rather , its purpose is to 
deter unlawful go vernmental conduct by removing the incentive 
to disregard the copnstitutional prohibitition against unreasonable 
search and seizures . This extraa•.inar y remedy has traditionally 
been applied in cases where the government seeks to use the 
unlawfully obtained evidence against a person suspected of 
--
criminal behavior. It is in these limited cases that the incentive 
for the government to act unlawfully is greatest and the resulting 
injury to individuals is most severe. On the other hand, the 
exclusionary rule has not been applied 
moving to supress is not the object of the criminal process. 
This point is easily illustrated by the fact that, as mats best 
I can determine, the exclusionary rule has no application to ciWil 
actions. Although the govern~t may have obtained the evidence 
unlawfully, it is nevertheless admissible. 
Thus, application of the exclusionary rule depends 
just 
no~on whether a witnesses 4th amednment rights have been ~ 
violated, but on ~ whether the illegally seized evidence 
is sought to be introduced against him in a criminal process . 
Turning to the present case, the inapplicability of 
tN,'l'\ 
the exclusionary rule • is ~ apparent . Calandra is not 
the target of the criminal investogation; no evidence is sought 
to be introduced against him . We need not rely on the subjective 
intent of the prosecutor for assurance in this matter since 
the Government has sought transactional immunity for Calandra . 
Thus, there is no possibility that he will become a "de facto" 
defendant . This point disposes of the case . 
There are several advantages for taking the 
approach suggested . First , it does not require a re-examination 
of the effectiveness of the exclusionary rule . I would think 
the Court would be on solid ground in stating that the exclusionary 
rule is available only to those who are objects of criminal 
-._ -
investigations . Here, Calandra ' s life or liberty are clearly ------........ ........ --
the approach is responsive to the CA 6 ' s 
tcrwflcH.t"\ 
that ~ immunity does notl protect Cal~ndra ' s privacy 
-
\t.ftct.U.Se, 
interest sj(: :sc he may still be called before the garnd jury 
to testify. The simple answer is that the exclusionary rule 
t P 1 is not intenct''"~ o redress or prevent that kind of injury~ 
Calandra's remedy is a civil suit for damages for invasion 
of his privacy rights. Thirs, the approach distinguishes between the 
right and the remedy. It is essential to recognize that --------- --
standin~ t~a~s~rt _a~~~metf1~ent cla~m is not the "same thing" 
as applicability of the exclusionary rule. Otherwise, 
evey person having standing to assert the 4th amednment claim 
would also be entrutled to the benefits of exclusion. My point 
is that the remedy must be examined separately in terms of the 
purposes which it has traditionally been thought to serve. 
The Government confuses standing with exclusion, and unconsciously 
acknowledges this fact in 
has standin !the 
that Calan 
4l(e). 
footnote 9 of it brief by a ~ noting 
return of the property under rule 
for~~~xessia~xa~tsi~ext~ex~xa~~x~~xy 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v . United States, 251 U.S. 385, 
is not to the contrary . There, illegally obtained evidence 
was presented to a grand jury which had already indicted the 
Silverthornes. Later, in a separate proceeding, a district court 
ruled that the evidence was obtained illegally and ordered its return 
to the Silverthornes. Meanwhile the grand jury framed a new 
indictment based on the illegally obtained evidence and then issued 
a subpoena to the 
••rui :i' b • Silverthornes to produce the same documents 
and papers. The Silverthornes refused to obey the subpoena 
and were held in contempt. The Court held that the subpoena 
was invalid because it was based on knowledge obtained from 
the illegally seized evidence; under Weeks v. United States, 
the grand jury could not use that evidence. (f"i'• Uo/t~Au~ .I:) 
-
By contrast, in the present case, resp Calandra has been granted 
transactional immunity and is not the object of the criminal 
investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule has no application. 
For the reasons stated, I would reverse. 
/ 
l/ I have been pondering this statement, and I think it should be 
modified. It would make sense to apply the exclusionary rule 
in cases involving "substantial'' violations of the 4th amednment. 
I am referring, of course, to the ABA standard and the ( lt L I 
balancing test it implies. This is an extremely limited exception, 
but it would satisfy the need for a remedy in the truly 
exceptional case • 
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No. 72-734 United States v. Calandra 
Summer Memorandum 
This is a brief memorandum, dictated after having 
read most of the briefs. It is entirely preliminary and, 
in large degree superficial. Further study is indicated. 
Statement of the Case 
Federal agents were conducting an investigation of 
extensive gambling and bookmaking operations . Based on 
information obtained from various sources (court ordered 
wiretap, physical surveillance of various suspected participants, 
and the statements of informers), a search warrant was issued 
for the search of respondent 1 s place of business . In making 
----------------------------------------------this search for documents and equipment relating to illegal 
gambling, the FBI discovered a record believed to constitute 
evidence of a federal loan sharking offense against a previously 
identified victim . The government intended to present this 
and other evidence to a special grand jury conducting an 
investigation of loan shark activities . 
Respondent, when subpoeaned to testify before the 
grant jury refused . He invoked the Fifth Amendment, and 
) 
continued his refusal after the government has requested the 
District Court to grant respondent- immunity pursuant to 18 
U. S . C. 2514 (see Kastigar) . At the suppression hearing- which 
interrupted respondent 1 s appearnce before the grand jury-
2. 
respondent asserted that he would refuse to answer questions 
based on the seized material. The District Court concluded 
(i) that the warrant was inadequate to justify the seizure in 
question; (ii) that the search was broader than the warrant 
justified, constituting a "general search"; (iii) that due 
process "allows a witness to litigate the question of whether 
the evidence which constitutes the basis for questions asked 
of him before the grand jury has been obtained" in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment; and (iv) the DC ordered the evidence 
suppressed, and specified that respondent need not answer any 
questions before the grand jury based on the suppressed 
evidence. CA 6 affirmed in a strong and carefully written 
opinion reviewing numerous authorities. 
The g~~xex government considers this a case of first --
importance, as affirmance of the decision below would -----
constitute an "extravagant extension" of the exclusionary 
--------------
rule which - in turn - is said to rest on "standing to suppress " - --
the fruits of an illegal search and seizure . 
Questions Presented 
The only question presented is summarized by the 
SG as follows : 
"Whether a grand jury witness (for whom the 
government has sought transactional immunity under 
18 U. S . C. 2514) is entitled to refuse to answer 
questions put by the grand jury on the ground that 
the questions are based upon leads which were the 
product of an illegal search and seizure . " 
(brief for U. S. p . 3) 
Discussion 
I have read, preliminarily, the briefs by both 
parties and am strongly inclined toward the government ' s 
position primarily because I am opposed to a further 
extension of the exclusionary rule . Under the doctrine of 
3. 
Mapp and in the subsequent line of cases referred to in my 
Bustamante opinion if the rule is here extended to federal 
grand juries and witnesses before them, it will also be 
extended to state court grand juries and collateral proceedings 
in both the federal and state courts . For the reasons stated 
in my Bustamante opinion, unless and until empiric evidence 
documents more fully than at present the efficacy of the 
exclusionary rule, I consider its extension in collateral 
proceedings - indeed its present use in Bustamonte-type cases -
is not only a futile exercise but gravely impinges on other 
important interests . 
Accordingly, I find the brief of theSG generally 
congenial with my views . The brief of respondent essentially 
tracks the same arguments made by CA 6 in its opinion. While 
these are well stated and viewed narrowly are persuasive, the 
broader considerations that impelled my Bustamante opinion 
seem controlling here . 
There is no authoritative opinion of this Court on 
the issue squarely presented . Although Silverthorne Lumber 
Co . v . U. S . , 251 U. S. 385 is relied upon heavily by respondent, 
the SG distinguishes it well in note 2, p. 11 of its brief. 
In any event, more recent Supreme Court cases lean the other 
way (see Alderman, language in Gelbard, Dionisio and others 
cited in SG's brief). 
The SG makes two separate points which, though 
related, would independently support a reversal if they are 
sound: 
A. Even though a search and seizure is unlawful 
4. 
under Fourth Amendment, a grand jury may consider and a grand 
jury witness must answer questions based upon~ the fruits 
of such a search and seizure. In support of this argument, 
the SG emphasizes - as would be expected - the freedom of a 
grand jury from 11 technical rules 11 , the importance of the 
investigative power of such a jury, its authority to consider 
11 tips, rumors, evidence proffered by the prosecutor or the 
personal knowledge of grand jurors . " Branzburg v. Hayes, 
408 u.s. 665, 700-701. 
It is also emphasized that if a grand jury witness 
has a due process right to a "full blown suppression hearing 
U.c.. G/t}-_ 
• 
11 Gel bard, 408 U.S. 41, 70, ~ would be saddled 11 wi th 
.A 
many trials and preliminary showings would assuredly impede 
) 
its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the 
fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws." 
Dionisio, slip opinion at 15-16. 
Although CA 6, and respondent rely on Rule 4l(e) of 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the SG disposes (perhaps 
adequately) of this argument in his footnote 4, p . 15 of his 
brief . 
In addressing the exclusionary rule issue which 
5. 
underlies the entire argument, the SG notes that this would do 
little if anything to promote the privacy interests protected 
by the Fourth Amendment . There is already little or no --incentive for the discovery of evidence which cannot be used 
at trial; thus a holding that illegally seized evidence cannot -------
even be presented to a grand jury would have a miniscule ----
deterrent effect, if any . 
B. The government ' s second point is that the --
exclusionary rule may not be invoked by a witness to prevent 
questioning with respect to which he has been offered immunity. -----
As noted in Alderman, 394 U. S. at 175, the exclusionary 
rule does not "provide that illegally seized evidence is 
inadmissible against anyone for any purpose . " Historically, 
the rule xxx has more narrowly provided only that "evidence 
obtained in violation (of the Fourth Amendment) cannot be 
used in a prosecution against a vict~m of the unlawful search 
and seizure if he makes timely objection . " Goldstein v . U. S . , 
316 U. S. 114, 120 . As Alderman further stated (394 U.S . at 174) : 
"There is no necessity to exclude evidence against one defendant 
in order to protect the rights of another . No rights of the 
6. 
victim of an illegal search are at stake when the evidence is 
offered against some other party.u 
Thus the holding of CA 6 would benefit gratituously 
third parties (respondent in this case) who would lack standing ------under existing authorities of the Court to invoke the 
exclusionary rule. Respondent, according to the SG, is in 
essentially the same position "as a witness who, having 
refused to testify solely on Fifth Amendment grounds is offered 
immunity. Although such a witness may prefer not to testify, 
he has no constitutionally protected interest in preventing 
the use of his own self incriminating but immunized testimony 
against others." See Kastigar. 
The SG further argues that the rationale of the 
decision below"would presumarly even authorize a non-witness 
to challenge the presentation of evidence to the grand jury 
or at trial, on the ground that the discovery of the evidence 
infringed his Fourth Amendment rights" (SG's brief p. 23). 
It is to be remembered in considering this case that 
the grand jury was in its investi~ative stage, no indictment 
or charge has been made against respondent, the search of his --- -
business offices was in fact made only pursuant to a warrant 
(although this was held to have been too narrowly drawn), 
respondent himself was not the object of the grand jury's 
investigation, and the government had offered transactional 
immunity. To extend the exclusionary rule this far would, as 
the SG states, constitute an "extravagant extension of a 
prophylatic rule." 
No. 72-734 p. S. v. CALANDRA Arguecfi0/11/73 
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, MEMORANDUM 
No. 72-734 U.s. v. Calandra 
cellaneous thoughts concerning our opinion in the above case. 
1. I think the importance of the role of the grand jury - the 
foundation of my position - should be emphasized somewhat more than 
in the initial draft. I am inclined to include in our opinion all, or at least 
most of, the ''quotations" from Branzburg set forth on p. 9 of the SG's 
brief. This is the most recent expression of opinion by the Court, and 
it is fairly comprehensive. 
2. In the absence of a compelling reason to the contrary, 
unduly hamper the work of a grand jury to be denied access to the type 
of documentary or physical evidence which is usually the pooduct of a 
search and seizure. We might quote from Justice Black's dissenting 
opinion in Kaufman (394 U.S. at 237) to the effect that: 
"A claim of illegal search and seizure under the Fourth 
Amendemtn is crucially different from many other con-
stitutional rights; ordinarily the evidence seized can in 
no way have been rendered untrustworthy by the means 
of its seizure and indeed often this evidence alone establishes 
beyond virtually any shadow of a doubt that the defendant 










If we use all or a part of the foregoing quotation, we should make it clear 
,, that in the present case we are not concerned with the admissibility at 
trial which presents an entirely different issue. It is only with respect 
to such admission that the exclusionary rule has been held applicable by 
this Court. Respondent would now have us (as you have already said) make 
an extravagant and unwarranted extension of a rule which often excludes 
the clearest proof of guilt with a very high content of reliability. 
3. The SG's brief (pp. 13, 19, 23, n. 9) makes the point that 
respondent has other remedies which protect his "legitimate interest". 
The term "legitimate interest" comes from pionisio (cited p. 12, 13) 
of the SG's brief. At p. 19, the SG cites three cases and states that: 
•" "The essence of such decisions is that more limited 
re-medies are available to vindicate the 4th Amendment 
interest at stake and provide an adequate measure of 
deterrence. In the present context, those remedies 
would include return of the seized property, exclusion 
of the property and its fruits from evidence against 
respondent at a criminal trial, and an action for damages. '' 
' I have net checked the three cases cited to see to what extent 
they support the SG's argument. If they do lend support, I think the 
argument is worth making- certainly to the extent of emphasizing that 
the intrusion on respondent's privacy has already occurred (and cannot 
be repaired) and that he is fully protected for the future against the rule 





that it is realistic to talk about an "action for damages". 
4. If the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to "deter" (as the 
cases have said), the question arises in this case as to why deterrence 
3. 
would not result from applying the rule to grand juries. The SG suggests 
one answer as follows: 
"Such an extension of the exclusionary rule (to grand jury 
proceedings) would deter only police investigation con-
sciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely 
, for the purposes of grand jury consideration; the instances 
of such intentional police action must be comparatively 
rare." (SG's brief 18) 
r;' 
I agree with this. There may well be situations in which conscientious 
policemen are deterred from Fourth Amendment violations because they 
know that the evidence seized will not be admissible in the trial of the 
person whom they have arrested or wish to charge committing a crime. 
It is quite unrealistic to assume that even the relatively sophisticated 
policeman would be thinking of the implications of a search and seizure 
with respect to a grand jury investigation. I suppose that the great 
majority of illegal searches and seizures come about more or less under 
emergency situations. If there is abundant time to obtain a warrant, 
police are taught and normally required to do so. There will be few 
emergency situations arising with respect to a pending or contemplated 
grand jury investigation. In short, whatever may be said in terms of 
the deterrent value of the Rule with respect to the conviction of a 
, 




' . '• 
···-
'·· 
' . .. 
' ,_ .. ,. 
•. 
4. 
a suspected criminal, it simply strains credulity to suggest that police 
conduct will be affected one way or the other by extending the Rule to 
grand jury proceedings. 
5. Subject to your views, it seems to me that the central theme 
of our Calandra opinion - after setting the stage appropriately - should 
be a bldancing, on the one hand, of the societal interests in safeguarding 
the role of grand juries against the marginal deterrent effect (if any) 
; on police misconduct which might result from extending the Rule to grand 
jury proceedings. 
6. Stated broadly, the public's interest ia ~ ?Jl safeguarding the 
efficiency and effectiveness of graud jury proceedings or investigations. 
Extension of the exclusionary rule, as sought by respondent, would 
-
undercut the public interest in two significant respects (i) it would deny 
to grand juries the fruits of such searches and seizlix-es as may be found 
by a court to have violated the Fourth Amendment, quite without regard 
to the egregiousness of the violation or of the importance to the 
investigation of the evidence in question; and (ii) suppression hearings 
which could be quite numerous -would result inevitably in protracted 
interruptions and delays of grand jury proceedings, no doubt in some 
instances to the point of total frustration or expriation of the grand jury's 
You have identified both of these interests in your first draft. 




somewhat greater emphasis on these, especially the latter. I think it is 
worth at least a footnc:te to indicate the extent of the disruption in this 
case. On December 11, 1973, three years wUl have elapsed since th 
search of Calandra's office, and more than two-and-a-half years 
have elapsed since the grand jury was convened. If Calandra, and the 
information derived from the search of his office, are vital to the 
conspiracy investigation underway in 1971, it is entirely possible that 
~· ~··L 
' 0 ':,j this particular investigation has been frustrated completely. 
7. I have just looked again at respondent's brief, and the truth 
•"·'· ~~ 
is neither you nor I have addref}Js.e.,..IJ.it; ,Pmcipal ~rgument. ~ .. ~c~relies 
a an alleged "invasion of privacy" which results from the questioning 
~: , , , HI ~ ~ 
before the grand jury . .:.:·1i'Ot fr,om the seizing of th:e dpcument 
' '" . 
;;>, 
Respondent concedes that the exclusionary rule is a "remedy'' which 
"»:r":k )!';t' .. ~ . _ .~r!l\\~. /. ~ ·~.~- "'· llrOJ "" • ,.,,: , «..-
he contends would afford incomplete or bia proprtate relief in th1s1'case 
' f.(' ~-· '~ ,, '-"' . --,_.. '' ··~· ' •. 'l ~:~-~''i ·*·~ '""\ _,.,. .'~ 
;.~r;-_· ~.1· 
He relies, rather, on a'"'clitim of "Fourt Amendment right of privacy". 
' I. ·'!I' '" 
See Summary of A~gument in respondel}t~, si,brief, asf" more fully elaborated 
'·~ ~· ~··. 'ii 
·M It ' f_ *"~ ;'i-~···~';-}f &\' .,}''- ·, ' ·""' -1 ,1!1, ' . .,., ~fii!f• 
in his aggument. At the oral argument, as my notes ind1cate, responden 
A , !\'c ,, ' 'V•' ~ f, ' \'fill ' ' 
" contended that each e(Uestion asked before the grand jury would constitute 
a fresh invasion of Fourth Amendment rights. ~ 
There are several answers. The privacy protected by the Fourth 
Amendment is the invasion of one's person, house, papers or effects. 












either a grand jury or a petite jury except by virtue of a suppression 
(under the exclusionary rule) of the product of an unlawful search and its 
It seems to me that respondent is trying to frationate Fourth 
Amendment rights, and in effect to create a new right. The Fifth Amend-
ment provides protection against questioning which incriminates, and 
respondent's reliance upon the Fourth in this respect is misplaced. 
is forced into this posture by virtue of the immunity grant. 
I have taken a new look at CA6's opinion, and it does speak of 
the "right of privacy". Yet, the opinion seems to predicate the privacy 
on the operation of the exclusionary rule as the "means of giving effect 
to the Fourth Amendment guarantee of privacy." (Petition p. 15). 
, The CA6 opinion states the question in an interesting manner: 
"Whether one whose Fourth Amendment right to privacy 
has been violated by an illegal search and seizure and 
is therefore a proper party aggrieved in the Alderman 
sense may assert such right when called as a witness 
before the grand jury. " 
The Court stated that the answer to this question is "currently: 
a matter of serious debate", and cites a number of circuit court opinions. 
Perhaps you should take a look at these. 
In summary, I believe we need to address more directly respondent's 
as well as the analysis of CA6. 





, I lmow that you have already been collaborating with John Jeffries, 
who made a special study during the summer of the exclusionary rule. 
'. Please give John a copy of your second draft when you make one available 
I am anxious to circulate this opinion next week. 
* * * * * 
Please do not construe the foregoing comments (or any other 
comments) as indicating criticism or dissatisfaction with your first 
draft. This is a difficult case to write - at least it is for me. It is 
also an extremely important case, and I would like to have a scholarly, 
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On page 10 of your draft of 11/9 you refer to the evidentiary 
privileges established by statute or common law. What about the 
privileges derived from the eonstitution? {_e.~· recently considered 
in Brewster and Gravel, as well as number of other cases). In view 
of the pendency of the Watergate nightmare, we would have to deal with 
these privileges with the utmost care and neutrality. Yet, if we do not 
mention them, the omission might be noted. What do you think? 
... -~ ' 
rw18ed draft ot November 9, toPther with papa 1 aDd 3 of the nctea 
! 
(excluding note• 10, 11 and 12). 
~.Thts is a ~e product, ·~ri~tlng eubatantlal improvemen~ tn 
'• .. ,~ f " !, ' «' ' . . 
pntzatloo and substance OYer the flHt draft. I think you succeeded 
~- ·-'' ' ' ~ . i. ·: >, • ' - ·--·•"" 
·, 
e well in Incorporating the ngpattou I made on the margin ol the 
tat wtll be a~l;»le during the da~. Thts ~~~ us, I thlftk, In good shape 
o~mg from the prtater a ebambers lli'aft, bJ Wedn•day (I hope, 
the latest). 
' 
' , · .. ~ I~bave aC:1d8d a couple ot rtdera to your draft, and wMtten tn a 
f· ~11: 
' 
number ot suggested changes. None of theee 1s of any great ccmaequenee. 
' ,. i 
•. ,. ~·· .. ~ In addition, u 1 was ln the process .of revtew I dictated a few 
-·~~ ' 






J'lnally, I make a few generaly obaervattons: 
1. There ~ a certain repetttlowmess in the opinion which yoU 
~ ww '~, 
1D Yin of the way the oplnioa S..~ •tructured. The repetttton oecun 
primarily from p. 13 to p. ~ 18, where - ln ldent:lfytng the publle 1nte 
we repeat (In aummary form) a good deal that liJ set forth under Part U. 
Thla 18 espeetally t~< on pages 13-15 1n empbaslzlngtbe role and function ,,, ', 
' & 
of the p-and Jury. I do think tt te necessary to repeat, in summary form, 
the eaence of what hal been sald tn Part II, aDd I am content to leave it 
u presently wrlttea tf - after rereading - you and John Jeffries thtak lt 
2. We may be laylnglt on a btt thick (paps 15, 18) 1n the dts-
casslan ot ''delayl.4(i' dllruptlon... Thla 18 an important polDt, but I do 
n« want to onremphutu tt. 
S. I hope that you and John Jeffrlea both wW bear tn mind my 
ButamODte optnton. I jut do not wl8b fo ay anything that can tie ued 
aptnat me if aDd when the Court addresses the coDUnued UM of the 
aclulCI'l&ry rule In eollateral.attaek proeeedlnp. Allo, pleue keep 
In mind that the Sollcltor Generalis trying to perauade the Court to 
· ... tbe subatance Of the ALI fQrmulatton wtth respect to the exelusl«W"f , 
le~ Thll wu rataed tn Robinaon but not reached. I am not sure u 
to my flDal poettlOD on this proposal, I do n« want to foreclose either 
3. 
myself or the Court .~ what ta Aid In tbta cue. · 
" " '' .. f" • '! ; i >r" 
: . 4i' I belleve we wW have fairly met' each ·:c.t the prtnclpal arguments 
..::•. '\f~'". 'i. '">i.\ ' ~· - . :'>.' ' ,. -., ~\ • 'ffl. 'I> t' 
~ •: .. ·. ,",' - ' ,o; :. . . ', : ~ 
advane~J>Y,· l1'spondent. ~· you Jmow, hOWeftr, 1t hu been my practice 
> '·' .. • 
number of the leading ones, 1 aleo rely <a you for the relevancy of. the 
. :~ j} F \ j 
' ues which we have cited. Under no clrcumstancea, do I want t.o cUe 
·;ol! ' 
, . , - , ... :P -~"'· 
·ln any opinion a cue based on What somebody else has aid tt holdS • 
. ~
. 
' . .. 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: Mr. Jobn J. Bue y D TE: November 10, 19'13 
FOOM: Le ta F. P 11, Jr. 
Calandra 
a review of the first 18 p8 of your 
rev d draft of Nov mber , to her with 1 2 of the notes 
( g notes 10, 11 12). 
Tbta 18 a fine product, reflecting aubst 1a1 tmprovem tin 
gantzatton and bstance r the flrst draft. I think y 
quit 11 In lncorpo stlCDI I made on the mar of the 
first draft 1n my mo dum to you of ovem r 8. 
d til final point to be cl ded tn the text of 
th opinion, d t ot d altng h eovery of th s tz 
peraaoal p rty. I e d that the few addlttonal 8 for th 
tat w11l be ava.llable durin the day. Thta 8 us, I think, 1n good 8lli.J" 
for olUJ.ntn fro t printer a ...,ua.u.r. 
at the late ). 
I have add a coop of rtd ra to your draft, and wMtten tn a 
, 
num rot au ed chaD s. None of th e 1a of aDJ at eon qu nee. 
In dltl , I was 1n the proces of review I dictated a t 
o rvatloos 1n a coupl of m m whtch are attach be to. 
2. 
lly, I make fe aly o e ton : 
1. There 18 a c rtaln tttowmess 1n the inion which y 
r tn mtnd as you rer tt. Most of tt 18 robably nee eary 
in view o t e y t 1nio 1s tructu d. 'J· e ltlon c t 
rily fro • 1 to • 16, wh re -in 1 ifyln th • 
(in ry form) a de 1 that is set o n. 
e 11 t 1n em iztn rot d ... etton 
of th d jury. I n ss , in aum ary t rm, 
t e e nee of 
ntl ritt n 1f .. 
y 
eussloo of "delay 
not t to ov rem 






inion. I ju do n 
tng-y 
itthc ( s 15, 16) in th 
is is 1m ortant point, I do 
ffrle both ill ar in ml my 
y anythin t at c 
e if d n th Court u e of the 
ry rul 1n eol tae p 
olte. or 1 1 trytn to 
ad tlon 
not r ... '""' .... 
to ition t is pr al, I do net want to for clo eith r 
ry 
3. 
yaelf or the Court by what is d ln thta cue. 
4. I believe wUl h ve irly m. h of th principal argum nts 
vanced by respoo ent. Aa you ever, lt has been my practice 
to do thte 1n ac oplnion. 
&. I rely <m you for the correctn sa d accuracy l all citations 
d otattCGS, I do n~ und rtake tbls myself. Althou I am famUiar 
with most of the c es c ed in the oplnlcm., d have a 
wn r of the 1 ding s, I also r ly on y for the rel ey of the 
eu which have cJt • U er no circum ances, do I want to clt 
in y oplnt a cas somebody els h td lt olds. 
••••• 
I am ndln copi s of tbls memorandum to Jack J 
We :ve select J n to th chambers .. d or" ow oplnt 
cue. He wtll submit d dtac a his au chan a w1th you, 
Jeffrle • 
Jn thta 
If they involve 1a s of au ce you d I should diseuse them. When 
a c mbers copy 18 n.Ua le, I ho Jack also will :v an opportunity 
to tt fl'l r - not wttb a primary reapoo.albW.ty ... to :ve the 
benefit his "off the cuff" t<ms. 
A lD, I c gratulate you on I think Ia a One tece of or 




- > ,'\, ~-
',; ~~f~ ,' ~ •. •; 
Mr. John J. Buckley 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Also on pgge 10 you have a good quote from Blair (near the 
bottom of the page) indicating that under certain circumstances a witness 
may be excused from telling all that he knows. What would you think of 
citing my concurring opinion in Branzburg as a see also at that point. 
I may add here that we have used Branzburg - at my suggestion - so 
strongly that we may be chilling Justice stewart (although basically he 
is willing to follow precedents in most areas). 
On page 12, in stating the purpose of the exclusionary rule, 
retum to your primary reliance upon Tehan. Do you think that case 
is as strong authority for the deterrent purpose of the rule as the state-
ment I quoted in my rider from Elkins? We might discuss this. , 
* * * * * 
Also on page 12 in stating the analytical basis of the rule, you 
have generally followed my suggestion. Although numerous eases have 
said that deterrence is the purpose of the rule, the Brenn8f Douglas 
•, 
--- y• 
~.- i: .~ ); 
11'·. ' 
2. ' 
Marshall axis will react strongly to as precise a formulation as we 
now have in this draft. I am inclined to leave it in my first circulated 
draft of the opinion, as I would like to settle the question that is sometimes 
raised as to whether the exclusionary rule is itself a constitutional personal 
right. As John Jeffries has given this a lot of thought I am particularly ,' 
take 
anxious that he tlmt a good look at this sentence. We will also want to r 
know what Jack thinks about it. I personaijy have no doubt as to the 
correctness of what we have said as a matter of constitutional law. :' 
~;;; 
do want to be sure that we have expressed it as carefully and precisely 
as possible. 
; I have not seen the footnotes that accompany the handwritten 
,., •:; addition at the top of page 13. I cannot recall, off the cuff, what you 
l, ~ 
!1 
•: have in mind in talkingaabout .._._ .. =~klllBfml~ 
potentially de facto criminal defendants . 
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Mr. John B. Buckley 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 
Calandra 
DATE: November 19, 1973 
I write this memorandum to remind me to discuss with you 
the following: 
1. The press undoubtedly will be reading this opinion carefully 
to see whether any "smoke signals" are being sent up with respect 
to Watergate grand jury proceedings. You and I have mentioned this. 
\1\.,0/ 
'/ You might ask Jack and John Jeffries whether they see any language 
0~ 
that creates any legitimate problem in this respect. 
2. One quite minor point which I raised earlier: I still 
wonder whether we should refer to my concurring opinion in Branzburg -
possibly adding it to note 4 on page 5? I see no inconsistency in 
our heavy reliance on Branzburg in this case, and what I said in my 
concurrence in that case. What do you think? 
3. Perhaps we should have a footnote on the 
/ A brief note might prevent s a,meoo.e thinking we had overlooked this. 
L. F. P., Jr. 
TO: 
FROM: 
Mr. John B. Buckley 
Lewis F. Powell, Jr. ,, 
Calandra 
I write this memorandum to 
the following: 
1. The press undoubtedly will be reading this 
, to see whether any "smoke signals" are being sent up with respect 
to Watergate grand jury proceedings. You and I have mentioned this. 
You might ask Jack and John Jeffries whether they see any language 
that creates :tuoJ;w legitimate problem in this respect . 
. ··;~ 2. One quite minor point which I raised earlier: 
wonder whether we should refer to my concurring opinion in Branzburg -
possibly adding it to note 4 on page 5? ~ see no inconsistency in 
our heavy reliance on Branzb1:1rg in this case, aad what I said 
concurrence in that case. What do you think? 
3. Perhaps we should have a footnote on the immunity point. 
might prevent Ill~ ttHP~in~ we had overlooked this. 
·, 
CHAMBERS OF" 
.jtqrrtmt Q}ou.rt of tltt 'J[tni:tcb ~tatts 
~lttllrmnton, ~. <!}. zo,5)~~ 
JUSTICE WM. J. BRENNAN, JR. November 21, 1973 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE 
RE: No. 72-734 United States v. Calandra 
In due course I shall circulate a dissent 







~u.prtmt <!}curl cf tlrt ~tb ~tatts 
._uJringhm. ~. <!):. 2llgt'1~ 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
November 23, 1973 
Re: No. 72-734 - United States v. Calandra 
Dear Lewis: 
I anticipate joining your fine opinion in this case. 
I am presently uneasy -- very likely unjustifiably so --
by two statements in the opinion, both on page 8. The 
first is: 
"When the grand jury itself threatens 
to commit a wrong, it may be restrained." 
The second is: 
"And presumably grand jurors who themselves 
threaten to conduct an illegal search may 
be restrained like any others. Judicial 
intervention is appropriate in such cases 
because it may prevent the wrong be fore it occur s. " 
Without having gone into the subject as deeply as I 
know you have in preparing this opinion, I had thought that 
the principal control over grand juries is that which you 
detail in footnote No. 4 on page 5: -
"In particular, the grand jury must rely 
on the court to compel production of books, 
papers, document~ and the testimony of 
witnesses, and the courtL~~sh or modify 
a subpoena on motion ••• " 
- 2 -
Though there may be cases of this Court which support 
injunctions against grand juries themselves, I am not familiar 
with them. I am worried that the two quoted sentences may 
be thought to authorize injunction actions which would cut 
entirely against the thrust of your opinion here, and of 
Potter's opinion of last year in Mara and Dionisio. 
Sincerel~ 
Mr. Justice Powell 
CHAMBCRS OF 
.JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
~ttpr.cmc C!j' ~,.n.rt of tltt ~ttitdt ;jtatc£t 
'lttlasl(htgft1tt. ;D. <!f. 2.0,ct>i-~ 
November 23, 1973 
Re: No. 72-734 - United States v. Calandra 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your opinion in this 
case. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.iu:pTmtt Qtcurt cf t!rt ~tb .itatts 
Jfasqmghm. ~. Qt. 2llp)l.' 
November 26, 1973 
No. 72-734 - U. S. v. Calandra 
Dear Lewis, 
Upon the understanding that you will 
consider the editorial changes we discussed 
on the telephone today, I am glad to join 




Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~U.VrtttU' <!fomt (tf tltt ~lnittb" ~tetfttt 
"'lanlyi:nghttt. ]J. <q. 20b1>~;,1 
November 28, 1973 
Re: No. 72-734 -- United States v. Calandra 
Dear Lewis: 
I am waiting for Bill Brennan's dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference .· 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
.iu:prtmt Q):~ttrl ~f tlft ~tb .Jtws 
._-as!p:ttgbm. IO. <!]:. 2.0~'1~ 
November 28, 1973 
Re: No. 72-734 - United States v. Calandra 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me in your circulation of November 27th. 
sincerelyr 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
~tt.premc ~cnrt of tlFJ.lnttc~ ~httcu 
';Wnsirnntcn, p. ~· z.o,s:>12 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS December 12, 1973 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent in 
72-734, U.S. v. Ce.lo.nd.ra. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.:§u:pr.mtt <qo-u:rt ltf tire Jllnit.ch ~twa 
'lhultittgto-tt. tn. <q. 20?'~2 
/ 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARS HALL December 27, 1973 
Re: No. 72-734 -- ·u.S. v. Calandra 
Dear Bill: 




Mr. Justice Brennan 
cc: The Conference 
'·. 
C H AMBERS OF 
JUSTICE H A RRY A. BLACKM U N 
~tm:t (ijourlttf tfr.t 1!lttit.th ,itaf:tg 
,.-ultingbm. ~. (ij. 211~~~ 
November 26, 1973 
Re: No. 72-734 - U.S. v. Calandra 
Dear Lewis: 
I shall be with you in this case, I am sure, but might 
I offer the following suggestions for your consideration: 
1. I am somewhat disturbed about the two references, 
on page 8, to restraint of the grand jury. This aspect is not 
before us here, and I would prefer not to cover it by dictum at 
this time. Could we omit the first full sentence on page 8 and 
the last two sentences of Part II? 
2. I had a little trouble with the very end of the opinion. 
think my difficulty would be alleviated if the word "The 11 at the 
ginning of the next to the last sentence of the penultimate para-
graph were changed to " 0 ur. 11 I admit that this is a trivial sugges-
tion, but it seems to straighten me out. 
CH AMBERS OF 
~t"tmt Qfourlltf tfr~ ~ni.ttb .itattg 
._-asltingbm. ~. <If. 2ll.;t,., 
..JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
November 28, 1973 
Re: No. 72-734 - U. S. v. Calandra 
Dear Lewis: 
I am pleased to join your opinion as re-
circulated November 27. 
Sincerely, 
6 
Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
lfp/ss 1/4/73 No. 72-734 U.S. v. Calandra 
The respondent in this casf as called to testify before a 
grand jurf investigating ~ sha..':king activities. His place of business 
had pr eviously been searched by feEi@FEHo ageat s under a warrant 
direct~ solely toward evidence in bookmaking operations. In that ------
search, evidence as to loan sharking was seized. The warrant was ------
11 
not broad enough to encompass such evidence, 
1
and accordingly its 
seizure was unlawful. 
On respondent's motion, the district court ordered suppression 
of this evidence • .!J"further held that respondenyheed not answer/ 
any of the grand jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. Mltl Ttie case 
is here on the governmentf s petition for certiorari. -
The exclusionary ruley a judicially created remedy designed 
to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights,/ is applicable in criminal trials 
to suppress illegally seized evidencr'and the fruits thereof. The 
question in this case)s whether the exclusionary rule applies ~ 
to a grand jury investigation. 
We hold that it does not. The rule does not proscribe the 
use of illegally seized evidence/in all proceedingsj or against all 
persons. Its application has been restricted to those areas where 
its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served. 
Extending the rule to grand jury investigations would, at 
most, achieve only a speculative advancf in the deterrence of 
2. 
police misconduct. More importantly, such an extension would 
unduly interferf ith the effective and expeditious dischar~f the 
grand jury's duties. The public has a substantial interesy in 
preserving the historic role and functions of the grand jurf ithout 
burdening it with what the Court, in a recent case, has characterized 
as mini-trials. 
It is to be remembered/that a witness called by the grand 
jury,rL:rt eSiieftdallt 'i peeiii' may of course protect his . own • 
positior y invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination. Indeed, in this case, respondent had been offered 
transactional immunity. 
Mr. Justice Brennan has filed a dissenting opinion in which 
Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice Marshall have joined. 
.§1tp1'tlttt <!fond o-f fltt 'Jlttifdt ~taus-
Pttsfringtcn, :!9. <!J. 20&1}1-~ ;;:-: J ~ f~ ~ Q ·~ ~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JL,IST ICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. January 16, 1974 ·--~t~~§E ~f"t~~N 
ffi filtf 
Case Held for No. 72-734 United States v. Calandra 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
No. 72-1649 Westerberg v. District Court in and for 
the Second Judicial District of Colorado, et al 
Petitioners were subpoenaed to testify before a state grand jury 
empaneled to investigate certain criminal activities. After having been 
notified that the grand jury intended to ask questions based on informa-
tion obtained pursuant to court-approved electronic surveillance, 
petitioners moved unsuccessfully in the state courts for a suppres-
sion hearing. Petitioners later appeared before the grand jury but 
refused to testify, contending that the wiretaps violated the Fourth 
Amendment. Petitioners were then granted transactional immunity 
but again refused to testify. After the state trial court announced its 
intention to hold a suppression hearing, the State applied to the 
Colorado Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition. That court 
granted the writ, holding that petitioners' claim could only be con-
sidered after they had refused to testify and been cited for contempt. 
Petitioners' contentions are essentially the same as those in 
Calandra. No claim is made under Title III of the Omnibus Crime 
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 u:s. C. §§ 2510, et seq. 
I would therefore deny certiorari. 

















































































































































































































































































SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 72-734 
United States, Petitioner,/ On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of Ap-
John P. Calandra. peals for the Sixth Circuit. 
[December -, 1973] 
MR. JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
This case presents the question whether a witness 
summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury 
may refuse to answer questions on the ground that they 
are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search 
and seizure. This issue is of considerable importance to 
the administration of our criminal justice system and 
has not previously been decided by this Court. 
I 
On December 11, 1970, federal agents obtained a 
warrant authorizing a search of respondent John Calan-
dra's place of business, the Royal Machine and Tool 
Company in Cleveland, Ohio. The warrant was issued 
in connection with a11 extensive investigation of the sus-
pected illegal gambling operations and specified that the 
object of the search was the discovery and seizure of 
bookmaking records and wagering paraphenalia. A 
master affidavit submitted in support of the application 
for the search warrant contained information derived 
from statements by confidential informants to the Fed-
eral Bureau of Investigation (FBI), physical surveillance 
,. 
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conducted by FBI agents, and court-authorized electronic 
surveillance.1 
The Royal Machine and Tool Company occupies a 
two-story building. The first floor consists of about 
13,000 square feet and houses industrial machinery and 
inventory. The second floor contains a general office 
area of about 1,500 square feet and a small office occupied 
by Calandra, president of the company, and his secretary. 
On December 15, 1970. federal agents executed the war-
rant directed at Calandra's place of business and con-
ducted a thorough four-hour search of the premises. The 
record reveals that the agents spent more than three 
hours searching Calandra's office and files. 
Although the agents found no gambling paraphenalia, 
one did discover, among certain promissory notes, a card 
indicating that Dr. Walter Loveland had been making 
periodic payments to Calandra. The agent stated in an 
affidavit that he was a\Yare that the United States Attor-
ney's office for the Northern District of Ohio was inves-
tigating possible violations of 18 U. S. C. § § 892, 893, 
and 894, dealing with extortionate credit violations, and 
that Dr. Loveland had been the victim of a "loanshark-
ing" enterprise then under investigation. The agent 
concluded that the card bearing Dr. Loveland's name 
was a loansharking record and therefore had it seized 
along with various other items, including books and 
records of the company, stock certificates, and address 
books. 
On March 1, 1971, a special grand jury convened in 
the Northern District of Ohio to investigate possible 
loansharking activities in violation of federal laws. The 
1 On the basis of the same affid:wit, fed em! agents also obtained 
warrants authorizing ~carrhcs of Calandra'" re~:;idcnce and auto-
mobile . The present rase involves only the search of the Royal 
Machine and Tool Company. 
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grand jury subpoenaed Cala11dra in order to ask him 
questions based on the evidence seized during the search 
of his place of business on December 15, 1970. Calandra 
appeared before the grand jury on August 17, 1971, but 
refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privi-
leged against self-incrimination. The Government then 
requested the District Court to grant Calandra trans~ 
actional immunity pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2514. 
Calandra requested and received a postponement of the-. 
hearing on the Government's application for the immu-
nity order so that he could prepare a motion to suppress' 
the evidence seized in the search. 
Calandra then moved pursuant to Rule 41 (e) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for suppression and 
return of the seized evide"nce on the grounds that the 
affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and that 
the· search exceeded the scope of the warrant. On 
August 27, the District Court held a hearing at which 
Calandra stipulated that he would refuse to answer 
questions based on the seized materials. On October 1, 
the District Court entered its judgment ordering the 
evidence suppressed and returned to Calandra and fur-
ther ordering that Calandra need not answer any of the 
grand jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence. 
332 F. Supp. 737 (1971). The court stated that "due 
process . . . allows a witness to litigate the question 
whether the evidence which constitutes the basis for the 
questions asked of him before the grand jury has been 
obtained in a way which violates the constitutional pro-
tection against unlawful search and seizure." 332 F. 
Supp .. at 742. The court found that the search warrant 
had been issued without probable cause and the search 
had exceeded the scope of the warrant. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 
465 F. 2d 1218 (1972) , holding that the District Court 
had properly entertained the suppression motion and 
0 
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that the exclusionary rule may be invoked by a witness 
before the grand jury to bar questioning based on evi-· 
dence obtained in an unlawful search and seizure. 2 The 
offer to grant Calandra immunity was deemed irrelevant, 
We granted the Government's petition for certiorari, 
- U. S. - (1973~ reverse. 
II 
The institution of the grand jury is deeply rooted in 
Anglo-American history.:l In England, the grand jury 
served for centuries both as a body of accusers sworn 
to discover and present for trial persons suspected of 
criminal wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens against 
arbitrary and oppressive governmental action. In this 
country the Founders thought the grand jury so essential 
to basic liberties that they provided ii1 the Fifth Amend-
ment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only 
be instituted by "a presentment or indictment of a grand 
jury." Costello v. United Slates, 350 U. S. 359, 361-362 
(1956). The grand jury's historic functions survive to 
this day. Its responsibility in our constitutional frame-
work includes both the determination whether there is 
probable cause to believe a crime has been committed 
and the protection of citizens against unfounded criminal 
2 The Court of Appcnls affirmed the Diot ri rt Court's finding that 
the search of Ca l andra'~ bu~ine~s and ~eizurc of his propert y was 
unlawful. AI! hough the Go,·crnmcnt docs not agree with the court's 
finding, it has not sought rr1·irw of this issue. 
~For a cliHru~~ion of the history and role of the grand jury, see 
Costello v. United States, 350 U. S. 359 , 361-362 · air v. m e 
States. 250 U. 8. 273, 279-283 (1919) ; !I ale v. He1zkel, 201 U.S. 43, 
59 (1906) , 4 Blurbtone Commentaries 301 et seq.; G. Edwards, 
The Grand .Jury 1- 44 (1906) ; 1 F. PoHoek and F. Mait land, History · 
of English Luw 151 (2d rd. 1909) ; 1 W. Hold~worth, History of Eng- . 
!ish Law 312-323 (7th rev. ed . 1956) . 
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prosecutions. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 686-
687 (1972). 
Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide 
latitude to inquire into violations of criminal law. No 
judge presides to monitor its proceedings.~ It deliberates ~ 
in secret and may determine alone the course of its- j 
:lnquiry. The grand jury may compel the production of?L.. -
evidence or the testimony of ,{Witnesses i.:n the--marme it. 
considers appropriate, and its operation generally is ~ 
unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary ----
rules governing the conduct of criminal trials. "It is a 
grand inquest, a body with powers of investigation and 
inquisition, the scope of whose inquiry is not to be limited 
by doubts whether any particular individual will be prop-
erly subject to an accu~'<ation of crime.'; Blair v. United 
States, 250 U. S. 273, 282 (1919). 
The scope of the grand jury's power reflects its special 
role in insuring fair and effective law enforcement. A 
grand jury proceeding is not a11 adversary hearing in 
which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudi· 
cated. Rather, it is an ex parte investigation to determine 
whether a crime has been committed and whether 
criminal proceedings should be instituted against any 
person. The grand jury's investigative power must be 
broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be dis-
4 The grand jury, of conr~c, is subjert to the court's supervision 
in several respects. Sec Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41, 49 
(1959); Rules 6 nnd 17, Frd. Rule Crim. Proc. ; L. Orficld, Criminal 
Procedure Under the Federal Rules, 475-477 ( 19GG). In pnrticular, 
the grnnd jury must rely on the court to compel production of 
books, papers, and documents or testimony of witnesses, and the 
court may quash or modify a subpoena on motion if compliance 
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charged. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra; Costello v. United 
States, supra. 
In Branzburg, the Court had occasion to reaffirm the 
importance of the grand jury's role: 
"[T]he investigation of crime by a grand jury imple-
ments a fundamental governmental role of secur-
ing the safety of the person and the property of the 
citizen .... " I d., at 700. 
"The role of the grand jury as an important 
instrument of effective law enforcement necessarily 
includes an investigative function with respect to 
determining whether a crime has been committed 
and who committed it . . . . 'When the grand jury 
is performing its investigatory function into a gen-
eral problem area .. . society's interest is best served 
by a thorough and extensive investigation.' Wood 
V:· Georgia, 370 U. S. 375, 392 (1962). A grand 
jury investigation 'is not fully carried out until 
every available clue has been run down and all wit-
nesses examined in a proper way to find if a crime 
has been committed.' United States v. Slone, 429 
F. 2d 138, 140 (CA2. 1970). Such an investigation 
may be triggered by t{ps, rumors, evidence preferred 
by the prosecutor, or the personal knowled.ge of the· 
grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S., 
at 362. It is only after the grand jury has examined 
the evidence that a determination of whether the 
proceeding will result in an indictment can be 
made . . . ." I d., at 701. 
. The grand jury's sources of information are widely 
drawn. and the validity of an indictment is not affected 
by the character of the evidence considered. Thus, an 
itldictment valid on its face is not sub.fect to challenge 
on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of 
inadequate or incompetent evidence, Costello v. United 
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States, supra; Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 
(1910); or even on the basis of information obtained in 
violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, United States v. Lawn, 355 
u.s. 339 (1958). 
The power of the Government to compel persons to 
appear and testify before a grand jury is also firmly 
established. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 
(1972). The duty to testify has long been recognized 
as a basic obligation that every citizen owes his Govern-: 
ment. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 
(1932); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)~ 
ln Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S., at 688, the Court 
noted that " [ c] itizens generally are not immune from 
grand jury subpoenas .... " and that "the longstanding 
principle that 'the public has a right to everyman's 
evidence' ... is particularly applicable to grand jury 
proceedings." The duty to testify may on occasion be 
burdensome and even embarrassing. It may cause injury 
to a witness' social and economic status. Yet the duty 
to testify has been regarded as "so necessary to the 
administration of justice" that the witness' personal 
interest in privacy must yield to the public's overriding 
interest in full disclosure. Blair v. United States, 250 
U. S., at 281. Furthermore, a witness may not interfere 
with the course of the grand jury's inquiry. He "is not 
entitled to urge objections of incompetency or irrelevancy, 
such as a party might raise, for this is no concern of his." 
Id., at 282. Nor is he entitled "to challenge the author-
ity of the Court or the grand jury" or "to set limit to 
the investigation that the grand jury may conduct." 
Ibid. 
Of course, the grand jury's subpoena power is not 
).....-----:W-R-ei+:Y unlimited. It may consider incompetent evi-
dence, but it may not itself violate a valid privilege, 
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whether thr Conf?titution, statutes, or the 
common law. Branzburg v. Hayes, supm; United States 
v. Bryan, supra; Blackmer v. United SLates, supra; 8 
J. Wigmore. Evidence. ~~ 2290-2391 (McNaughton rev. 
1961). When the grand jury itself threatens to commit 
a wrong, it may be restrained. Ro, for example. an 
indictment baf?ecl on evidence obtai ned in violation of 
a defendant's Fifth Amrnclment privilrge is nevertheless 
valid, United SLates v. Lawn, supm, but the grand jury 
may not force a '"itness to answer questions in violation 
of that constitutional guarantee. Rather, the grand jury 
may override a Fifth Amendment claim only if the wit-
ness is granted immunity co-extensive with the privilege 
against self-incrimination. Kast?'gar v. United States, 
supra. Similarly, a grand jury may not compel a person 
to produce books and papers that would incrin1inate him. 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 633-635 (1886). 
Cf. Couch v. United Stales, 409 U. S. 322 (1973). The 
grand jury is also without power to invade a legitimate 
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
A grand .i ury's subpoena decus tecum will be disallowed 
if it is "far too sweeping in its terms to he regarded as 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.n Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). And presumably grand 
jurors who threaten to conduct an illegal search may be 
restrained like any others. 
III 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that 
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment also 
limits §9 grand jury's subpoena power and ,.Y1at a wit~ 
ness may refuse to answer thr grand j ur~!:Iuestions 
based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search 
and seizure. The exclusionary rule was adopted to ef~ 
fectuate the Fourth Amendment right of all citizens 
"to be secure in their houses, papers, and effects, against 
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unreasonable searches and seizures .... " Under this 
rule evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amend-
' ment cannot be used in a criminal proceeding against 
the victim of the illegal search and seizure. Weeks v. 
United Stales, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U. S. 643 (1961). This prohibition applies as well 
to the fruits of the illegally seized evidence. Silver-
thorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920); 
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U. S. 471 ( 1963). 
The purpose of the exclusionary rule is not to redress 
the injury to the privacy of the search victim: 
<' [T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and 
effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too 
late." 'Uinidetter v. Walker, 381 u~ S. 618, 637 
(1965). 
Instead, the rule is designed to deter unlawful police 
conduct in the future and thereby e · tuate t e guarante.e 
of the Fourth Amendrr\eni against unreasonable search 
and seizures: 
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair: 
lts purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutidnal guaranty in the only effectively avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard 
it.'; 
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960); Mapp 
v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 656 (1961); Tehan v. United 
States, ex rel Shot, 382 U. S. 406, 416 (1966); Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 29 ( 1968). In sum, the rule is a 
judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth -Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, r /.4.a.~ 
rather than a personal constitutional right ~xercisable l '!J LA- ._..,......._ 
~the party aggrieved." --~-------
5 There is some di~agreemenl as to the practiral effirnry of the 
exclu~ionnry rule, and a::; the Court noted in Elkins v. United States, 
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Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusionary 
rule has never been intcrpret<'d to proscribe the use of 
illegally-seized evidence in all proceedings or against all 
persons. As in the application of any remPclial device, 
the scope of the rule has been restricted to those arras 
where its remedial objectives arc thought most effica-
ciously served. The balancing process implicit in this 
approach is expressed in the contours of the standing 
requirementf. Thus, standing to invoke the exclusionary 
rule has been confined to situations where the Govern-
ment seeks to use such evidence to incriminate- the 
victim of the unlawful SC'arch. Brown v. Unitfd States, 
411 U. R. 223 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 
U. S. 165 (1969); TVong Sun v. United States, supra; 
Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 ( 19GO). This 
standing rule is premised on a recognition that the need 
for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the 
364 U. R. 206, 21R (1960). rrlrvnnt "rrlrnpiriral stnii"tirf< arr not 
avnilnhlr." ('f. Oak,.:. Rtud~·ing: thr Exrlu~;ionar~· Rnlr in Srarrh 
and Rriznrr. 87 U. Chi. L. Rrv. 66.'i (1970). Wr hnvr no occasion 
in thr prr~rnt rnsr to ronKider the extent of the rule's efficacy in 
criminal trials. 
i 
6 In wrig:hing thr comprting: intrrr . ;f~, it should br notrd that the 
primary social rost of the Fourth Amrndmrnt exrlu~iona ry rule is 
tha.t it depriws thr rrimin:d. jHslirr sy~trm of probative evidence. 
v~tout tcgutel to the c.dc::l of 11:t ~ottlia HJ 1o 1 in1rPoian 21 the 
v!ntirt~'a fili Mf, or 1lu r. hm' I nod 1 0 COl?! icier tho 0 ililoNOP. We 
ha e 0 If 0~1 in eel 2 ~flit a:J jJI tt tliilfJfitJB ll11!A 'not All , m,Jg ,,lai,eh 
aCCOJttpli Ia: fl:::t 1@1 alt. Nw do::: '. e'::Jq l ~-l·k 888 "H.~. QQQ; '1~0 
(.WjOS). 'fl:e .<petttl fottc of 'he arahwi enerr mde in 'he eont("!!ft 
~ltd illu..-d senoh ond seiz liP n moll :lsl'Dt !d fl· Mr. JuRtice Bla~k s-t-.et•J 
in his dis. rnting opinion in Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 
237 (1969): 
"A rlnim of illegal ~rnrrh and srizmr . is rrurinlly diiT<'rrnt from 
many ot hrr constitutional rights; ordinnril~r the e,·idrnre seized cnn 
in no wny have bern rrnclrrwl untrnst worthy by the means of its 
seizure and indeed oft en t hi~ evidence nlone est ablishrs beyond 
virtually any shadow of a doubt that the defendant is guilty." 
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evidence are strongest where the Government's unlawfui 
conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction 
on the victim of the search.7 
IV 
In deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule 
to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh the injury 
to the historic role and functions of the grand jury 
against the potential benefits of the rule as applied in 
this context. At the outset, it is evident that this ex~ 
tention of the exclusionary rule would seriously under-
~~----------~--cut the role of the grand jury. Because the 
grand jury does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence, 
7 The warrant requirement of the Fourth Amrndmrnt am1Iics even 
to administmti,·e srarchrs wherr the primary purpo~e of the govern-
mental intrusion is not to obtain evidence of criminal conduct by 
which to convict t hr ~earch Yictim. SPe Camara v. Municipal Court, 
387 U. S. 523, .530 (1967); See v. City of Seattle. 3 7 U. S. 541 
(1967). The rxrlusiomtr~· rule, however, has been applied to a 
more limited catrgor~· of ~ituntions. Standing to in\'oke the rule 
genernlly has been confinrd to crirninnl drfendantH, Alderman v. 
United States, supra. Cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 
supra; One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U. S. 693, 
702 (1965). 
In holding that the respondrnt had Htanding to invoke tllP rxclu-
sionary rule in t1 grnncl jur~· procePding~. tlw Court of Appeals relied 
on Rule 41 (e) of the Fedrral Rules of Criminal Procedme. Rule 
41 (e) prm·idr~, in reiP\'ant part, that "[a] per..;on nggrieved by an 
unlawful search and seizurp ma~r move the district court ... for 
return of the property :md to suppress for usc as evidence anything 
so obtained .... " It further states thnt "[t]he motion shall be 
made before trial or hPnring .... " We have recognized that Rule 
41 (c) is "no broader thnn tl1P constitutional rule." Alderman v. 
United Stales, 394 U. S., at 173, n. 6; Jones v. United States, 362 
U. S. 257 (1960). In the present rase, the Government docs not 
challenge the cou1i 's order dirPct ing return of the illegally-seized 
property to respondent. \Ve therefore ha\'e no occasion to consider 
whether the return order i:,; proper where, a~ here, it is made for 
the first time in the ~ of a grand jury proceeding. 
4n.h'(f 
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it has traditionally been allowed to pursue its investiga-
tive and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evi-
dentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a 
criminal trial. Permitting witnesses to invoke the ex-
clusionary rule before a grand jury would precipitate 
adjudication of issues hitherto reserved for the trial on 
the merits and occasion delay and disruption of grand 
jury proceedings. Suppression hearings would halt the 
orderly progress of an investigation and might necessi-
tate extended litigation of issues only tangentially related 
to· the grand jury's primary objective. The iHevitable o 
result would be "protracted interruptions of grand jury 
proceedings," Gelbard v. United States, 408 U. S. 71, 
70 (WHI'l'E, J., concurring), effectively transforming them 
into preliminary trials on the merits. In some cases the 
delay might be fatal to the enforcement of the criminal 
law.8 Just last Term we reaffirmed our disinclination to 
allow litigious interference with grand jury proceedings: 
"Any holding that would saddle the grand jury 
with mini-trials and preliminary showing would 
assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the 
public's interest in the fair and expeditious admin-
istration of the criminal law." United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U. 8.1, 17 (1973). 
Cf. United States v. Ryan, 4'02 U.S. 530 (1971); Cobble-
dick v. United States, 30!) U. S. 323 ( 1940). In sum, 
we believe that allowing a grand jury witness to invoke 
the exclusionary rule would interfere with the grand 
jury's effective and expeditious discharge of its duties. 
8 The force of this nrgumcnt i ~ well illu ~tratcd by the fact s of 
the prrsrnt case. A~ of the d:ite of this decision , ~ore thim two 
and one-half ~·car~ \\"ill h:~vc elapsed ,.:incc Calmidr:n wn ~ ~tnrunoned · 
to appear :~ncl te,.;tif~ · beforr the p;rnnd jury. If Calandra '~ testi-
mony waH vital to p;rnncl jur~· 's im·c,.;tiga1ion in August 1971 of 
rxtort ion:tte crrdit t rn n~a ct ions, it is po~~iblc that thi~ rwrticular: ' 
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Against this potential damage to the historic role and 
functions of the grand jury, we must weigh the benefits 
to be derived from this proposed extension of the ex-
clusionary rule. Suppressio11 of illegally-seized evidence 
from use against the search victim in a criminal trial 
is thought to be :it · met 1od of effectuating 
the Fourth Amendment right of privacy. But it does 
.not follow that that constitutional guarantee requires 
.adoption of every proposal that might deter police mis-
conduct. In Alderman v. United States, 394 U. S., at 
J. 7 4, this Court declined to extend the exclusionary rule 
to one .who was not the victim of the unlawful search.: 
"The deterrent values of preventing the incrimi-
nation of those whose rights the police have violated 
.have been considered sufficient to justify the sup-
·pression of probative evidence even though the case 
·against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. 
We adhere to that judgmei1t. But we are not con-
vinced that the additional benefits of extending the 
exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify 
further encroachment upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them 
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evi-
dence which exposes the truth." 
,We think this observation equally applicable in the 
present context. 
· Any incremental deterrent effect which might be 
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceed-
ings is uncertain at best. Whatcvorftl~~~~;:t:~;t:-\ 
vlith re&j3eet t9 exclusion of illegally-seized evidence from 
criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that applica-
tion of the rule to grand jury proceedings would sig-
nificantly affect police conduct. Such an extension would 
only deter police investigation consciously directed to-
ward the discovery of evidence solely for usc in a grand 
72-734-0l'Ir ION 
14 UNITED STATES v. CALANDRA 
jury investigation. The incentive to disregard the re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment in order to ob-
tain an indictment from a grand jury is substantially 
negated by the fact that the illegally-seized evidence 
would be inadmissible in a subsequent criminal prosecu-
tion of the search victim. We therefore decline to em-
brace a view that would achieve a speculative and un-
doubtedly minimal advance in the deterrence of police 
~iSC01_1duct at the expense. ou~~ VItiating the 
v 
Respondent also argues that each and every question 
based on evidence obtained from an illegal search and 
seizure constitutes a fresh and independent violation of 
the witness' constitutional rights. ~il , of course, 
a witness has no right of privacy before the grand jury. 
Absent some recognized privilege of confidentiality, every 
man owes his testimony. Blair v. United States, supra. 
He may invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination, but he may not decline to answer on 
the grounds that his responses might prove embarrassing 
or result in an unwelcome disclosure of his personal 
9 At ora.l argument, counsel for re.spondcn~tetl the e6~ 
~it to the Court that raeh que::;tion a~krd of the R<'!'pond~· 
ent before the grand jur~· . which qur~tion was only a;.:krd because 
of n past vi oint ion of t hr Fourth Amendment, f amounts to] a new, 
immediate violation of the Fourth Amenclm('l1t . . . . fA] question 
cleri1'ecl fmm n pnst violation, a question into the pri1·acy of the 
witneBs amounts to another intru~ion in violati(n1 of the Fourth 
Amenclmenl. 0 Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. 
"[R]efu~ing to answer a quei'lion in which the quest ion coneeiYably 




~k;f. '' : 
rise to ~ aclditiQ.!?al or nrw Four! h Amrudmrnt right to re~ist 
answrring that question because·· the quest ion . iti'df become[;; an ) 
additional intrusion .... '' Tr. of Oral Arg. 20: (~ ~ . 
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affairs. Respondent's claim must be, therefore, not 
merely that the grand jury's questions invade his privacy 
but that because those questions are based on illegally- c:..<-
obtained evidence, they somehow constitute distinct vio-
lations of his Fourth Amendment rights. We disagree. 
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent 
unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy 
of one's person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong ~-~ 
condemned is the unjnstified governmental invasion .. of/ L__ 
.. "areas of an individual's life~tabot~ which he entertaihs ' 
legitimat expectations of pnvacy.' United States v. ~---;:--
Robinson ~ U. S. -, - (1973) (PowELL, J., con~ 1 
curring). That wrong, in t 11s case, is fully 
accomplished by the original search without probable 
'cause. Grand jury questions based on evidence obtained 
thereby involve no independent governmental invasion 
'Of one's person, house, papers, or effects, but rather the 
usual abridgement of personal privacy common to all 
grand jury questioning. Questions based on illegally-
obtained evidence are only a derivative use of the product 
of a past unlawful search and seizure. They work no 
new wrong, Whether such derivative use of illegally-
obtained evidence by a grand jury should be proscribed 
presents a question not of rights but of remedies. 
In the usual context of a criminal trial, the defendant 
is entitled to suppress not only the fruits of an unlawful 
search and seizure but also any derivative use of that 
evidence, r..Hl..Q.4:)l:.G'ffil~t0fl-t}HA.e.~~~*H~"'"f'i:He-ffi'HS'Ih< 
reach such derivative use if it is to fulfill its function of 
detering police misconduct. In the context of a grand 
jury proceeding, we believe that the damage to that 
"' .. ~.~ institution from an extension of the exclusionary rule 
r,. ~-- ~--- outweigtis anYlincremental deterrent effect. That con-
------- elusion necessarily controls both the fruits of an unlawful 
search and seizure and any question or evidence derived 
72-734-0PINiON 
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therefrom.10 The same considerations of logic and policy 
apply to both the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure 
and derivative use of that evidence, and we do not dis .. 
tinguish between them.11 
10 It should br notre! that n grnnd jun· wi11WRR mn~· hnvo o1hcr 
remrdirs, of vnr~·ing rfTirnr~·. 1o rrdrrR~ thr injm~· to hi,; privncy 
and to prr,·rnt n fmthrr inv:tsion in 1 hr fu(lll'('. Tir mn~· br rntitlrd 
to maintnin n rn u~o of nrtion for cbmngr~ ngain~1 1hr offirrr:< who 
conducted 1 he nnlnwful srn rrh . Biv fns v. Si:r Unkown N amrd 
Agents of the Ji'rdeml Bureau of lnvrstigation. 403 U. S. 3Ril ( 1071). 
He rna~· also srrrk return of thr illrgn ll~· -sP i zrd proprr1~· . and rxclu-
sion of thr propPrt~· nnd itR fruit. from !wing u ~rd as Pvidcncr 
against him in a. rriminnl tr ial. Go-Bart Importing Co. v. Unitrd 
Stales, 2, 2 U. S. ::!44. In thrsr rirr11m~tnnrcs, we cnnnot sn ~· !hat 
sueh a. witne.:s is A'lcft remediless in tfie face ol nn unlnwlul sea rch 
and seizure. ~",..,...~"" 
11 ~nlm;M«l),_relirR primn rily on Silverthorne Lmnber Co. v. United 
Statrs. supra . In thnt rn~r, frdNnl offirN;: unlmvfull ~ · seizrd rertain 
documents h r longing 1o 1 hr Rih-rrt hornr;; nne! their lumber company 
and 11rr;:rntrd 1hrm to a grnncl jur~ · 1hn1 hnd alrcndy indicted thr 
Silvrrthornes. A distrirt court ordrrrd thr return of thr docu-
ment ;: but im]10t11ldrd pho1 ogrnphs and copirs of the originnls. 
Later , the pro~rcu1or cnusrd thr grnnd jur~· to i;:suc suh]10rnm; duces 
tecum to the Rih·rrthornrs to produre thr originnls, nnd their refusal 
to comply lrd to a contrmpt ritn! ion. In rrvrrsing the judgment, 
the Court hrld thnt 1hr suhporna" \\·rrr im·n lid brrause thry wrre 
basrd on knowlrdge oht ainrd from thr i ll Pgnll~· sri zed rvidence, ri! ing 
Weeks v. United States, supra. Mr . .Tusti cr Holmrs, writing for the 
Court , stated 1hn1 thr "rssenrr of the provision forbidding 1hc 
acquisition of e,·idrncp in n rrr!nin wny is not merrly that the 
evidrnco so ncquirrd ~ hnll not hr usrcl before the Court but that 
it shall not br used at nll." 251 U. S. at 392. 
Silverthorne is distinguiHhnble from the prr~ent rase in ~evrral 
re~prcts. Thrrr, 1hr Rilwrthorne;; had prrviousl ~· bren indic1rd by 
the gmnd jm~r and hnd standing to invokr the rxclusionnry ru le on 
~ ...u the bnsi~ of 1 hrir R1ntus ns rrimiml drfrndants. The Govrmment's 
...(/r- ------.1-n':"'te_r_e--:-RtArcraptming the originnl documents was obviously bnsed on 
~ belief 1hnt the~· might br u;;el'ul in a subsrqurnt pro~erution . Jndred , 
the funrtionnl ronsequrnrc of the court·~ dcci8ion wn s to exclude 
the evidence from the subsequent crimina!' trial. Furtlierinote, prior ' 
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The judgment of the Court <1Jf Appeals is 
·Reversed. 
to the issunn ce of the grnnd jury subpoenns there hnd been a judicial 
determination that the search and seizure was illegal. The Silvcr-
thorncs' claim was not rai ::;ed for the fir::;t time in pre-indictment 
motion to suppress. f\,1 r-es .._ &..."+ 
By contrast, in the instant rase Elalsf1 dl'l1 had not been indicted 
by the grand jury and wus not. a criminal defendant . Under tradi-
tional principles, he had no standing to invoke the exclusionary rule. 
The e!Tect of the Distri ct Court's order wa::; to deprive the grand 
jury of testimony it needrd to conduct its investigation . Last ly~ 
9ttltt,;J:t~~~1ion to suppress was made prior to indictment and 
required int erruption of the grand jury proceedings. In these cir-
cumstances, Silverthorne i · not eon trolling. To the extent that the 
Court's broad dictum might ~ di!Terent result in the present 
case, we decline to follow it. )-..___ 
&~~~~~ 
To: The Chief Just1ce 
Mr. Just .CL ; '\S 
Mr. <Tl'r; c ' ' 
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I 
l 1 nited States_, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of Ap-
, .John P Calandra. peals for the Sixth Circuit. 
[ Dt->cember -, 19731 
Mu JusTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court, 
Th1s case presents the question whether a witness 
summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury 
may refuse to answer questions on the ground that they 
are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search 
and seizure. This issue is of considerable importance to 
the administration of criminal justict>, 
I 
On December 11, 1970, federal agents obtained a 
warrant authorizing a search of respondent John Calan-
dra's place of business, the Royal Machine and Tool 
Company in Cleveland, Ohio. The warrant was issued 
in connection with an extensive investigation of sus-
pected illegal gambling operations. It specified that the 
object of the search was the discovery and seizure of 
bookrnakmg rPcorcls and wagering paraphenalia. A 
master affidavit submitted in support of the application 
for the warrant contained information derived from state-
ments by confidential informants to the Federal Bureau 
Qf Investigation (FBI) . from physical surveillance con-· 
2 t•N"ITED 8TATES 1• CALANDHA ,, 
rlucted by FBI agents. and from court-authorized elec· 
tromc surveilla11cc.' 
The Royal Machine and Tool Company occupies a 
two-story building. The first floor consists of about 
13,000 square feet and houses industrial machinery and 
inventory. The second floor contains a general office 
area of about 1.500 square feet and a small office occupied 
hy Calandra, president of the company, and his secretary. 
On December 15, 1970, federal agents executed the war-
rallt directed at Calandra's placr of busuwss and con-
ducted a thorough four-hour search of the premises. The 
record rrveals that the agents spent more than three 
hours searching Calaudra's office and files. 
Although the agents found 110 gambling paraphernalia, 
one discovered, among certain promissory notes, a card 
indicating that Dr. Walter Loveland had been making 
perwdic payments to Calandra. The agent stated in an 
affidavit that he was aware that the United 8tates Attor-
ney's office for the Northern District of Ohio was inves-
tigating possible violations of 1R P. S. C. ~~ 8Q2, 893, 
and 804, dealing with extort.ionatc credit transactions, and 
that Dr. Loveland had been the victim of a "loanshark-
lllg" enterprise thru under investigation. The agent 
roncluded that the card bearing Dr. Loveland's name 
was a loansharking record and therefore had it seized 
along with various otlwr items. including books and 
records of the company. stock certificates, and address 
hooks. 
On March 1. 1!:171. a special grand JUry convened in 
the Northern District of Ohio to investigate possible 
loansharking activities in violation of federal laws. The 
1 On tiH' ha~t ~-> of thr ~am<· al!idavJt, f<'d<'ral ag<'nt~ abo obtained' 
warrnnt:-; authortziug ~<·arriJPH of Calandra '~ rr~ tdrurt> and auto-
lllobt!<' . Thr pm;mt ea~P tnvolvr>< onlY tlw se>arrh of tlw Hoyal 
~laehut<' and Tool Compan~ . 
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grand .1 ury subpoenaed Calandra m order to ask him 
questions based on the evidence seh:ed during the search 
of his place of business on December 15, 1970. Calandra 
appeared before the grand jury on August 17, 1971, but 
refused to testify, mvoking his Fifth Amendment privi-
leged against self-incrimination. The Government then 
req l.lested the District Court to grant Calandra trans-
actional immunity pursuant to 18 U. 8. C. § 2514. 
Calandra requested and received a postponement of the 
hearing on the Government's application for the immu-
nity order so that he could prepare a motion to suppress 
the Pviclence seized in the search. 
Calandra then moved pursuant to Rule 41 (e) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for suppression and 
return of the seized evidence on the grounds that the 
affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient aud that 
the seE~-rch exceeded the scope of the warrant. 011 
August 27, the pistrict Court held a hearing at which 
Calandra stipulated that he would refuse to answer 
questwns based on the seized materials. On October 1.. 
the District Court entered its judgment ordering the 
f•vidPnce suppressed and returned to Calandra and fur-
ther ordering that Calandra need not answer any of the 
grand Jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence. 
332 F ~upp. 737 (1971). The court stated that "due 
process . . allows a witness to litigate the question 
whether the evidence which constitutes the basis for the 
questions asked of him before the grand jury has been 
obta111ed 111 a way which violates the constitutional pro-
tectiOn agawst unlawful search and seizure.·· 332 F . 
~upp., at 742. The court found that the search warrant 
had been issued without probable cause and that the 
search had exceeded the scope of th e warrant. 
The Court of Appeals for the :-lixth Circuit affirmed, 
465 F . 2d 1218 (1972). holding that the District Court 
l) ·ad properly Pnt~rtanu=-d thP suppression motion and 
< • 
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that the excluswnary rulr may be mvoked by a wituess 
beforP th<" grand .1 ury to bar questioning based on evi-
dence obtainPd in an unlawful search and seizure." The 
offer to grant Calandra unmunity was deemed irrelevant. 
465 F 2d, at 1221. 
We granted the Government's petitwu for certiorari, 
-- l' H - ( J!.l7:3 l \V r I lOW rrverse. 
1T 
ThP Jnstitutwn of the grand jury is deeply rooted in 
A11glo-American history." ln England, the grand jury 
served for centunes both as a body of accusers sworn 
to chscover and present for trial persons suspected of 
criminal wrongdoiug and as a protector of citizens against 
arbitrary and oppressive governmental action. In this 
country the Founders thought the grand Jury so essential 
to basic liberties that they provided in the Fifth Amend-
ment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only 
he mstituted by "a pres€~ntment or indictment of a grand 
JUry Costello \' . United States, 350 U. S. 359, 361-362 
(1956 ). The grand JUry's historic functions survive to 
this day. Its responsibility in our constitutional frame-
work includes both the determination whether there is 
probable causf' to believe a crime has been committed 
and the protrction of citizens against unfounded criminal 
2 Tho Court of AppPal~ affirmed the Dt~t net Court ';; finding that 
f lw search of Calandra':-; lntsine:-;~ anrl ~eiznre of hi;; proprrty was 
unlawful Although thP Gon-rnment do(',.; not agree with thr court';; 
finding, tt ha~ not ~ought rPviPw of t Ju,.; I$i:iUC 
a For a di;;cussion of t hr lw.;tory and role of t hP grand jury, see 
fosteflo ' l 111ited 8tates, 350 P . S. :35!:1, :31il-311:2 (1956); Blair ,._ 
l 'nited State~. 250 ll S. 27:l, 279-21\:3 (1919); Hale v Henkel, 201 
! ' ::3 4:3, 59 (1901>) . -t Blark~tollf" C'ommC'ntanP~ :l01 et seq.; G. Ed-
ward:;, TIH• <:rand .Jury 1-44 (1901)), 1 F Pollock nnd F . Maitlnnd, 
Ht~tory of Englt~h Law liH (2d C'd. 1909) ; l W. Holc!Kworth , Hi;;tory 
nl Eng:h~h Law :n2- :r2.:3 17th rPv rd ~95fil. 
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prosecutwns. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 686-
687 (197:2) . 
Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide 
latitude to mquire into violations of criminal law. No 
JUdge presides to monitor its proceedings:' It deliberates 
Ill secret and may determine alone the course of its 
1nquiry. ThP grand jury may compel the production of 
evidence or th<> testimony of witnesses as it considers 
appropriate. and its operation generally is unrestrained 
by thP technical procedural and evidentiary rules govern~ 
mg the conduct of criminal trials. "It is a grand inquest, 
a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the 
scope of whose inquiry is not to b<> limited by doubts 
whether any particular individual will be properly sub-
.iect to an accusation of crime." Blair ' '· United States, 
:250 r . s. 273. 282 1 1919) 
The scope of the grand Jury's powe!S reflects 1ts special 
role m insuring fair and effective law enforcement. A 
gra1H.l Jury proceeding IS not an adversary hearing in 
which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudi-
cated. Rather, 1t IS an e.r parte investigation to determine 
whet,her a crime has been committed and whether 
rnminal proceedings should be mstituted against any 
rwrson . The grand ,jury's investigative power must be 
broad if Jts public responsibility is adequately to be dis-
charged. Branzbury v Hayes, supra, Costello v. United 
8tates , supra 
· Tlw grand .Jllr~ , ol rour:::<· . i ~ ,;ub.wrt to lh<' court 's ~uprrvision 
in ~ev<'ral resp<>rt ~. Srr /3rotNl v. l'uited States, ;359 U. S. 41, 49 
(Hl59) . Hule:; Ha nd 17, Fed Hul <' Crun. Proc., L. Orfkld. Cnmmal 
Procrdurr Under the Federal HttiP;;, 475-477 (19()()). In particulnr, 
IIH· grand Jltry mu~t rrly 011 the court io comprl produrt1on of 
hlloh, 1>11Jl<•r,.; , document~ . and tiH' trHtunon.v of Wltn(>::<~r~. and tlw 
<·ourt ma~ qua;;h or mod1f~ a subpoena on moti011 if compliance 
\V(HIId br ·· unrra~onnhlP or opprr"'"lV<' " Hulf' 17 (r) , Fed . Hule 
ll rim. P1 111, 
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lu 8ra11zburg, the Court had uccaSIOil to reaffirm the 
un portance of thP grand jury's rolf'. 
" [T]he mvestigat10n of crime by a grand jury imple-
ments a fundamental governmental role of secur-
ing the safety of the person and the property of the 
Citizen .. " 408 U. 8., at 700. 
"The role of the grand Jury as an important 
instrument of effective law enforcement necessarily 
lllcludes au investigative function with respect to 
determinmg whether a crime has been committed 
and who committed it . . 'When the grand jury 
is performing Its investigatory function into a gen-
Pral problem area ... society's interest is best served 
by a thorough and extensive Investigation.' Wood 
v Georgia, 370 r . ~. 375, 392 (1962). A grand 
jury mvestigatwn 'is not fully carried out until 
Pvery available clue has been run down and all w1t-
11esses examined in a proper way to find if a crime 
has been conumtted.' United States v. Stone, 429 
F. 2d 138, 140 ( CA2 1970). Such an investigation 
may be triggered by tips, rumors, evidence proferred 
by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the 
grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S., 
at 362. It is only after the grand jury has examined 
the evidence that a determination of whether the 
proct>edi11g will result in an indictment can be 
tnadP !d., at 701 
The grand .1 ury's sources of Information are widely 
drawn, aud thf' validity of an mdictment is not affected 
by the character of the evidence considered. Thus, an 
mdictmeut valid on Its face is not subject to challenge 
on thf' ground that the grand .1 ury acted on the basis of 
madequate or incompetent evid('nce, Costello v. United 
States, supra. Holt \', United States, 218 U. 8. 245 
I HllO); or even on thr basiR of information obtained in 
"tt •I 
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Lu Hra11zburg, the Court had occaSlOJl to reaffirm the 
importance of the grand JUry's rok. 
:c [ 1'] h<~ m vestigatwn of crime by a grand jury imple~ 
meuts a fundamental governmental role of secur-
rng the sa-fety of thP person and the property of the 
crttzen , .. ' 408 P. S., at 700. 
' 'The role of thC' grand .1 ury as all important 
instrument of effective law enforcement necessarily 
tnoludes au investigative function with respect to 
determinmg whether a crime has been committed 
and who committed it . . 'When the grand jury 
ts performing tts investigatory function into a gen-
Pral problem area ... society's interest is best served 
by a thorough and extensive investigation.' Wood 
" Georgia, 370 P. S. 375. 392 ( 1962). A grand 
,lury mvestigattotl 'is not fully carried out until 
c>very available clue has been run down and all wit-
nesses examined in a proper way to fiud if a crime 
has bee11 committed.' United States v. Stone, 429 
F. 2d 138, 140 ( CA2 1970). Such an investigation 
may be triggered by ttps, rumors, evidencr proferred 
by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the 
grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S., 
at 362. It is only after the grand jury has examined 
the evidE'nce that a determination of whether the 
proceeding will result in au indictment can be 
tnacl<' !d., at 701 
The grand jury's sources of mformatiOn are wtdely 
drawn, and thE' validity of an indictment is not affected 
by the character of the evidence considered. Thus, an 
· mdictmcnt valid on Its face is uot subject to challenge 
on the ground that the grand .1 ury acted on the basis of 
madequate or incompE'tent evidence, Costello v. United 
States, supra . Holt \', United &ates, 218 U. ~. 245 
( HllO), or evf'n on the basis of inforlllation obtained in 
' .. 
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violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination. United States v. Lawn, 355 
P . S. 33H ( 1958) . 
The power of tlw Government to compel persons to 
appear and testify before a grand jury is also firmly 
estabhshed. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U. S. 441 
( 1 1:)72) . The duty to testify has long been recognized 
as a basic obligation that every citizen owes his Govern-
ment. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 
(1932); United States Y. Bryan, 339 U. ~. 323.331 (1950). 
Ju Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S .. at 688, the Court 
noted that "l c] itizeus generally are not immune from 
grand jury subpoenas ... and that "the longstanding 
·princ1plr that 'the public has a right to everyman 's 
ev1deucp ' IS particularly applicable to grand jury 
proceedings." The duty to testify may on occasion be 
burdensome and C'Ven embarrassing. It may cause injury 
to a witness' social and econonuc status. Yet the duty 
to testify has been regarded as "so uecessary to the 
adminis~ration of JUStice" that the witness' personal 
Interest 111 privacy must yield to the public's overriding 
mterest in full disclosure. Blair v. United States, 250 
l'. S .. at 281. Furthermore, a Witness may not interfere 
w1th the course of the grand jury's inquiry. He "is not 
rntitled to urge objections of incompetency or irrelevancy, 
such as a party might raise. for this is no concern of his." 
/d., at 282. Nor is he entitled "to challenge the author-
Ity of the Court or the grand JUry" or "to set limits to 
the 111 vest1gatwn that the grand Jury may conduct." 
lbtd. 
Of coursP, the grand JUry's subpoena power is not 
unlimited It may consider incompetent evidence, but 
It may not itself violate a valid privilege. whether 
established by the Constitution, statutes. or the com-
mon law Rrnnzbury \ Hayes, supra; United States. 
·.I 
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Y Bryan, supra; Blackmer v. United States, supra; s· 
J. Wigmore, Evitlence, ~~ 2290-2391 (McNaughton rev. 
1961). When the grand jury itself threatens to cop1mit 
a wrong, it may be restrained. Although, for example, an 
indictment based on evidence obtained in violatio11 of 
a defendant 's Fifth Amendment privilege 1s nevertheless 
valid. United States \'. Law11, supra, the grand jury 
may not force a witness to answer q uestious in violation 
of that constitutional guarantee. Rather, the grand jury 
may override a Fifth Amendment claim only if the wit-
ness 1s granted immumty co-extensive with the privilege 
agalllst self-mcnminatwn. Kastigar v. United States, 
S'upra. Similarly, a grand JUry may not compel a person 
to produce books and papers that would incriminate him .. 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. 8. 616, 633- 635 (1886). 
Cf. Couch v. Umted States, 409 U. S. 322 ( 1973). The 
grand ,1ury is also without power to invade a legitimate 
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Arnendment. 
A grand jury's subpoena duces lecum will be disallowed 
Jf it is "far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'' Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U. S. 43. 76 ( 1906). And presumably grand 
jurors who themselves threaten to conduct an illegal 
search may be restrained like any others. Judicial inter-
vcntion is appropriate in such cases because it may pre-
vent the wrong bPfore it occurs,. 
TTl 
ln the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that 
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment also 
limits the . grand ·jury's power to compel a witness to 
answer questions based on evidence obtained from an 
unlawful search and seizure. The exclusionary rule was 
adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of 
all citizens " to be secure in their houses, papers, and 
~ffects. against unreasonab]P searches and seizures . . . ,' '' 
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y Bryan, supra; Blackmer v. United States, supra; 8 
.T. Wigmore, Evidence, ~~ 22!10-2391 (McNaughton rev. 
1961 ). When the grand jury itself threatens to CO)Umit 
a wrong, it may be restrained. Although, for example, an 
indictment based on evidence obtained in violation of 
a defendant 's Fifth Amendment privilege 1s uevertheless 
valid, United States ,. . Lawn, supra, the grand jury 
rnay not force a witness to answer questions in violation 
of that COllstitutional guarantee. Rather, the grand jury 
may override a Fifth Amendment claim only if the wit-
ness 1s granted 1mmumty co-extensive with the privilege 
agamst self-mcruninat1011. Kastigar v. United States, 
supra. Similarly, a grand JUry may not compel a person 
~o produce books and papers that would incriminate him .. 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. 8. 616, 633-635 (1886). 
Cf. Couch v. Umted States, 4ml U. S. 322 (1973). The 
grand JUry is also without power to invade a legitimate· 
privacy iuterest protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
A grand jury's subpoena duces tecum will be disallowed 
if it is "far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'' Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906). And presumably grand 
jurors who themselves threaten to conduct an illegal 
search may be restrained like any others. Judicial inter-
vention is appropriate in such cases because it may pre-
vent thP wrong before it occurt'o. 
Til 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that 
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment also 
limits the . grand · jury's power to compel a witness to 
answer questions based on evidence obtained from an 
unlawful search and seizure.. The exclusionary rule was 
adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of 
all citizens "to be secure in their houses, papers, and 
E)ffeets. against. unrc>asonab}P searches and seizures . . . ,., 
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Linder this rule. evidence obtained iu violation of the 
Fourth Amendment cannot he used in a criminal pro-
creding against the victim of the illegal search and sei-:-
zure. Weeks v. United States, 232 r. ~. 383 ( 1914); 
Mapp v. Ohio, 307 P. ~. 643 ( 1961). This prohibition 
applirs as well to the fruits of the illegally seized evi-
dence. Woll(J Sun v. U 11ited States, 371 U. S. 471 ( 1963); 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 
( 1 920) . 
The purpose of the exclusiOnary rule is not to redress 
·Lhe ll1JUry to the privacy of tlw search victim : 
" [T Jhe ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and 
effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too 
late." Linkletter \' Walker, 381 lT . S. 618, 637 
(1965) . 
Instead, the rule 1s designecl to deter future unlawful 
police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee 
of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search 
and seizures 
" The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. 
[ ts purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail-
able way- by removing the incentive to disregard 
tt.'' Elki11s v. (Tnited States, 364 U. S. 206, 217 
( 1D60) . 
Accord. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 656 (1961); Tehan 
v. United States, ex rel. Shot, 382 U. S. 406, 416 ( 1966); 
Terry v. Ohw, 392 lJ. S. 1, 29 (1968) . In sum, the rule. 
is a judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent 
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the 
party aggrieved ' 
' Tlwre t:> :somP ch~agrC'l'llll'lll a~ to 1 he practtcal efficacy of the 
(''\cht~touary rult•, and"~ tlw Court uot<'d in Elkin.~\' , United States, 
72-734-0PU~TON 
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Despite its broad deterreut purpose, the exclusionary 
i·ul<> has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of 
illegally-sei~ed evidence m all proceedings or against all 
perso'ns. As with any remedial device, the application 
of the rule has been restricted to those areas where 
Its renw(·lial ob:J<'Ctives are thought most efficaciously 
serve(L The balancing process implicit in this approach 
1:-; expressed in th<> oontours of the stanuing require-
ment. Thus. standing to invoke the exclusionary rule 
has been confined to situations where the Govern-
ment seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the 
victim of the unlawful search. Brow'// v. United States, 
411 C. S. 22~ ( 1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 
U. :-5. 165 ( 1969); Woug Sun v. United States, supra; 
Jones v. United States, 362 C. S. 257 (1960). This 
standing rule is premised on a recognition that the need 
for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the 
t>v1dence are strongest where the Government's unlawful 
conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction 
on the victim of the search " 
,{()4 C. S. :!Oti. 21!-. (1!:JliU), relevant •·[e]mpmral ~tat1~tic!; III'P not 
avadaulr. ' Ct. Oak~. Stud)·mg thr Exclmnonary Rulr 111 Search 
and 8c•Jzun•, :37 lJ Ch1. L. Hev. ()()5 (1970). Wr have no occa~:~ion 
lll tlw pre~ent ('H~e to ronHtder the Pxtent of tlw rule'~ efficacy in 
('l'llllllla I t rwl~ 
11 ln holdmg that tlw n•~:~poudrnt had oti!nding to invokl' the Pxclu-
;.;wnary rul(• m a grand Jlll')' procerchng:<, the Court of Appeab relied 
on Hule 41 (P) of tlw Frdrral Hub of Crnninal ProcPdure. Rule 
41 (e) providE'ti , Ill rPi<'VH nt part, that "r a] per~Oll aggripved by an 
unlawful ~earch and ::;rJzurr ma)· mov(• thr d1~triet court ... for 
return of the Jll'Operty and to ~liJl]lfPI':> for U~(' Itt' Pvit\Pnce anything· 
so obtauwd. lt furtlwr HtntrH that " I tjlw motion ~hall be 
madP brforP tr~al or h<'al'lng. . '' We have rPrognized that Rule-
41 (r) tH ''no broad<•r tlwn the cou~tllutwnal rulE'." Alderman v. 
( 'mted Stateo•', :3!:.14 ll . S .. at li:~. n. G; Jones v. ( 'mted States, :362· 
l'.. H 2!'>i ( 19!)0) Smc<· the OoV!'qmwnt ha~ not C'hnllengcct the 
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In deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule 
to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh the potential 
injury to the historic role and functions of the grand 
jury against the potential benefits of the rule as ap-
plied in this context. lt is evident that this exten-
tion of the exclusionary rule would seriously undercut 
the role of the grand JUry. Because the grand jury 
does not finally adjudicate gt1ilt or innocence, it has 
traditionally been allowed to pursue its investigative 
and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evi· 
dentiary and procedural restrictions applicable to a 
crirninal trial. Permitting witnesses to invoke the ex-
clusionary rule before a grand jury would precipitate 
adjudication of issues hitherto reserved for the trial on 
the merits and occasion delay and disruption of grand 
Jury proceedings. Suppression hearings would halt the 
orderly progress of an investigation and might necessi-
tate extended litigatiou of issues only tangentially related 
to the grand jury's primary obJective.' Tho probable 
result would be "protracted interruptions of grand jury 
proceedings," Gelbard v. United States, 408 C. S. 41, 70 
(1972) (WHITE. J.. concurring). effectively transforming 
Dtst rirt Court ':,; ordrr c!Jrert mg rrt\ll'n of t lw illcgally-:;eizrd proprrty 
to respondrnt, we do not n•arh that I~::iUt' . 
Tlw Court of Appral~ al:;o found I hat I hr Gowrnmc·nt 's offrr of 
immumt ~· undrr 18 ll . 8. C. § 2514 wa~> im-lr~nnt to rrspondrne~ 
"tanc!tng to mvokt> tlw exelu~wnary rule. W(• ~with that dP-
tcrmmatwn for thp rpa,;ons ~!ftted m Part~ III, IV, and V of this 
opimon. 
· Thr fo1w of tht~ nrgumrnt i:; W<:'ll Illustruted by the facts of 
tlH• prPsPnt. cas('. A~ of the dntr of thtl' drcision, more than two ~ _ .-.u_L...d 
·uHI one-half yt>nr:; will havr t>lapsPd ~ince Gnl~tnelat'"~:a;' summoned
io appear and tP:;tli\ bd'on' thr grand Jury . If E:nlm:tl :n"'S""fesh-
mon.\· waK vttal to grand Jury ':; mvr.;;tigatwu :n Augu~t. . 1971 of 
nxtort wnnte rrPdtt t rnn~art wn~, 11 ::; po~::;iblr that this particular 
i.I.JVP::;ttga t 1011 h<I~'- bPt>ti eomplPtrly fn~~~ rat PeL 
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them wto preliminary trials on the merits. In some 
cases the delay might be fatal to the enforcement of the 
criminal law. Just last Term we reaffirmed our disin-
clination to allow litigious interference with grand jury 
proceedings : 
" Any holding that would saddle the grand jury 
with mini-trials and preliminary showing would 
assuredly impede its investigation and frustq:tte the 
public's interest in the fair and expeditious admin-
1Stration of the criminal law.'' United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 P. S.l. 17 (1973) . 
Cf. Uuited States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 ( 1971); Cobble-
dick v United States, aon U. S. 323 ( 1940). In sum, 
we belirve that allowing a grand jury witness to invoke 
the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the 
t'ffective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury's 
duties. 
Against this potential damage to the role and func-
tiOns of the grant! jury, we must weigh the benefits to 
be derived from this proposed extension of the exclu-
sionary rule. Suppression of the use of illegally-seizeq 
evidence against the search victim in a criminal trial 
is thought to be an important method of effectuating 
the Fourth Amendment. But it does not follow that the 
Fourth Amendment requires adoption of every proposal 
that might deter police misconduct. In Alderman v. 
United States, 304 U. S .. at 174. for example, this Court 
declined to extend the exclusionary rule to one who was 
not the victim of the unlavv·ful search : 
"Thr dett>rrent values of preventing the incrimi-
nation of those whose rights the police have violated 
havr been eonsiderPd sufficient to justify the sup-
pression of probativr evidence even though the case 
agamst tlw defendant is weakened or destroyed, 
l'NITED HTATr•;S u. CALA~DHA 1~ 
\Yf' adlwre to that .Judgment. But we are not con-
vinced that the additional benefits of extending the 
exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify 
further encroachment upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime and having the~n 
acq11itted or convicted on the basis of all the evi· 
dellCC' which C'Xj)OSeS the truth.'' 
\VP think this observation equally applicable in the 
present context. 
Any incremental det('rrent effect which might be 
achieved by extending the rule to grand jury proceed-
mgs is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrent effect h1ay 
rcsul t from the exclusion of illegally-seized evidence fron1 
criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that applica-
tion of the rule to grand jury proceediugs would sig-
tufican tly affect police conduct. Such an extension would 
deter only police investigation cousciously directed to-
ward tlw discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand 
jury investigation. The incentive to disregard the re-
quirement of the Fourth Amendment in order to ob-
tain an indictment from a grand jury is substa11tially 
negated by the inadmissibility of the illegally-seized evi-
dence i 11 a subsequent criminal prosecution of the search 
v1ctun. For the most part, a prosecutor would be un-
likely to request an indictment where a ~lltteetK!,~ Ct~NV; c.l1 ~~ 
not be obtained. \Ye therefore decline to embrace a 
view that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly 
minimal advancf' in the deterrence of police misconduct 
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of the 
grand JUry.' 
'R<·~pondem rl'IIC'~ prnnanl~· on 81/vrrthurne Lu111b1'1' Cu. v. Uuitrd 
Stat.-&, :l51 l i. 8. :~b5 (1920) . In ilwt caoC>, fedC>rnl oJ!irn~ unlawfully 
Hl' IZNI cPrl n Ill dorumPJlt,.; I>Plonp;mg 1 o 1iw Sli vC>rthorne~ and the1r 
lumbt•r eompan.\' and prC>,;PntPd 1lwm loa grand .iur.\· that hnd nlrC>ndy 
mc(lrt<'d t lw 81! vPrl horn<'>- , A \ll :> l nrt r·otJrt urd<'r<'d t hr I'<' I urn of the-
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RPspondent also argues that each and every question 
based on evidencC' obtained from an illegal search and 
seizure constitutes a fresh and iudependent violation of 
documpnl,.: but Impounded photogmph,.: and eopir" of thr original:;. 
Lat PI'. t h<> pro~rcu tor r:tll~<'tl t lw gmnd jury I o i~,.:ur subpoena:; d'Uces 
tecum to the SIIv<·rt horne:< to proclucp the original::<, and their refu:;a ] 
to romp]~· k•d to a contempt citation. In rrver;,;ing thr judgment, 
the Court held t hnt 11H· HubpoPtHI>' \\'<•re invalid hP<·au~c· they wcrr 
ba~Pd on knowledgP obtuinPd from tlw ilkgall~· ~<'i~rd PvidenrP, citing 
Weeks\'. United 8tates, supra. :\[r. .l11~iiee I-Iohrws. writing for the 
Co11rt. HI n 1 ed 1 ha 1 tlw "P>'>"l'll<'C of t lw provi,.:iou forbidding t hr 
acqut>'Jtion of p,·iden<·<' in a errtain wa~· i" not !TH'r<·l~· that tho 
evHlPncc HO acq11ired ,.:h;tl] not bP used before thr Court but that 
II· ~h;tll not br used at all." 251 U. S. at 392. 
Silverthome is distingui:;habiP from the pre~·Jtt ca~c· in :<everal 
re:>]Wd:;. Tllf'rP, thl' Sih·Nthornes had prrviou:;ly been indieted by 
the grand jur~· ;md mm.. . ..,..,nuiin~ tt~ofri'Vokr the Pxclu:;ionary rule im 
tho basi~ of thrir :,;tatu,.; a~ crimtnal drfendant;,;. Tllf' Government's· 
mtpre~t in reeaptunng the onginal docum<•nt~ wn~ obviou~ly hn:;ed on 
a belief that thry might br usrful in a rrim\nal pm~rcutinn. Indrrd, 
t hr pnma ry eon,;rquc·nce of 1 hr Court·~ dPei:;ion wa;; 1 o <·xclud<' 
the Pvidener from the ~;ub~rqtH'lll crimina I 1 rinl. Fmt hennore,,JJI'ior· 
to tlw l:s.,;wtner of the grand jur~· ~ubpoma:> tlwrr had bPen a judicial 
d.rt <•rrnina tion that t h < · .,;rarch and "<'i~urr wa~ illeg;a!. The Silver-
thorne:;' claim wa~ not raisPcl for the fin;t tinw ilt pre-indictment 
motion to supprr:-:,~. 
By contrast, in the im:tant ea::;<' rr::;pondent hnd not brrn utdieted 
by the grand jury and wn:; not a eriminnl defendant. Under tracli-. 
11onal prtneiple::;, lw h·td no :;tanding; to invoke tlw rxelusionary rulo. 
The effeet of the D tHtrirt Court'"' ordrr wa" to dqll·i,·e thr grnnd 
Jllr~· of tr,.;IJmou~ · it nredrd to conduet its invc>:stigntion. La,;tl~·. 
rr::;poncl<•nt '"' motion o supprr::<s wa" made prior 1 o indictmrnt a net 
rrquired intc>rruptioJ 1 of thr grand jm~· proccwlings. In thrse cir-
eum:::tancr:;. 8ilverth C•l'lll! Jli not controlling. To the t•xt rnt that the· 
Court's broad dJelul1J might be eon:st rued to :suggr:;t n diffPrrnt re-
sult 111 tlw pre::;rnt c a:,;e, we noll' that 11 has lw<·n "ubstantlally undt·r· 
minrd by lat<•r rase:; Sec Part~; Ill :mel IV of 1 hi~ opinion. 
,, 
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the witness' constitutional rights ." Ordinarily, of course, 
a witness has no right of privacy before the grand jury. 
Absent some recognized privilege of confidentiality, every 
man owes his testimony. He may invoke his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, but he 
may not decline to answer on the grounds that his 
r·esponses might prove ~mbarrassing or result in an un-
welcome disclosure of his personal affairs. Blair v. United 
States, supra. Respondent's ' claim must be, therefore, 
not merely that the grand jury's questions invade his 
privacy but that because those questions are based on 
illegally-obtained evidence, they somehow constitute dis-
tinct violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. We 
disagree. 
The purpose of the .fourth Amendment is to prevent 
unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy 
of one's person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong 
condemned is the unjustified governmental invasion of 
these areas of an individual's life. That wrong, commit-
ted in this case, IS fully accomplished by the original 
search without probable cause. Grand jury questions 
based on evidence obtained thereby involve no independ-
ent governmental invasion of one's person, house, papers, 
" At oral argument, coun~el for respondent ::;tated tho contention 
a;; follows · 
' 1 oubm1t to tlw Court that each questiOn aoked of the Reopond-
ent before thr grnnd jur~,., whirh que::;tion wno only asked because 
of H pa~>t violation of the Fourth Amendment, fnmounts to] u new, 
Immediate violatiOn of the Fourth Amendment . . . . [A] question 
cjerived from a pa~t violatiOn, 11 question into the privacy of the 
wttne~>o amo~mto to another intrusion in vwlatwn of the Fourth 
Amendment.'' Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. 
'' I H] efu"mg to answer a que::;tion tn which the question conceivably 
i:> <ienved from a past violation of the Fourth Amenchnent, gives 
rise ro an ndditiOIJill or nrw Fourth Amendment right to resist 
nhswenng that qu<'~twn because the que~tion itself becomes an 
addlttonal mmuswn ••• : Tr. of Oral Arg. 20. 
,, . 
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or effects, but rather th<> usual abridgement of personal 
privacy common to all grand jury questioning. Ques-
tions based 011 illegally-obtained evidence arc o1lly a 
derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search 
and seiwre. Tlwy work 110 new wrong. Whether such 
derivative usc of illegally-obtained evidence by a grand 
Jury should be proscribed presents a question not of 
rights but of remedies. 
ln the usual context of a criminal trial, the defendant 
is entitled to suppress not only the fruits of an unlawful 
search and seizun' but also any derivative usc of that 
evidence. The prohibition of the exclusionary rule must 
reach such derivative use if it is to fulfill its function of 
deterring police misconduct. In the context of a grand 
JUry proceeding, we bPlieve that the damage to that 
institution from an extension of the exclusionary rule out-
weighs any possibl<> incremental deterrent effect. The con-
clusion necessarily controls both the fruits of an unlawful 
search ancl seizure and any question or <'vidence derived 
therefrom.10 The same considerations of logic and policy 
apply to both the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure 
and derivative use of that evidence, and we do not dis-
tinguish between them. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
10 H ~hould br notPd that, rven nbsPnf tlw <•xl'lu,;wn:tr.l· rule, a 
~rand jm~· witnrs,; ma~· hav<• othrr n·tnPdi(·~ to rPdrr~s tlw injury to 
hi,.; pnvaf·~- and to prrwnt n futihN tnvn;,;ion in tiH• f'nlurr. Hr ma.1· 
br entitlrd to mamlain a cau:;c of :tl'lion for d:tma~r" a~ains1 11w 
o!lierr;,; who conductrd th<· unlawful ;;parch . Bivl!118 \'. Si.~: U11knvw11 
Named Age'llts of thl' Federal Bureau of hwl'stioatiou, 40:~ U. R. :~Rt' 
(1971) . Hr may nl~o ~<'<'k rrtum of thr iiiPg;nll~·-~piz('d proprrt~·, 
:111d exeluswn of the prop<-' l'l)' and its fruit>' from IH'mg u~Pd n~ <•vi-
ct<'ll<'<' ng;atn~t hun m n cnmmal trial. Go-Bal'l lm]Jorting Co. \'. 
Cmted otate~;, :21-12 U. S. :3+4. In tlw~r cireurn~tunr·P~. we> rannol ~ny 
that ~uelt a wttnP~~ Jt< necp~ .-mrily ldt rrmeclilr:<~ in tlw facr of nn 
unlawful ~rarch and sr1wn•, 
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rnited States, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v United States Court of Ap-
, .fohn P Calandra. peals for the Sixth Circuit. 
[ Der.ernber -, 19731 
MH Jm:mcE PowELL delivered the opinion of the 
Court, 
Th1s case presents the questwn whether a witness 
summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury 
may refuse to answer questions on the ground that they 
are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search 
and seizure. This issue is of considerable importance to 
the administration of criminal justicP, 
I 
On December 11, 1970, federa.l agents obtained a 
warrallt authorizing a search of respondent 'John Calan-
dra's place of busmess, the Royal Machine and Tool 
Company in Cleveland, Ohio. The warrant was issued 
111 connection with an extensive investigation of sus-
pected illegal gambling operations. It specified that the 
object of the search was the discovery and seizure of 
hookmakmg records and wagering paraphenalia. A 
master affidav1t submitted in support of the application 
for the warrant contained information derived from state-
ments by confidential informants to the Federal Bureau 
Qf Investigation ( FBJ ), from physical surveillance con-
t·NTTED STATES 1• CALANDHA 
rlucted by FBI agents. and from court-authorized elec~ 
tromc surveillattcc. ' 
The Royal Machine and Tool Company occupies a 
two-story building. The first floor consists of about 
1:3,000 square feet and houses industrial n1achinery and 
inventory . Tht> second floor contams a general office 
area of about 1,500 square feet and a small office occupied 
hy Calandra, president of the company, and his secretary. 
On December 15, 1970. federal agents executed the war-
r-ant directed at ( 'alandra's place of bus1ness and con-
ducted a thorough four-hour search of the premises. The 
record rf:'veals that the agents spent more than three 
hours searching Calandra's office and files. 
Although the agents found uo gambling paraphernalia, 
one discovered. among certain promissory notes, a card 
1ndicatmg that Dr. Walter Loveland had been making 
penodic payments to Calandra. The agent stated in an 
affidavit that he was aware that the United 8tates Attor-
ney 's office for the Northern District of Ohio was inves-
tigating possible violations of 18 P. S. C. §§ 8Q2, 893, 
and 894, dealing with extortionate credit transactions, and 
that Dr. Loveland had been the victim of a "loanshark-
lllg" enterprise thf'u under investigation. The agent 
concluded that the card bearing Dr. Loveland's name 
was a loansharking record and therefore had it seized 
along with various other Items, including books and 
records of tlw company. stock certificates, and address 
books. 
On March 1. 1971. a special grand .Jury convened in 
the Northem District of Ohio to investigate possible 
loansharking activities in violation of federal laws. The 
'On tlw ba~1s of thr ~amr atlidavlt, fPdPral H!!;l'llt~ abo obtained 
warrnnt~ nuthonz!ltp: ~Par(']H•:-: of Crdaudra.'~ re:>td<'IH'(' and auto-
mol))!P . Tlw pn>:·wnt ra~e tnvolv!'~ onlY tlw "Parrh of tlw Hoval 
\la<'hUH' and Tool Compan,\ . • 
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grand jury subpoenaed Calandra in order to ask him 
questions based on the evidence seized during the search 
of his place of business on December 15, 1970. Calandr1:1 
appeared before the grand jury on August 17, l971, but 
refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privi-
leged against self-incrimination. The Government then 
requested the District Court to grant Calandra trans-
actional immunity pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § ~5l4. 
Calandra requested and received a postponement of the 
hearing on thE' Government's application for the irnmu-
nity order so that he could prepare a motion to suppress 
the evidence seized in the search. . 
Calandra then moved pursuant to Rule 41 (e) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for suppression and, 
return of the seized evidence on the grounds that the 
affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and that 
the ' se~:~-rch exceeded the scope of the warrant. On 
August 27, the pistrict Court held a hearing at which 
Calandra stipulated that he would refuse to answer 
questiOns based on the seized materials. On October 1.. 
the District Court entered Its judgment ordering the 
evideuce suppressed and returned to Calandra and fur-
ther ordering that Calandra qeed not answer any of the 
grand Jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence. 
332 F Rupp. 737 (l971) . The court stated that "due 
process . . allows a witness to litigate the question 
whether the evHience which constitutes the basis for the 
questions asked of him before the grand jury has b,een 
obtawed m a way which violates the constitutional pro-
tectwu agamst unlawful search and seizure.'' 332 F . 
Supp., at 742. The court found that the search warrant 
had beeu Issued without probable cause and that the 
search had exceeded the scope of the warrant. 
The Court of Appeals for the ~ixth Circuit affirmed, 
t65 F 2d 12l8 ( 1972) , holding that the District Court 




that the exclusiOnary rule may be wvoked by a witness 
bf'fore the grand JUry to bar questioning based on evi-
dence obtained i11 an uulawful search and seizure! The 
offer to grant Calandra unmunity was deemed Irrelevant. 
46.'> F 2d, at 1221 
We grantf'd the GovcmnH'nt 's petitwn for certiorari, 
-- e H - t W7:3l We now rf'venw. 
H 
ThP instttut io11 of the grand jury is deeply rooted in 
Auglo-American history.'1 In England, the grand JUry 
Herved for centunes both as a body of accusers sworn 
to discover ami present for trial persons suspected of 
cl'irnitlal wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens against 
arbitrary aud oppressive governmental action. In this 
country the Founders thought the grand JUry so essential 
to basic liberties that they provided in the Fifth Amend-
ment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only 
he 111stituted by "a presentment or indictment of a grand 
.1ury" Costello v (lnited States, 350 U. S. 359, 361-362 
( 1956 ). Tlw grand JUry's historic functions survive to 
this day. Its respousibili ty 111 our constitutional frame-
work includes both the df'termination whether there is 
probable cause to believe a crime has been committed 
and the protPction of citizens against unfounded criminal 
2 Thl~ Court of AppPHL~ alfirnwd t h<' Dt~t net Court' IS finding that 
tlw ::;rarrh of Calandra's busuw;;s and setzurP of his property wa:s 
unlawful Although thr Gowrnmt•nt doe:; not agree with the court's 
finding, it ha::. not "ought rPviPw of t hts l$Slll' 
~ For a discussion of the lu:;tory and rolP of tlw grand Jury , see 
rostello v ( Tn!trd 8tates, 350 l' S. :359, :31H-:3H:! (1956); Blail' \' , 
( 'nited 8tatr.s. 250 l1 S. 27:1, 279-21-\:~ (1919); Hale v. Henk~<l , 201 
11 ~ 4;{, 59 (J90ti), -l Blnck,.;tour C'ommentanr:; :301 et seq.; G. Ed-
ward::<, The Urand .Jury 1-·!4 (1901i), 1 F Pollock and F . :vi:utlund, 
l·IJ;;tury of Engltsh Law 151 (2d eel. 1909): 1 W. Hold~worth, History 
•.1l Engh~h Law :U2_-;{.~:~ 17th n•v PC! ~95f1l. 
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prosecutwns. Branzbur(J v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 686-
687 (1972) . 
Traditwnally the grand jury has been accorded wide 
latitude to mqmre into violations of criminal law. No 
judge presides to momtor Its proo~edings:' It deliberates 
111 secret and may determine alone the course of its 
1nquiry. Th(:' grand jury may compel the production of 
evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers 
appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained 
hy thP technical procedural and evidentiary rules govern~ 
mg the conduct of criminal trials. "It is a grand inquest, 
a body with powers of investigation and inquisition, the 
scope of whose inquiry is not to be limited by cjoubts 
whether any particular individual will be properly sub-
.l.ect to an accusation of crime." Blair v. United States, 
'250 r. s. 273. 2s2 ( 1919) 
ThP scope of the grand JUry's power reflects Its special 
role Ill msuring fair and effectivE> law enforcement. A 
graud JUry proceeding JS not an adversary hearing m 
which the guilt or mnocence of the accused is adjudi-
cated. .Rather. 1t IS an ex parte investigation to determine 
whether a crime has been committed and whether 
rnminal proceedmgs should bf' mstjtuted against any 
person. The grand .1ury's mvestigative power must be 
broad 1f Its public responsibility is adequately to be dis-
charged. Brauzbur(l v. Hayes, supra, Costello v. United 
S.tates, supra. 
· Thr grand jur). ol rour~P . 1~ ~ubwct to thl' euurt's ~upervision 
in sevt'ral rPspPc·t~ See Brou•n \'. United States. 359 ll. S. 41, 49 
(Hl59J . Hule::< fi awl li . F'<'rf Bulr Cnm Pror, L. OrfiPld. Crnrpnal 
Procedure" UndN tht' F'ed<'ral HuiP~. 475-477 (1966). [n particular, 
th<• grand .JIIl'Y mu,;t rel~ · ou the eourt to comp<'l procluctwn of 
hnoh, pnp<• r~< . dO<'IIIlH'IIt,., ami thP te~tunony of wttnP!l~e~ . :wd tlw 
<·ourt may quaiih or mod1f~· a ~uupoena on motwn if compliance 
wqnJd lw ' tmr<>a~onahlr or oppr<•.~,;tv~>" HuiP 17 (rl. Fr.-d Rule 
(.;':tim. Pt (oo • 
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In H ratLzburg , the Court had occas10p to reaffirm the 
importance of the grand jury's role . 
'' [T]hP mvestigatwn of crime by a grand jury imple~ 
ments a fundamental governmental role of secur-
rng the safety of the person and the property of the 
cr t1zen · 40R l'. ~ .. at 700. 
"The role of the grand jury as an important 
Instrument of effect1ve law enforcement necessarily 
Ill eludes an investigative function with respect to 
determimng whether a crime has been committed 
and who committed 1t . . . 'When the grand jury 
ts performing 1ts investtgatory function into a gen-
Pral problem ar·ea ... soc1ety's interest is best servf:ld 
by a thorough and extensive 111 vestigation.' Wood 
v Georgia, 370 l'. ::-l. 375, 392 ( 1962). A grand 
,lury mvestigabqn 'is not fully carried out until 
Pvery av11ilable clue has been run down and all wit-
nesses examined in a proper way to find if a crime 
has been committed.' United States v. Stone, 429 
F. 2d 138, 140 (CA2 1970). Such an investigation 
may be triggered by t1ps, rumors, evidence proferred 
by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the 
grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S., 
at 362. H JS only after the grand jury has ex11mined 
the evidence that a determination of whether the 
prom .. edillg will result in an JtldJOtmf'nt can be 
madP . . " I d., at 701 , 
I'lw graud JUry 's sources of wformatwn are w1dely 
drawn, and the validity of an mdictment is not !lffected 
by the charfl.cter of the evidence considered. Thus, 1'\.B 
· mdictmeut valid on Its face is not subject to ch!lllenge 
on the ground that the grand JUry acted ou the basis of 
rnadf'quate or rncompetent evidence, Costello v. United 
States, supra, lfolt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245. 
flHl 0) ; or pven otr the bu.sis of mformation obtained m 
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violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege 
agawst self-incrimiuation. Um:ted States v. Lawn, 355 
{' ~ . 33~) (1958) 
The power of t,b.Q Go¥er· to compel persons to 
appear and testify before a grancl jury is also firmly 
established. Kasti(Jar v. United States, 406 lJ. S. 441 
l1972) . The duty to testify has long been recognized 
f.l,s a basic obligation that every citizen owes his Govern-
ment. Blackmer \' . United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 
( 1932); United States v. Bryan, 3:19 U. ~. 323,331 (1950). 
In Rranzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. ~ .. at 688, the Court 
noted that "I c J itizetls generally are not immu11e from 
grand .il.lry subpoenas . .. allf! that "the longstanding 
pnnciplr that 'the public has a right to everyman 's 
evidence ' ts particularly applicable to grand jury 
proceedings. " The duty to testify may 011 occasion be 
burdensome and even embarrassing. It may cause injury 
to a witness' social and economw status. Yet the duty 
to testify has been regarded as 11SO necessary to the 
auministratlOil of JUStice" that the witness' persona) 
tnterest ' 111 privacy must yield to the public's overriding 
mterest 111 full disclosure. Blair v United States, 250 
r S., at 281. Furthermore, a Witness may not iuterfere 
wtth the course of the grand jury's inquiry . He "is not 
rntitled to urge objections of incompetency or irrelevancy, 
such as a party might raise, for this is no concern of his." 
/d ., at 282. Nor is he entitlerl "to challenge the author-
tty of the Court or the granrl JUry" or "to set limits to 
the 111 vesttgation that. the grand .) ury may conduct." 
lbtd 
Of course , the grand jury's subpoena power is not 
unlimited It may constder incompetent evidence, but 
tt may not ttself vwlate a valid privilege, whether 
established by the Constitution. statutes. or the corn-
own law Rmnzbnry ' Hayes, supra; Tlnited States 
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y Bryan, supra; Blackmer v. l:nited States, supra; 8 
J Wigmore, Evidence, ~~ 2290-2391 (McNaughton rev. 
1 ~~!.1-JWhen tne grand jury itself threatens to cmnmi 
~IJ&,. it may be restrained! Although~eA~.amp)e~ __....--
indictment baseq on evidence obtained 111 violation of --z7 
a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege IS nevertheless 
valid, U niled States \'. Lawn, supra, the grand jury 
may not force a witness to answer questions in violation 
of that constitution11l guarantee. Rather, the grancl jury 
may override a Fifth Amendment claim only if the wit-
ness IS granted unmumty co-extensive with the privilege 
agaHlSt self-mcnminatwn. Kastigar v. United States, 
supra. Similarly, a grand Jury may not compel a person 
to produce books and papers that would incriminate him .. 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. :::l. 616, 633-635 (1886). 
Cf. Couch v. Umted States, 409 U. S. 322 ( 1973). The 
grand .1ury is also without power to invade 11 legitimate 
privacy mterest protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
A grand jury's subpoena duces Lecum will be disallowed 
if it JS "far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as 
1·easonable under ~he Fourth Amendment.'' Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43.76 (1£!Q,6).jAira p;·esumably grand~,.. 
.turors who "t'hemselves threaten to conduct an illegal tf Gl 
~h may be restrained like auy others.! Judici11l inter- -----w.- -
vention IS appropriate in such case~se it ~ pte.. -/-u ~-t·A- • ~ 
~ th~ wmug ·befor& it ocetJrR. ~ ~ 
Til 
ln the instant c~:tse, the Court of Appeals held that 
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment also 
lilnits the , grand ·.Jury's power to compel a witness to 
answer questions based on evidence obtained from an 
unlawful search and seizur~. The exclusionary rule was 
adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of 
all citizens l(to be secure in their houses. papers, and 
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Under this rule. evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal pro-
ceeding against the victim of the illegal search and sei-
zure . Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); 
Mapp v. Ohio , 367 P. S. 643 (1961). This prohibition 
applirs as well to the fruits of ~he illegally seized evi-
dence. Jll ' ong Sun v Uuited States, 371 U. S. 471 ( 1963); 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 
( 1 920) . 
The purpose of the excluswuary rule is not to redress 
·t,he lllJUry to the privacy of the search victim. 
" [ T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and 
effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too 
late." Linkletter \' Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 637 
(1965) 
Instead, the rule IS designed to deter future unlawful 
police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee 
of the Fourth Amendment against unreasonable search 
and se1zurrs : 
" The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. 
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively avail-
able way- by removing the incentive to disregard 
1t ·• Elkins \' f'nited States , 364 U. S. 206, 217 
( 1960 ). 
Accord, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961); Tehan 
v. United States, ex rel . Shot , 382 U. S. 406, 416 ( 1966); 
Terry v. Ohio, 3fl2 U. S. 1. 29 ( 1968) . In sum, the rule 
is a Judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent 
rffect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the 
party aggrieVf•d " 
TIH•re 1::. ~onw ch~agreenwm a~ to the prnct1cal efficacy of the 
l'X<'Iuswnar,y rul!•, and a:< 1lw Court notPcl iu Elkin,~ v. United States, 
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DPspitE' its broad deterre11t purpose, the exclusionary 
t·uiP has never bePn interpreted to proscribe the use of 
illegally-seized evJdencP Ill all proceedings or against all 
pPrsc)ns. As with any remedial device, the applioati011 
of thP rule has been restricted to those areas where 
i'ts remedial ob:wctives are thought rpost efficaciously 
serwt'!. ThP balancing process implicit in this approach 
1s expressed in the pontours of the Stltnding require· 
ment. Thus, standiqg t.o invoke the exclusionary rule 
has been confined to situations where the Govern-
ment seeks to usf' such evidence to incriminate the 
v1ctim of the unlawful search. Brown v. United States, 
411 U. S. 22~ ( 1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 
F . S. 165 ( 1969), Wong Sun v. United States, supra; 
Jones v. United 8tates, 362 U. ~. 257 ( 1H60). This 
standing rule is premised on a recognition that t.he need 
for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the 
t'VIdence are strongest where the Government's unlawful 
c~onduct would result in imposition of a criminal sapction 
on the victim of the search ~> 
;{()4 U. S. :.!01-i, 211- (HHiO), rt'!Pvnnt " [r]mp•rical ~tatistico; are not 
avallaiJlc·.' Cf. Oak~. Studymg th<' Exclu:;wnary nufe m Search 
and SPJZill'l', ;n P C'h1. L. HPv. 6()5 (1970). We have no occao;wn 
in the· prP;:mt c·a~r to c·onsJf[Pr tlw oxtent of the rule'~; efficacy in 
<'l'lllllllal ti'J:t]l-
u In holdm~?: that tlw re,;pon<lrnt had stamlmg to invoke the exclu-
'~!Onary rule m a gmnd JUI'~' proceechng::-:, the Court of Appeal;; relied 
on Rul<' 41 (P) of t!JP Federal Rul<'i:i of Cnminal Procedure. Rule 
41 (e) providrs, Ill rPlt•vant part, that '' fa] person aggrieved by an 
unlawful ~Parch and :;(•Izurp may mov(' th<' d1stnct court . . for 
retmn of the property and to supprP~~ for nsr a~ evic!ence> anything· 
so obtamrd. ' It furtlwr o;tat<'i:i that ''lt]he motion shall be 
made b<'fort• tnal o1· hranng. \VP havr rpcogmz<:'d that Rule· 
41 (<') 1:; "no broadPr than the coustnutwnal rulr." Alderman v. 
( 'mted State~'. :394 l t. S .. at 17:3, n. (l; Jones v. United States, 362· 
''.. H. 2,"Ji (l!:lf\0 l Sm<'e t lw Governnwnt ha::; not rhnllcngecl the· 
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IV 
[n deciding whether to extend the exclusionary rule 
to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh the potential ~ 
injury to the historic role and functions of the grand _.-- ~~~ • LJ, 
111
9.._ ~ 
Jury against the potential benefits of the rule as ap- _ ,.,~~ lf..6ct-: 
plied in this context. It is evident that this~exten- .. 
tion of the exclusionary rule would seriously undercut 
the role of the grand .1 ury. Because the grand .i ury 
does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence, it has 
iraditiOllally been allowed to pursue its investigative 
and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evi-
dentiary a,nd procedural restrictions a,pplicable to a 
criminal trial. Permitting witnesses to invoke the ex-
clusioqary rule before a grand jury would precipitate 
adJudication of issues hitherto reserved for the trial on 
the merits and occasion delay and disruption of grand 
Jury proceedings. Suppression hearings would halt the 
orderly progress of an investig11tion and might necessi-
tate extended litigation of issues only tangentially related 
to the grand jury's primary objective. 7 The probable 
result would be "protracted interruptions of grand jury 
proceedings," Gelbard v. United States, 408 l..J. S. 41, 70 
(1972) (WHITE. J .. concurring). effectively transforming 
D1st rirt Court '::; order directing rrturn of t hr illcgally-;,;eizPd property 
In rr~pondc·nt . wr do not rParh that l~i>tW . 
Tlw Court of AppPal~ ubo found th(lt til<' Gowrnmf'nt 's offer of 
inunu1nty und!'r 18 ( l. 8 C. § 2514 wa;; irr<'l!'vant to l'!'lSj)OI'\denes 
-..ramlmg to mvokP tlw !'Xclu~ronary rule . We argue with that dc-
termmntwn for thr rpa,;om; ~tated m Part~ Ill, TV, apd V of this 
opiuron . 
. Thr forrP of I hi:- argunwnt i~ \V(')) IllUstrated hy the facts or 
IIJP pr<'lSent. ca::;t· . A~ or the dut<' of th1~ deciswn, more tlum two 
and on(•-half yt-ar:s w111 hav<> t•laps<'d ~incr Calandra was :summoned 
to appear and te:st!l'y b<>ror<' the grand JUry. If Calandra's testi-
mon.\' wa:; v1tal to grand ]my 's rnv~t1gation rn August . 1971 of 
<\Xtortwnat!l cred11 ti'Hnsartronb, 1t I~> po:s::Hble that this particular 
i tlVr::-tlgatloll h<t." lwt•IJ rompletPI;> fru;:;trat!'d , 
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them into preliminary tnals on the merits. In some 
eases the delay might be fatal to the enforcement of the 
(•riminal law. .Just last Term we reaffirmed our disin-
clinatiou to allow litigious interference with grand jury 
proceedings : 
" Any holding that would saddle the grand jury 
wit,h mini-trials and preliminary showing would 
assuredly impede its investigation and frustr11te the 
public's interest in the fair and expeditious admin-
IStration of the criminal law." United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 P . S. 1. 17 ( 1973) . 
Cf. United States v. Ryan, 402 U. S. 530 ( 1971); Cobble-
d-ick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323 (1940). In sum, 
we believe that allowing a grand jury witness to invoke 
the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the 
effective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury's 
duties. 
Against this potential damage to the role and func-
twns of the grand jury, we must weigh the be11efits to 
he derived from this proposed extcnsiop of the exclu-
siopary rule. Suppression of the use of illegally-seizeq 
evidence against the search vwtim in a criminal trial 
is thought to be an important method of effectuating 
the Fourth Amendment. But it does not follow that the 
Fourth Amendment requires adoption of every proposal 
that might deter police misconduct. In Aldermrt-'n v. 
{1 nited States, 384 U. ~ .. at 174. for example, this Court 
declined to extend the exclusionary rule tq ope who was 
not the victim of the unlawful search : 
' 'The deterrent values of preventing the incrimi-
nation of those whose rights the police have violated 
have been considered sufficient to .justify the !:!Up-
pression of probatiw evidence even though the case 
against thr defendant is weak<'twd or destroyed. 
l 'NJTED HTA'H;S 11. CALANDHA 
Wt> adhPre to that JUdgment. But we are not con-
vmced that the additional benefits of extending the 
exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify 
further encroachment upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them 
acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evia 
dence which exposes the truth." 
\V P think this observation equally applicable in the 
present context. 
Any incremental deterrent effect which might be 
achirved by extending the rule to grand jury proceed-
mgs is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrent effect t:nay 
rrsult from the exclusion of illegally-seized evidence front 
criminal trials, it is unrealistic to assume that applica-
tion of the rule to grand jury proceedings would sig-
tuficantjy affect police conduct. Such an extension would 
deter only police investigation consciously directed to-
ward the discovery of evidence solely for use in a grand 
jury investigation. The incentive to disregard the re-
quirement of th<' fourth Amendment in order to ob-
taitt an wdictment from a grand jury is substantially 
negated by the inadmissibility of the illegally-seized evi-
dence in a subsequent criminal prosecution pf the search 
vtctun. For the most part, a prosecutor would be un-
likely to reql.lcst an indictment where a connection could 
not bP obtai ned. We therefore decline to embrace a 
view that would achieve a speculative ami undoubtedly 
minimal advance in the deterrt~nce of police misconduct 
at the cxpens€' of substantially impeding the role of the 
11:rand ,I ury ' 
' Hr~pondPnt n>IIP;o; prnnanl~· on 8tlverthome Lumber Co. v. United 
.'\tale~. :.!51 l'. S. ;)1{5 (1920) . In thai C'a"e, feqernJ officers unlawfully 
"l'tZPd <'Prtam documPnt::; [)('longmg to tlw StlvPrthornC'~ and then· 
hnnbt•r <·ornpun~· and prp;;pnted tlwm ron grand Jur~· that had nln•ady 
utdu•tf>d t hr Stlvrrthonw, , A dto;t rtrt eottrt ordPr<>d thr return of the-
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Respondeut also argues that each and every question 
based on evideuce obtained from an illegal search and 
se1zure cons~itutes a fresh and independent violation of 
tloeumentH but Impounded photogrnphs nnd ropje;; of the original:,;, 
Later, the prosrcutor cau~ed the grand jury to is~ur ~ubpoenas duces 
tec·um ro t hr 8IIverthom!'1:i to producr the originals, und thmr refusal 
to comply led to a contrmpt ritution. In reversing the judgme11t, 
the Court held thnt thr ;,;ubpoenn:s were uwnlid brcnpse they were 
lm;sed on knowledge obtained from thr il!egnl!y seized evide1we, citing 
Weeks v. United States, stt]n·a. l\J r . .Justice Holmrs, writing for the 
Court, Ht n trd that the "('l;~:>rnce of the provi~ion forbiclcliilg tlH' 
apquisitiOn of Pvidencr 111 n certnin wny is not merely that the 
OVJJlrnce :so acqUired Hhall not be used before thr Court but that 
it. shill! not be q~ed at all." 251 U. S. at 392. 
Silverthorne Js distinguishable from the present case in several 
rrspct•1s. There, the Silverthornes hnd previously been incliotod by 
the grand jury und had st11nding to iqvok(l the exclusionary rule on 
the bns1s of their ~tntq8 Hs crimmnl defenclants. The Govermnent's· 
111terest m reca]Jtunng the anginal docum<,nts wns obvioqsly based on 
a belief that they might be useful m fl criminal prosecution. Indeed, 
the pnmary con:s('quence of thr Court's decision wa~ to Pxclude-
the evjdenre from thr ~qbr;rquent criminal triaL Furthermore, priOI' 
to thr I~sunnce of the grnnd jt1ry subpornus there 11ad bern u juqjoial 
detcrmmation th11t tju• ~rarch nnd se1zure was illegaL The Silver-. 
thorne8' claim wn:s not rnjs(ld for the first time in pre-indictmen~ 
motJOJJ to supprei:i.~. 
By contrast, m the instant ca~(l responqent hncl not bern 111clicted 
by the grand Jlli'Y nnd was not u criminal defendant. Under tradi-. 
twnal PrlllCipje~;, he had no :stand1ng to mvoke the rxclusionary rqlo .. 
The rffect of the Di~trict Court's order was to deprive the grand 
.1ury of te8timony It needed to eonduct 1ts investig11tion. Lastly, 
rrsponclrnt's motion to 1mppres.,; was maqe prior 1o indktment anct_ 
reqmred mterruptwn of thr grand jury proce(ldings. In these mr-
enmstances, · Silvertho1'1/e Is not controlling, To the extent that the· 
( 'mirt's broad d1ctum m1ght be con~:;t n)ed to ~uggrst a ditff~r~nt rr-
~ult m t t'Je present cnsc, we note that It ha:> bern substantially under• . 
minf'd by laH•r cnses. 8ee Pnrts lll nnd IV of thll:l opinion . 
' . 
72-734-0Pi:NION 
tTNITED STATES v. CALANDRA 15 
the witness' constitutional rights." Ordinarily, of course, 
a witness has no right of privacy before the granct jury. 
Absent some recognized privilege of confidentiality, every 
rn11.n owes his testimony. He rpa invoke his fifth 
Amendp1ent privilege agains se -incrimination, ut e 
may not decline to answer on the grounds that his 
responses might prove ~mbarrassing or result in an un-
welcome disclosure of his personal affairs. Blair v. United 
States, supra. Respondent's ' claim must be, therefore, 
not merely that the grand jury's questions ipvade his 
privacy but that because those questions are based on 
illegally-obtained evidence, they somehow constitute dis-
tinct violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. We 
disagree. 
The pl!rpose of the .fourth Amendm~nt is to prevent 
unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privapy 
of one's person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong 
conctemned is the unjustified governmental invasion of 
these areas of an individual's life. That wrong, commit-
ted in this case, is fully accomplished by the origil1al 
search without probable cause. Grand jury questions 
based on evidence obtained thereby involve no inctepend-
ent governmental invasion of one's person, house, pfl,pers, 
• At oral argument . connsrl for rPspondent statPd the contention 
as follows · 
' 1 subrntt to thP Court that each question asked of qw Respond-
ent before the grflnd jttry, whirh qurstipn was only asked pecause 
of a pao;t violation of the fourth Amendment, ramottnts to] a new, 
qnmediate violntwn of the Fourth Amendment . . . . [A] qJ.JeStipn 
qerived from a pu t violatwn, n question into the privncy pf thf:l 
wttnes~S ;tmo~mts t.o another intrusiop in vwlatwn of tile Fourth 
Amendment' ' Tr. of Ornl Arg. 17. 
· [H]Pfu~mg to answPr u q~testion ill which the question oqnc(:livftbly 
i:,. derived from a past violation of 1he Fourtn Amendwent, gives 
nsr \O an addtttonnl or new Fourtll Amet1dme11t rigpt to r!')si&i 
i!'hswering that qq<·stiort becnl)sP tlw que~tion itself hepomes an 
adclittonnl mt-rn~wn Tr_ of Or11l A rg. 20. 
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or effects, but rather thf' usual abridgement of personal 
privacy common to all grand jury questioning. Ques-
tions based on illegally-obtained evidence are only a 
derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search 
and seizure. They work no new wrong. Whether such 
derivative use of illegally-obtained evidence by a grand 
jury should be proscribed presents a question not of 
rights but of remedies. 
In the usual context of a criminal trial, the defendant 
is entitled to suppress not only the fruits of an unlawful 
search and seizure but also any derivative use of that 
evidence. The prohibition of the exclusionary rule must 
reach such derivative usc if it is to fulfill its function of 
deterring police misconduct. In the context of a grand 
jury proceeding, we believe that the damage to that 
institution ~a-n t~tenfloie.l4~xolusionary ~out-
weighs any possible incremental deterrent effect. ~l con-
clusion necessarily controls both the fruits of an unlawful · -----
search and seiwre and any question or evidence derived 
therefrom.' 0 The same considerations of logic and policy 
apply to both the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure 
and derivative use of that evidence, and we do not dis-
tinguish between them. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
'
0 lt ~hould he notc•d that, rvrn :tbl:'Pnt tli<' <'xdu~IO!I:tr.'· rule, a 
grand Jury wit np;;:,; ma~· ha V<' nt hrr rrm('(li<·~ to rPd rr~;; t lw inj my to 
hi::; pnvaey and to Jll'f'V<'llt a ftnilwr 111va~ion in tlw fut un•. Hr may 
b<• entitlf'd to mmntain a rausr of ::~rtion for dHJnagf's ag;nin;;t the 
officer;; who concluctf'd tllP unlawful Hf'arch. Bivens v. Si:r Unlmown 
Named AgPnts of the Federal Bureau of fnuestigat.ion. 40:3 U. S. :381-1 
(1971) . He may also ::;f'f'k rf'tum of the illf'gall~·-~f'izPd pro]Wl't~ · . 
nnd exrlmuon of thr propNt~· and itH fruit" from bring u:;rd ns cvi-
denrf' a~am:-;t hun 111 a cnmmal 1 rial. Go-Bart lmportiug Co. v. 
Umted States, 282 U. S. 344. In thPHC cireum~tanC'f•:s, we canuo1 say 
that l:'ll<'h a Wl1nr~~ i:o neceo::sanly lf'ft remrclile:ss in thr face of an 
unlawful srar<'h and sr1zurr , 
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United States, Pet.itioner,l On Writ of Certiorari to the 
v. United States Court of Ap-
,John P. Calandra. peals for the Sixth Circuit. 
[Deeemher - , 1973] 
MR. Jus•rJCE Pow~~LL delivered the opmwn of the 
Court. 
This case presents the question whether a witness 
summoued to appear and testify before a grand jury 
may refuse to answer questions on the ground that they 
are based on evidence obtained from an unlawful search 
and seizure. The issue is of considerable importance to 
the administration of criminal justice, 
I 
On December 11, 1970, federal agents obtained a 
warr;:tnt authorizing a search of respondent John Calan-
dra's place of business. the Royal Machine and Tool 
Company in Cleveland, Ohio. The• warrant was issued 
in connection with an extensive investigation of sus-
pected illegal gambliug operations. It specified tpat the 
object of the search was the discovery and seizure of 
bookmaking records and wagering paraphenalia. A 
master affidavit submitted in support of the application 
for the warn:wt co11tained information qerived fro~n state-· 
rnents by confidential informants to the Federal l3ureau 
of Investigation (FBI), from physical surveillance con~· 
' (:. 
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ducted by FBI agents. and from court-authorized elec· 
tronic surveillance.' 
The Royal Machine and Tool Company occupies a 
two-story building. The first ftoor consists of about 
13,000 square feet and houses industrial machinery and 
.inventory. The second floor contaws a general office 
area of about 1,500 square feet and a small office occupied 
by Calandra, president of the company, and his secretary. 
On December 15, 1970. federal agents executed the war-
rant directed at Calandra's place of business and con-
ducted a thorough, four-hour search of the premises. The 
record reveals that the ageuts spent more than three 
hours searching Calandra's office and files . 
Although the agents found no gambling paraphernalia, 
one discovered, among oertain promissory notes, a card 
mdicating that Dr. Walter Loveland had been making 
periodic payments to Calandra. The agent stated in an 
affidavit that he was aware that the United t;tates Attor-
ney's office for the Northern District of Ohio was inves-
tigating possiple violations of 18 l'. S. C'. ~ ~ 892, 893, 
and ~D4, dealing with extortionate credit transactions, and 
that Dr. Loveland had been the victim of a "loanshark" 
ing'' enterprise then under investigatioq, The agent 
cpucluded that the card bearing Dr. Loveland's name 
was a loansharking record and therefore had it seized 
along with various other items. including books and 
records of tho company. stock certificates, and address 
books. 
On March 1. 19n. a special grand JUry was convened 
in the Northern District pf Ohio to investigate possible 
loansharking activities in violation of federal laws. The· 
1 On tlw hn~t" of the ~amr affidn \'tt. f('d('ra) ag<mt:s al:so obtained 
warrl\nt::; authortzing; ~rarehe~ of C11landra'~ rr:sidrncc and anto-
mobtle . Thr prr:sent ra:sr mvolve~ only tho :;('a rch of the Royal 
Mn,rhinP and Tool C'ompan~ .. 
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grand jury subpoenaed Calandra in order to ask him 
questions based on the evidence seized during the search 
of his place of business on December 15, 1970. Calandra 
appeared before the grand jury 011 August 17, 1971, but 
refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privi-
leged against self-incrimination. The Government then 
requested the District Court to grant Calandra trans-
actional immunity pursuant to 18 u. s. c. § 2514: 
Calandra requested and received a postponement of the 
hearing on the Government's application for the immu-
mty order so that he could prepare a motion to suppress 
the evidence seized in the search . 
1 . ' 
Calandra later moved pursuant to Rule 41 (e) of the 
.Federal Rules of Cnminal Procedure for' suppression and 
return of the seized evidenc<' on the grounds that the 
affidavit supporting the warrapt was insufficient and that 
the search exceeded the scope of the warrant. On 
August 27, the Distnct Court held a hearing at which 
Calandra stipulated that he would refuse to answer 
questions based on the seized materials. On October 1, 
the District Court entered its JUdgment ordering the 
evidence suppressed and returned to Calandra and fur.: 
ther ordering that Calandra need not answer any of the 
grand jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence.· 
In re Calandra, 332 F. Supp. 737 (1971). The court held 
that "due process . . . allows a witness to litigate the ques-
tion whether the evidence which constitutes the basis for 
the questions asked of him before the grand jury has been 
obtained in a way which violates the constitutional pro-
~ectiOl~ agamst unlawful search and seizure.'' ld., at 
742. The court found that the search warrant had 
been issued without probable cause &nd that the search 
had exceeded the scope of the warrant. 
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit f\ffirmed , 
holding that the District Court had properly entertained· 
the suppression motion and that the exclusionary rule 
7'2-7:3-1.--0PiNlON 
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may be invoked by a witness before the grand jury to 
bar questioning basPd on evidence obtained in an unlaw-
ful search ami seizure." United States v. Calandra, 465 
F. 2d 1218 (1972). Tlw offer to grant Calandra immu-
nity was deemed irrelrvant. ld., at 1221. 
W c gran ted thr GovPmrnen t's petition for certiorari, 
- U, S - (1073) , We now reverse. 
lT 
The mstJtution of the grand JUry is deeply rooted in 
Anglo-American history:' 1 n England. the grand jury 
served for centuries both as a body of accusers sworn 
to discover and preseut for trial persons suspected of 
criminal wrongdoing and as a protector of citizens against 
arbitrary and oppressivr governmental action. In this 
country the Founders thought the grand jury so essential 
to basic liberties that they provided in the Fifth Amend-
ment that federal prosecution for serious crimes cau only 
be instituted by "a presentment or indictment of a grand 
JUry." Costello v. United States, a50 U. R. 359, 361-362 
(H)56). The grand JUry's historic functions survive to 
this day . Its responsibilities continue to include both 
the determination ·whether then· is probable cause to 
believe a crime has been committed and the protection 
~ The Court uf AppP:d~ anlrnwtl t hr Dtiit net Court·~ finding that 
the ~;Pa rch of Cnlaml.m',.; llll~inP:<" and ,.;pizun• of hi;; property was 
unlawful. 41i5 F . 2d, at 122ti. 11. 5. A It hough tlH• Governml'nt does 
not ngn•e with t lw eourt '" find itt~?:. It lw ::: not "ought reviPw of thi~; 
l~iiiH'. 
'1 For a tli,.;cu~"'wn of the IHHtory nnd mlt• of th<• grand JUry, ~ee 
Costello r. Umted States, :3W U. S. :359. :3(i]-:3G~ (195!1); Blair v. 
l 'nited .States; 250 U. S .. :!7:3, 27!:J-2i':3 ( J!:Jl9) ; Hall' v. 1/enkel, 201 
U. S. 4:3, 59 (190ti); + Blnrk.,tonl' Commc•Htarie:-< :301 et seq.; G. Ed-
1\[ll'd;,:, Thr Grnnd .ftlr~· l-44 (l!.lOfl) ; l F. Polloek and F . Maitland, 
History of Engli,.;h Lnw 151 (:ld ed. 1909); 1 W Holcbworth, Hi~tory 
.o! Engh,;h Law :n2.- :32:3 (7th rev N1 195t:i) 
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of citizens against unfounded erimmal prosecutions. 
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 e. S. 665, 686-687 (1972). 
Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide 
latitude to inquirE> into violations of criminal law. No 
judge presides to monitor its proceedings. It deliberates 
in secret and may determine alone the course of its 
inquiry. The grand jury may compel the production of 
evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it consider& 
appropriate, and its operation. genf)rally is unrestrained 
by the technical procedural and · evidep tiary rules govern-
ing the conduct of criminal trials. "It is, a grand inquest, 
a body with powers of investigation ~nd inquisition, thd 
scope of whose inquiry is not to bP- limited by doubts 
whether any particular individual will be properly sub~ 
ject to an accusation of crime. '' Blair v. United States! 
250 U. S. 27B, 282 (1919) 
. The scope of the grand JUry 's powers reflects Its special 
role in insuring fair and rffective law enforcement. A 
grand jury proceeding is not an adversary hearing in 
which the guilt or innocence of the accused is adjudi-
cated. Rather, It is an e:r parte mvestigation to determine 
whether a crime has been committed and whether 
criminal proceedings should be instituted against any 
person. The grand Jury's investigative power must be 
broad if its public responsibility is acjequately to be dis-
charged. Branzburg v. Hayes, supra,: Costello v. United 
States, supra. 
[n Branzburg, the Court had occasion to reaffirm the 
importance of the grand jury's role . 
" [T]he investigation of crime by a grand JUry imple-
ments a fundament10ll govemmental role of secur-
ing the safety of the person and the property of the 
citizen . , .. " 408 U R .. at 700 
"The role of the grand jury as an important 
i'nsttumen t of effecti Yf' law enfotcemen t necessarily 
r. •. , 
' ' 
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includes an investigative function with respect to 
determining whether a crime has been committed 
and who committed it . . . . 'When the grand jury 
is performing its investigatory function into a gen-
eral problem area ... society's interest is best served 
by a thorough and extensive investigation.' Wood 
v. Georgia, 370 U. S. 375. 392 (1962). A grand 
jury investigation 'is not fully carried out until 
every available clue has been run down and all wit-
nesses examined in a proper way to find if a crime 
has been committed.' United States v. Stone, 429 
F . 2d 138, 140 (CA2 1970). Such an investigation 
may be triggered by tips, rumors. evidence proferred 
by the prosecutor, or the personal knowledge of the 
grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S., 
at 362. It is only after the grand jury has examined 
the evidence that a determination of whether the 
proceeding will result in an indictment can be 
made . . . .'' I d., at 701. 
The grand jury's sources of information are widely 
drawn, and the validity of an indictment is not affected 
by the character of the evidence considered. Thus, an 
indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge 
on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of 
inac!equate or incompetent evidence. Costello v. United 
States, supra; Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 2~5 
(1910), or even on the basis of information obtained in 
violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination, United States v. Lawn, 355 
U.S. 339 (1958) . 
The power of a fedeq:tl court to compel persons to 
appear and testify before a grand jury is also firmly 
established. Kastigar Y. United States, 406 U. S. 441 
(1972). The duty to testify has long been recognized 
as a basic obligation that every citizen owes his Govern-
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tnent. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421, 438 
(1932); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). 
In Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S., at 688. the Court 
noted that 11 [ c] itizens generally are not immune from 
grand jury subpoenas .... " and that ''tlw longstancHng 
principle that 'the public has a right to everyman's 
evidence' .. . is particularly l;lpplicable to grand j\-lrY. 
proceedings." The duty to testify may on occasion pe 
Qurdensome and even embarrassing. It may ca1.1se injury 
t,o a witness' social and economic status. Yet the du~y 
to testify has been regarded as "so necessary to the 
administration of justice" t!1at the witness' persona~ 
inter(3st in privacy must yiel4 to the public's overriqin~ 
interest in full disclosure. Blair v. United States, 250 
U. S., at 281. Furthermore, ~ witness may not interferj3 
with the course of the grand jury's inquiry. He "is not 
entitled to urge objections of incompetency or irrelevalWY, 
such as a Pllrty might raise, for this is no concern of his." 
ld., at 282. Nor is he entitled "to challenge the author-, 
ity of the Court or the granq .iLJry" or "to set limits to 
tbe investigation that the grand jury may conquot." 
Ibid. 
Of course, the grand jury's subpoena power is not 
LJnlimited.' It may consider incompetent evidence, but 
it may not itself violate a valid privilege, whl'lther 
established by the Constitution, statutes, or the oom· 
mon law. Rmnzburg v. Hayes, 81.tpra; Uniteq Statf!S 
4 The grand jury is ~ubject tq the court's ~upervision in several/ 
respects. See Brown v. United States, 359 U. S. 41, 49 (1959); 
Rules 6 and 17, Feel. Rulr Crim. Proc.; L. Orfield, Criminal Pro-
cedure Under the Federal Hub, 475-477 (1966). In particu lar, 
the grand jury must rei~· on the court to compel production of 
books, papers, documrni;:;, and thr trstimony of witnessrs, n11d the 
court may quash or· modify a ~ubpoena on motion if comp!irtnpe 
')\'Ould be '·unreasonable or opprcs~ive." Rule 17 (c) , Fed. Rt~!e 
Cr\m, Proc, 
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v. Bryan, supra; Blackmer v. United States, supra; 8' I 
J. Wigmore, Evidence, ~~ 2290-2391 (McNaughton rev. 
ed. 1961). Although, for example, an indictment based' 
on evidence obtained in violation of a defendant's 
Fifth Amendment privilege is nevertheless valid, United' 
States v. Lawn, supra, the grand jury may not force• 
a witness to answer questions in violation of that 
constitutional guarantee. Rather, the grand jury may 
(')Verride a Fifth Amendment claim only if the wit-
ltess is granteq immunity co-extensive with the privilege' 
against self-inc~imination. Kastigar v. United States, 
supra. Similarly, a grand Jury may not compel a persorr 
to produce books and papers that would incriminate him. 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 633-635 (1886). 
Cf. Couch v. United States, 409 U. S. 322 (1973). The 
grand jury is also without power to invade a legitimate 
priyacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
A grand jury's subpoena duces lecurn will be disallowed. 
if it is "far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.'' Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U. S. 43, 76 (1906). Judicial supervision is] 
properly exercised 111 such cases to prevent the wrong-
before it occurrs. 
III 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that 
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment limits 
the grand jury's power to compel a witness to answer 
questions based on evidence obtained from a prior \ 
unlawful search and seiz11re. The exclusionary rule was 
adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of 
all citizens "to be secure in their houses, papers, and 
effects, ftgainst qnreasonable searphes and seizures .... " 
Under this rule, evidence obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment cannot be used in a criminal pro-
ceeding against the victim of the illegal search and sei-
'. 
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zure. Weeks Y. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 "C. S. 643 ( 1961). This prohibition 
applies as well to the fruits of the illegally sei?.ed evi-
dence. Wo11g Sun v. United Slates, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); 
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U. S. 385 
( 1920) . 
The purpose of the exclusiOnary rule is not to redress 
the injury to the privacy of the search victim: 
"[T]he ruptured privacy of the victims' homes and 
effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too 
late.'' Linkletter v. Walker. 381 U. S. 618, 637 
(1965) . 
Instead, the rule is designed to deter future unlawful 
police conduct and thereby effectuate the guarantee 
of the Fourth Amendment against unroasonable search 
and seizures : 
"The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repjlir. 
Tts purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
constitutional guaranty in the only effectively ava-il-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregllrd 
it." Elkins v. United States, 364 U. S. 206, ~17 
( 1960). 
Accord, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 l". S. 643, 656 (1961); Tehan 
v. United States, ex rel. Shot, 382 U.S. 406, 4l6 (1966); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1. 29 (1968). In sum, the rple 
Is a .i udicially-created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent 
effect, rather than a personal consti~utional right of the 
party aggrieved!' 
" Thrrr i~ ~onw di~agrrrmrnt. ft>' to the prnctiral efficacy of the 
Pxclu~wnnr~· n!lr, and a:; tlw Court notrd m Elkins\' . United States, 
:~()..[ IT. S. :206, 21~ (19(}0). rrl<'VIIIIi ''Jelmpiriral ~tati~ticH are not 
.wntlabl<'." Cf Oak~ . Stuclyin~?: the Exclu~ionary Hule in Search. 
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Despite its broad deterrent purpose, the exclusion::try 
t·ule has never been interpreted to proscribe the use ot 
iilegally-seized evidence in all proceedings or against all 
persons. As with any remedial devic<>. the application 
of the rule has been restricted to those areas where 
its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously' 
Rt'rved . The balancing process implicit in this approach 
is expr-essed m the contours of the standing require~ 
mrnt. Thus, standing w Invoke the exclusionary rule 
has been confined to situations where the Govern-
ment s<>eks to usc such evidence to Incriminate the 
victim of the unlawful search. Brown \'. United States, 
411 C. !-1. 223 ( 1973) ; Alderman v. United States, 394 
l'. ~- 1ti5 ( 1969) ; Wony Sun \'. Um,ted States, S'IJ,pra, 
Jones ,. United States, 362 U. ~- 257 (1960) . This 
standing rt.JI<' IS premised on a recogmtion th11t the need 
for deterrence and hence the ration~le for excluding the 
evidence ar<> strongest where thP Governrnent 's unlawful 
conduct would result in Imposition of a criminal sanction 
on tlw vietim of tlw search " 
and ::3rtzun•, :37 l ' . l'il1. L. Hev. (i(i5 (l!:liOJ. Wr have no occasion 
111 t h(' pn,~r nt case to ron~tdrr the <·xt rnt of the rule's efficacy m 
t'flllltllal t rta I ~ 
" In holding that tlw t'Pspond<•ttt had standmg to invoke the rxclu-
~ lllllnry rul<' tn a grand Jur~· prorPrdmg~ . till' Court of AppPab relied 
on Rulr -ll (<' ),~'rd. HuiP Crim. l'ro(' . 465 F. :Zd, at 1222-1224. Rul(l 
41 (<') provtdr~. tn rPirv:tnt part, that "I aj pcroon aggrieved by .un 
unlawful ~eareh and ~etzurt> may movP thp dii:itrict court . . for 
r·eturn of the propPrt~ · and to ~upprP~~ for tl~<· n:; rviclence anything 
:;o obtnmcd . . It further ~tate~ that "I tjhe motion sha ll be 
madP beforP tnal or )l('nrmg. . ,. We• havp n·cognizPd that Rule 
41 (e) lti " no broadt•r than tht> ronstt tutlonal rulP." Alderman v 
C'nitr.d Statl'S, 394 U.S., at li:). n. B; Jone~ \. Uuited States. 362 
l ' S. :25i (19110) Bqlr 41 (<'I. thPrl'f()rP. doe~ not conot ttute a statu- { 
tory rxpan~wn of th<' excluston:tr~· ruiP ln addition, ~incc thP 
Uovcrnn~<'l,l1 1"\n~ 1101 ch~tllrngPd tlw Dist rirt Court'>< order c!irecting 
·~ 
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ln decrding whetlwr to 1~xtcnd tlw exclusiOnary rule 
to grand jury proceedings, v\'<' must weigh the potential 
lllj ury to the historic role and functions of the grand 
jury against the potential benefits of the rul<' as ap-
plied in this context. It is evidt>nt that this extcn-
twn of the <'xclusionary ru]p would senously impede 
tl11• grand .1 ury. BPcause the grand .1 ury docs not 
finally ad.1 udicatf' guilt or i nno<'en(•p, it has tradi-
twnally been allow<'d to pursu1• · its investigative and 
aceusatonal functions unim1wd<'d by tlw evidentiary 
and procPdural restrictions applicabl<' to a criminal 
tnal. Permitting witn<'sses to invokP the exclusiOrf-
:;try ruh• b(•fon• a grand .JlH'Y would· preeipitate adjudi-
cation of issLH'S hithPrto r·ps(•rwd for the trial on 
the merits and wou Jd delay and disrupt grand Jury pro-
Ce<'dings. :-iuppression hearings would halt the orderly 
progrl'ss of an in vest1gation and might necessi taw 
extended litigation of issu('S only tangentially related 
to the grand JUry's primary ob.wctiv<'.' Tlw probable 
result would be ''protracted interruptions of grand jury 
proceedings." Gelbard ,. Cniled States, 408 L S. 41. 70 
( 1972) (WHITE, L conCll!Ting). eff<'ctiv<'ly transfonnin~ 
rrt11n1 of t lw Iil<'jra li~·-~!'1ZC'd propl't'i ~ · 1 o t·c·,-pond!'llt. wP do not r·c·a('h J 
I lu• rpH':'I lOll wlwthl·r t h<~t ordt•r w:1~ pi'OJH'r 
Tht• Court ol .\pJwab :d"o found that t lw ( :on•rnml·nt '~ otft•r ol 
munullJt~· undl'r II\ {' ~ . C. ~ ~.51-l wa~ tl'l'!'lr•vant to re~pond!•nt\ 
,..fandrng to tnvokt> tht• exf'iu,..tonar.\' rule·. -lti.~ I•' :!d. at U:Zl \\'P 
:ll).l'l'<' \nth that drtPrmtllHtton for till' n•a,..on,.. ~tntr·d til Part,.. Ill. TV. 
;tlld \' of tJlt,.. OJlllliOII 
The• forc·r ol t ht~ :1t'j!lllll!'llt t,.. wl'll tlhr,-t ratt·d b~· the faet~ ol 
till.' pn•,..c•nt ea,..t· A~ of the dntl' of tlu,.. dc•c·1~ton. morP than two 
lllld otlt'-h:tlf .\'!'ill'" will hil\'l' Piap:'Pd ,..Ill('(' n•,-potHIPIII wa,. :'llllllli011PU 
to :IJlJlP<tr and l<':'ttl\ hdor!' t lw grand Jill'~· If n·,..pmtdc•nt',.. tc•,-tt -
tnony wa~ nt:tl to grand .1111'<,.. 111\'(':'tigatton Ill .\ugu,..t 1971 of· 
l'XIlHiton:tlp ('l'!'dtt ll'llll:'iil'IIOil,.., II I:' pO,..:'tbl£- that tlu,.; ]J:tl'IH'IIiat• 
itJVP,..tlg;tiiOll Jw,. b(•(•Jl ('OIIlpirtp]~· fl'll~ll'at('rL 
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them mto prelinunary tnals on the nwnts. In sun1e 
cases the delay might lw fatal to thr· etdurc<'llH'nt of tlw 
criminal law. .Just last T<'rtn W<' n•affirnwd our disin-· 
clination to allow litigious interfercne<' with gratl(l ,ILII'Y' 
proceedings . 
'Any holding that would saddk tlH' g;rand Jlll'Y 
wtth mini-trials and pn'litninary showing would 
assuredly impPdt' its inwstigation and frustrate th<-
public's interPst in the fair and E'xp<•ditious admin-
istration of tiH' eriminal law." l'11ited States , .. 
Dio11isio, 410 C.~ . 1. 17 ( Hl7:3) 
Cf. l 'nited 8lat.es \' . Hyan, 402 ('. S. ;)30 ( Hl71) ; Cobble-
dick ,., ( 'nited ~tales. :10\) l'. S. :32:3 ( Hl40). fn sum. 
\\·e beli<'VC that allowing a grand j my witness to invoke 
the exclusionary rule would unduly int('rfPre with the 
C'ffectiw and <•xpeditious discharge of thl' grand jury's 
duties. 
Against this potential rlalltag<' to tlw role and func-
tions of tlw grand jury. ,,.<' must wPigh tlw benefits t() 
he d<'ri V<'d frO Ill tlJ is prO)JOS<'d <'Xti'IISiOtl of the <'XC] U-
~ionary ruh•. ~ltppn'ssion of tlw tiS<' of lllcgally-seized 
c•videt1ee against the S('areh victim i 11 a erimi nal trial 
ts thought to lw an important tnPtlwd of eff<,etuating 
t.lw Fourth AnH'tHiment. But it do<•s t1ot folio\\' that thP 
Fourth AuwrHlnwnt n•quir<'S adoption of <>very proposal' 
that might d<'t<•r polie<' misconduct. In .tldermr111 \'. 
Cnited States, :~!l4 l". ;-;.,at 174. for exan1pl<'. this Court 
lfpeJin<'d to <'Xt<·ncl the exelusionary mk to otH' who was 
11ot tlw \·ietim of tlw un]a,,·ftil search 
"Th<' rktPrT<'tlt values of pt'PW'ntmg tlw rrwnmr 
nation of thos<' whos<' rights tlw polie<• have ,·iolated 
hav<' lw<·n eonsid<•r<>d suffieiPnt to JUstify the sup-
pression of prohati\'<' <'vid<'nec' <'Ven though the ease 
i;tgainst. tlw rkfPndattt! is wP:;IkPtled or d<>stroyed . 
!::'\ITED :-l'l'ATE::- u C'ALAXUHA 
WP adhen• to that ,IUdglltE'tlt. But we are uot con-
vinced t,hat tlw additional IH'Jtdits of extending the 
Pxel usionary rulE' to oLiwr defendants would justify 
further c·neroaehnH'Ilt upon tlw puhlie interest in 
prosfwutin~-~: tho::-c' aeeusl'd of crime and having t.hem 
aeq ui tt<'d or con vwted on tlw basts of all tlw <WI' 
cl<-'tlCC which expos<'s tlw t,ruth .' ' 
We thlllk this observation equally aJ)p'Iwabk• 111 the 
prC'sent context. 
Any inc,·enwntal deterrPnt pffeet which might be 
achieved by t~xtend i ng tlw ru ]p to grand jury proceed-
ings is UtlCPrtain at bt>st. \\"hatevc•r deterrance of policf' ( 
misconduct may n~sult frotn tht> c•xclusion of illegally-
seized evidence from crlllllnal trials. it is u nrea]istie to 
nsstlllH' that applicatiotl of the rule to' grl;ind JUry pm-
C<'<'dlllgs would significantly further that goal. ~uch au 
extCilSJOll would d('tC'I' only police investigation COll-
scious]y din~eted toward the discovery of evidence solely 
for use in a grand jury investigation. The tncentive to 
disre~ard the requin•n1ent of the Fourth A111endment 
sokly to obtain an indwtnwnt from a grand jury Is sub- f 
stantially negated by the Inadlllissibility of the il1egally-· 
seized cvidellee 111 a subsequent crimlllal prosecutio11 of 
the ::-f'arch vietim. For tlw most part, a prosecutor would 
!w unlikrly to request an indictment when' a couviction 
could not be obtained. WP thereforr decline to embrace' 
a view that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly 
minimal advance i 11 the deterrPnce of police misconduct 
at the expense of substantially tmpeding tJw rok of the 
grand .1 ury · 
' Rt•Hponrll'tlt I"l'lw,_; primnril~· on 81/Verthome Lumber Co. v. l'nlted 
:States, 251 (' . 8 :~ss (19201 ln that <·n~e. f(•d<'ral olflec•r,_; unlawfully 
~c·tzrd c·<•rtalll documrnt:, h<•lonl-(lllg to tlw Sth•rrthome" and tlwtr 
lumbrr t"Ompau~· :111d pn·~rnt<·d tlwm to a grand .im~· that had nln•acly 
inrlictc·d tlw Sil\'('rthoi"IH'"· ,\ dr~t 1'(('1 ('0\11'1 ordPr<'d tlw rrtur:n ol the 
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v 
Respond0nt also argu<'R that C'aeh and <.'very questi01l 
based on evidence obtained from an illegal search and 
seizure constitutes a fresh aiHI independent violation of 
dormnrnt;; but Jmpoumlc•d photol!:raph~ and <·opir~ of thr ori~inab. 
Ln.t rr. the pro,rru tor ea U:"Pcl t hP gr:111d jm~· to i~"m' "ubpoenn,.; d U('es 
tecum :to tlH• SilvPrthomr" to prodtH'C' t!H• onginab. and tlwir rrfusal 
to romp!~· lrcl to :1 eontpmpt citation. Tn rrvrr,.;in~ tlw judgnwnt , 
t he• Comt hrld th:t t t hr :"11 hpo<•n:l~ \\'C•rc• in1·a lid hr<·nu~r t hP~· IV<'rP 
ba,rd on kno\\'lPd~r oht aint>d from t hr iiiPg:tll~· "rizrd Pl·idrneP, ('it in~ 
W eeks v. ( 'niter! Stales, supm. :.rr . .ru~ticc • Tiolmr". writin~ for thr 
C'onrt. "tat('(] that thr ·'p~"rncP of th<• pro1·i,ion forhiddin~ thr 
arqui~ ition of p,·id<·m·<· m :1 r·Prtain ll'a~ · i" not nwrrl~· tllilt thr 
pvid<'JH'r :"O aequin·d .• hall not lw u,.;pd bdorr tht> Comt but that 
1t "hall not hr li:"Pd at :ill." 2;31 P. S. nt :m2. 
Silvl'l'thome i,.; di,tingui~hablc• from I hP JH'<':"<' nf ea,.;r in ~rvrrnl 
rrsJWds. ThPJ'<'. tlw Sil \'('rf honw" had JH'<' I·iou,J,,· h<•Pn indirt rei b~· 
thr grand Jill'~ · :md tim" eould in1·okr tlw <'xehJ"iollar~· rnl<' on 
th<' ba"i' of thrir "t:Jtu,.; a" eriminal drff'JHl:mt:< . Thr Government':; I 
intrrr~ t in rrc·n ptming thr ori~inal do<·umPnt,.; \\'H" ob1·iou,.;l~· fonndrd 
on :1 brlid thnt thp~ · mi~ht hr U:<P ful in thr erimin:tl pro~P<·ution 
nlrrad~· aut horizrd h~· thP grand jm~· . Indrrd. t hr prima r~ · eon,r-
qnrnc·r· of tlw Comt ',.; dPri:"ion ll':t" to <•xri\J(k tlw r1·idrnre from thr 
"nh,c•qur nt C'J'imm:tl tri:1l. FurtiH·rmor<•. prior to the j,,uanee of the 
grnnd jur~ · "uhpoc•na". thc•rr had lwrn n judicial drtrrminntion that 
thr "ran·h :tnd ~c·iwn• \\':t~ ii!Pg:tl . TIH• ~ilnrthomc• ',.; ('!:tim wn" not/ 
r:ti:"rd for thr fir,.;! timr in :1 prr-indi<·t nlPnt motion to "upprr~" 
rrquiring inti'J'l'llption of gmn<l jur~ · proc·r<•<lin~" · 
B~· rontmRt, Ill thr in~t:mt r·n"<' n•"pond<•nt had not bc•<'n indicted 
b~· tlw grand jur~· and 1\':t ,; not :1 eriminal dc•frnd:tnt. Undrr tradi-
tional Jll'in!'ipl r~. hr had no ,.;tanding to ill\·okr t hP rx<'ltJ8ionar~· rule. 
Tht> pffc<'l of t hr Di"t rid Comt ',.; ordrr 11':1:" to dpprin· thr grnnd 
Jur~· of tr~timon~· it nrrded to <'OJHill<'f it " inw"tigntion . La~t l~·. 
f<',;pomll'nt ·,. motion 10 "uppn'"" had not hP<'Il prrl'iou,.;]~· madr nnd} 
rPquirPd intrnupt im1 of thr grnnd jm~· JH'ot•ePding:>. In thr,;e rir-
eum~tane e.'. Siluerthonte 1:s not ('Ontrollin~ To thr rxtrnt that the 
Court',.; broad dirtum might br con"t ru<'d to "ug~r,.; t a diffPrPnt re-
~ult in thr prP,rnt casr, wr note that it hm; bren "ub,tantiall~· under-
mined by lntrr cases. See Pari s III nnd IV of thi~ opi11ion. 
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the witness' constitutional rights.u Ordinarily. of course, 
a witness has no right of privacy before the grand jury. 
Absent somf' recognized privilege of confidentiality, every 
man owes his trstimony. Hr may invoke his Fifth 
AmPndment privilege against compulsory self-incrimina· } 
tion, but he may not decline to answer on the grounds 
that his responses might prove C'lllbarrassing or result in 
an unwelcome disclosure of his personal affairs. Blair v. 
United States, supra. Respondent's claim must be, there-
fore, not merely that the grand JUry's questions invade 
his privacy but that. because those questions are based on 
illegally-obtainrd evidence, thPy somehow con&titute dis-
tinct violations of his Fourth Ameudment rights. We 
uisagrPe. 
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent 
umeasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy 
of one's person, house. papers. or effects. The wrong 
condemned is the unjustified governmental invasion of 
these areas of an individual's life. That wrong, commit-
ted in this ca~e. is fully accomplished by the original 
search without probablf' cause. Grand jury questions 
based on evidence obtained thereby involve no independ~ 
cnt governmental invasion of one's person, house, papers,, 
~At. oral nrgunwnt . roun~<·l for n·~pondrnt ~tated the content JOn 
a,; follow,; 
' " l ~ubtlllt to t hr Court that <'arh que:st tOn n~krd of the Rr::;pond-
<!llt. b!'fore the f.!:rHnd jur~·. wht('h qu<'~tion wa~ only n::-krd b<'cau~e 
of a pa~t Yiolatiou of thr Fourth AmrndnH'nt, rmnount::; toJ a new, 
itimwdiatr nolatiou of tlw Fomth Anwndnwnt . . . I AI qur::;tion 
deriv<·d from a pa~t nolntion. a que,;tion into the privacy of the 
wit II<'~" amount>' to another int ni::Hon in vwlatwn of the Fourth 
Anwndmrnt .' ' Tr. of Oral Arg. 17 
" fHlPfu~mg to an~w<· r a que~twn 111 whtrh thr qii<'HttOn roncetvnbly 
1~ dPrnwl from a pa~t nolat1on of 1 he Fourth Anwndment, gives 
rt::'P to an nddtt1onal or tww Fourth AnwndmPnt nght to resist• 
nntiwc•rmg that qu<·~t 1011 heeatN' thr quP~t ion it:<Pif brcomf's an 
udditionnl intru~wn " Tr. of Om! Arg. 20 
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or effects. but rathrr tlw usual abridge1nent of personal 
pnvacy common to all grand jury q urstioni ng. Ques-
tions based on tllegally-obtainC'd evidence arc only a 
derivativC' usf' of tlw product of a paE't unlawful Sf'arch 
and seizure·. They work no nC'w Fourth Amendment I 
\\TOnj:!; . Whf'ther such derivative liS(' of illf'gally-obtained 
t>vidence by a grand jury should br proscribed presents a 
qtwstion not of rights but of remedies. 
ln the usual context of a criminal trial. the defendant 
ts entitlf'd to suppress not only tlw fruits of an unlawful 
search and seizurP but also any c!C'rivativP use of that 
f'videneP. Tlw prohibition of tlw exclusionary rule must 
reach such derivative use if it is to fulfill its function of 
deterring policr misconduct. ln thC' context of a grand 
Jury proceeding, we belicvf' that the damage to that I 
Institution from the unprecedented <'xtension of the 
exclusionary rok urged by respondent outweighs the 
benC'fit of any pot'sible incremental deterrent effect. Our 
conclusio11 necessarily controls both thC' fruits of an 
unlawful sf' arch and seizure all( I any q U<:'stion or C'videncc 
derivNI therefrom.'" Tlw !"amc considerations of logic 
and policy apply to both the fruits of an uulawful search 
and seizure' and derivative use of that evidence, and we 
do not distinguish bct•veen them. 
Tlw judgment of the Court of Appeals is Reversed. 
' 0 It ,d10uld br notrd thnt, rvc•n ah~rnt tlw pxelu~IOilar.l· rulr, a 
gm nd jury w1tnr:<~ mn~· hav<• otlwr rrmPdl<':< to n·drr~H tlw injury to 
lu~ priv:te~· and to prc•v<'lll a fu11lwr JllVH~ion 111 th<' future. He ma.1· 
he· PIH itlrd to mamtam a eau:<r of :tetion for damage:; agnin~t the 
offieN,; who ronduetf'd tlw unlawful ,.;rar<" h. !li ven,~ v. Si.t U11known 
N anU'd .4gents of tlu· Pedaal B urmu of hu·c~lt(Jal ion, ~();{ U. S. :388 
(19il) HP ma~ abo >'f'<'k return of tlw ii!Pg;nll~·-:;elz<'d propert~· , 
and ex('IU~IOJJ of thP propert~· and It:< fnnt" from bring u~rd as evi-
denee Hgamst hnn 111 a crimmal trw!. Go-Bart lmporti11(J Co . 1·. 
l lmted State~. :182 ( I H. :{H ( 19:H). In t hrse c1rcum~t anccs, we 
cannot ~a~· that ,.;uch a w1tnP"~ ~~ nece:-<~nnly left renwdileH;; 111 tho 
facr of an unlawful ,.;ear<'h and ~C'IZHI\' 
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Mn. JusTICE BRENNAN. dissenting. 
The Court holds that the exclusionary rule in search~· 
and seizur<' cases does not apply to grand jury proceed-
iugs because the objective of the rule is "to deter future 
unlawful police conduct." ante, p. 9, and "it is unrealistic 
to assum(• that application of the rule to grand jury 
proceedings would significantly further that goal." /d., 
13. This downgrading of the exclusionary rule to a 
determination whether its application in a particular 
type of )t'O · · furthers deterrence of future police 
mis nduct reflects a s ti 1g misconception, unless it 
is a purposefujrejection, of the historical objective and 
p rposP of the rule. 
connnan!Js-o · w Fourth Amendment are of course 
directed solely to public officials. Necessarily therefore 
only official violations of those commands could have 
created the evil that threatened to make the Amend-
ment a d'ead lett('r. But eurtailment of the evil. if a 
consideration at all, was at best only a hoped for effect 
of the exclusionary rule. not its ultimate objective. 
I ncleed, there is no evidence that the possible deterrent 
effect of the rule was given any attPntion by the judges 
chiefly responsible for its formulation. Their concern 
as guardians of the Bill of Rights was to fashion an 
enforc('ment tool to give content and meaning to the 
Fourth Amendment 's guarant<>es, They thus bore out 
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James Madison's prediction in his address to the First 
Congress on June 8, 1789: 
"If they [the rights l arc incorporated iu to the 
Constitution, independent tribunals of justice will 
consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guar-
dian of those rights; they will be an impenetrable 
bulwark against every assumption of power in the 
Legii'lati ve or Executive; they will be naturally led 
to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly 
stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration 
of rights." I Annals of Cong. 439 (1834). 
Since, however, those judges were without power to 
direct or control the conduct of law enforcement officers, 
the enforct>ment tool had necessarily to be one capable 
of administration by judges. The exclusionary rule, il 
not perfect, accomplished the twin goRls of enabling the -judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official law-
lessness and of assuring the people-all potential victims 
of unlawful government conduct-that the government 
would not profit from its lawless bt>havior, thus minimiz-
ing the risk of seriously underminiug popular trust in J 
government. _->-
That these considerations, not the rule's possible deter-
rent effect, were uppermost in the minds of the framers 
of the rule clearly emerges from the decision which 
fashioned it : 
"The effect of the Fourth Amendment is to put 
courts of the United States and Federal officials, in 
the exercise of their power anrl authority, under 
limitations and restraints as to the exercise of such 
power and authority, aud to forever secure the peo-
ple, their persons. houses, papers and effects against 
all unreasonable searches and seizures under the 
guise of law. . . . The tendency of those who exe-
cute the criminal laws of the country to obtain 
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GOnvivtion by means of unlawful seizures ... should 
find no sanction in the judgrner1ts of the courts 
which are charged at all times with the support of 
the Co11stitution and to which people of all condi-
tions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of 
such fundamental rights . ... 
"This protection is equally extended to the action 
of the Government and officers of the law acting 
under it. . . . To sanction such proceedings w9uld 
be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect 
if not an open defiance of the prohibitions of the 
Constitution, intended for the protection of the peo-
ple against· such una·ulhorized action." Weeks v. 
United States, 232 U. S. 383, 392, 394 (1914) (em-
phasis added) . 
Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes added 
their enormous influence to these precepts in their notable 
dissents in Olrns'tead v. United States, 277 U. S. 438 
(1928). Mr. Justice Brandeis said: 
"In a government of laws, existence of the govern-
ment will be imperilled if it fails to observe the 
law scrupulously. Our Government is the potent, 
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it 
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime 
is contagious. If the Government becomes a law-
breaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites 
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy." 277 U. S., at 485. 
And Mr. Justice Holmes said : 
" [ W] e must considPr the two objects of desire, both 
of which we cannot havP, alld make up our minds 
which to choose. It is desirable that criminal should 
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dence should be used. It also is desirable that the 
Government should not itself foster and pay for 
other crimes. when they are the means by which 
the evidence is to be obtained . . . . We have to 
choose, and for my part, I think it is a less evil that 
some criminals should escape than that the Gov-
ernmellt should play an ignoble part. 
" . . . If the existing code doPs not permit district 
attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it 
docs not permit the judge to allow such iniquities 
to succeed. " 277 e. S .. at 470. 
The same principles were reiterated only five years ago. 
ln 1'.!:!J::u_ Y. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1, 12- 13 ( 1968) , Chief Justice 
\Yarren said for the Court : 
"The rule also serves another vital function-'the 
imperative of judicial integrity.' Elkins "· United 
Stares, 364 l'. , '. 206, 222 (1960). Courts which 
sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be 
made party to lawless invasions of the constitu-
tional rights of citize11s by permitting unhindered 
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions." 
It is true that deterrence was a prominent consider-
ation in the determination whether Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
r. H. 643 ( Hl61). which applied the exclusionary rule 
to the States, should be given retrospective effect. Link-
letter , .. Walker, 381 F. S. 618 ( 1965). But that lends 
no support to today 's holding that the application of the 
exclusionary rule depends solely") upon whether its in-
vocation in a particular type of proceeding will signifi-
cantly further the goal of deterrence . The emphasis 
UJ!n deterrence in Linkletter must be understood in thC' 
li of the crucial fact that the States had justifiably 
rehe from 1949 to 1961 upon Wolf Y. ColoradJ, 338 
F . S. 25 ( 1949) , and consequently, that application of 
Mapp would have req_uired the wholesale· release of in.-
-
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numerable convicted prisoners, few of whoni could have 
been successfully retried. In that circumstance, Link-
letter held not only that retrospective application of 
Mapp would not further the goal of deterrence but also 
that it would not further "the administration of justice 
and the integrity of the .!uciicial process." 381 U. S., at 
637. Cf. Kaufman v. United States , 3D4 F. S. 217, 229 
(1969). 
Thus. the Court seriously errs in describing the 
exclusionary rule as merely "a judicial-created remedy 
des!gn~to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights gener-
ally through its deterrent effect .. . . " Ante, p. 9. 
Rather, the exclusionary rule is "part and parcel of the 
Fourth Amendment's limitation upon lgovernmental] 
encroachment of individual privacy.'' Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
F. S., at 651, and "an essential part of both the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments." id. , at 657, that "gives 
to the individual no more than that which the Consti-
tution guarantees him. to the police officer no less than 
that to which honest law· enforcement is entitled, and, 
to the courts. that judicial integrity so necessary in the 
tru<.> administration of justice." I d., at 660. 
This Mapp summation crystalizes the series of decisions 
that developed the rule, and with which today's holding 
is plainly at war. For the first time. the Court today 
11 J,tifP-.'1,~ ~ 
discounts to the point of extinction the vital function of t..:t!.t t/f,...,. 
the rule to insure that the .1· udiciary~oids even the · / ~;~~
slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal government 11 
conduct. This rejection of "the imperative of judicial 
integrity," Elkins "· United States, supra, 364 U. S., at 
222', openly invites "l tjhe conviction that all government 
is staffed by .. . hypocritt>s I, a conviction] easy to 
instill and difficult to erase.'' Paulsen, The Exclusionary 
Rule and Misconduct by thf' Police, 52 J. Crirn. L. and 
P . S. 255, 258 ( Hl61 ). When judges appear to. 
become "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a 
~~ 
~ 
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Constitution that they are sworn to uphold,'' Elkins v. 
United States, 364 e. H., at 223. we imperil the very 
foundation of our peoples' trust in their G'overnment on 
wl1'iCi1'0Ur TJeincor:acy rests. Sec On Lee Y. U niled 
States, 843 P. S. 747. 758- 759 (1052) (Frankfurter, J. , 
dissenting). The exclusionary rule is needed to make 
the Fourth Amendnwnt something rPal; a guarantee that 
does not carry with it the rxclusion of evidence obtained 
by its violation is a chimera. Moreover, 
"f i 1 nsistence on observance by law officers of tradi-
tional fair procedural requirements is, from the long 
point of view, best calculated to contribute to that 
end. However much in a particular case insistence 
upon such rules may appear as a technicality that 
inures to the benefit of a guilty person, the history 
of tlw criminal law proves that tolerance of short-
cut methods in law enforcement impairs its endur-
ing effectiveness." Miller \' . United States, 357 
F. H. 301, 313 (195R) . 
The judges who developed thr rxclusionary rule were 
well aware that it embodiE'd a judgment that it is better 
for some guilty persons to go free than for the police 
to behave in forbidden fashion. A similar judgment led 
the Court to drcide in Silverthorn e Lumber Co., Inc. v. 
United States, 251 r. ~ . :3R5 ( 1920), that a grand jury 
must be denied access to plainly relevant but illegally 
srit::ed papers. In that case, after federal agents unlaw-
fully seized papers belonging to the Silverthornes and 
their corporation, and presented the documents to a 
grand jury \',:hich had previously indicted the Silver-
thornes. a district court ordered the documents returned 
and copies that had bren prepared in the interim 
impounded. After returning the originals. the grand 
jury attctnpt<•d to recoup them by issuance of a subpoena 
duces tecu,m Compliance with the subpoena was: 
d..cq .. r::....r ..... .J...~-'-· 
r$~/ l .. J 
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refused, and contempt convictioJJS followed. In revers-
ing the judgment of conviction. the Court speaking 
through Mr. Justice Holmes held that the Government 
was barred from utilizing any fruits of its forbidden act, 
stating that " [ t] he essence of a provision forbidding the 
acquisition of evidence in a certain ,.,-ay is that not merely 
'evidence so acquirerl shall not be used before the court 
but that it shall uot be used at all.·· 251 U. S .. at 392. 
Silverthorne plainly controls this case. Respondent, 
like plam ti1fS-m-error 111 Stl ve~t h on~e,' seeks to a voic~ 
furnishing the grand jury with evidence that he would 
not have been called upon to supply but for the unlawful 
search and seizure. The Court would distinguish Silver--
thorne on the ground that there the plaintiffs~in-error 
had been indicted and could invok<' the exclusionary rule 
"on the basis of their status as criminal defendants," since 
the Government's effort to obtain the documents was 
"obviously founded on a belief that they might be useful 
in the c·riminal prosecution already authorized by the 
grand jury." Ante, p. 14 n. 8. The effort was clearly 
not "obviously" founded on any such belief. Overlooked 
is the fact that the grand jury's ii1terest in again obtain-
ing the documents in Silverthorne may well have been 
to secure information leading to further criminal charges, s 
especially since indictments of three other individuals, 
as well as additional indictments of the Hilverthornes,· 
had been the consequc:>nce of initial submission of the 
documents to the grand jury. See Brief on Behalf of 
Plaintiffs-in-Error, at 4. 18-19/ Only if Silverthorne is 
~ 1 Neitlwr. I lw . 'i.lvert horne LumbPr Co .. lK'can~P it was a corpora-
~-------r-1I-OI-1,-·;ee7/'(;fe'" \', (enkel. 201 ll . S. 4:~ (190fi), nor m;pondent, 
becaut>r hr wa~ grantrd I ransactional 1mmnnity, could invoke thr 
privi!c!l:r again~t srlf-incrimination. Thr ~if na I ion:-; arr therefore 
coml!letl"l~- compa rablr. 
2 The Court al~o argnr~ that "[t]ht> Silvrrthornr',; cbim wa~ not 
rai~cd for thr fir~t timl' in a prP-mdirtmrnt motion to o;uppress 
I 
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overruled can its precedential force to compel affirmanM 
here be denied. 
Co11gressional concern with the Silverthorne holding 
\Vas clearly evidenced in enactment of 18 U. S.C. ~ 2515, 
providing that "r w 1 he never any wire or oral communi-
cation haf\ been intercepted. no part of the contents of 
such communication and no evide11ce derived therefrom 
may be received in evidence in any proceeding in or 
before any . . . grand jury .. . if the disclosure of that 
.information would be .itt violation of this chapter.'' 
(Emphasis added.) 1 n Gelbard \', Unded States, 408 
U. H. 41 (19.72). wr set aside thE' adjudication in criminal 
contempt of a grand jury witness who refused to comply 
with a court order to testify on thE' ground that interro-
gation was to br based upon information obtained from 
tho witness' communications allegedly intercepted by 
fedf'ral agents by means of illegal wiretapping and elec-
tronic surveillance. Our reasons track the grounds 
advanced in Silverthorue. 
"The purposes of ~ 2515 and Title III as a whole 
would bE' subverted were the plain command of 
§ 2515 ignored when the victim of an illegal inter-
ception is called as a witness before a grand jury 
and askC'd questions basC'd upon that interception. 
Moreover. ~ 2515 servrs not only to protect the 
privacy of communications, but also to ensure that 
the courts do not become partners to illegal couduct; 
the rvidentiary prohibition was enacted also 'to pro-
tect the integrity of court and administrative pro-
requiring intt'rrupt 1011 of grand Jill'~ ' procerdiug~, " ante. Jl . 14 n. R, 
and t hcrrforr Jli"C'~umably Its al:'~rrtion oecasionrd no delay. How-
evf'r, t hr District Coul't in Sil uerthorue had gran trd ;In ea r!irr appli-
cation for rPturn of thP :;PizNI documrnt~ from thr grand jury after 
drtrrmining that tlw~· had bren obtainPrl in violation of the Fourth 
Amrndmrnt . Thr Court mmk 110 intimation that thr Di~triet Court 
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ceedings.' Consequently, to order a grand jury 
witness, on pain of imprisonment, to disclose evi-
dence that ~ 2515 bars in unequivocal terms is both 
to thwart the congressional objective of protecting 
individual privacy by excluding such evidence and 
to entangle the courts in the illegal acts of Govern-
ment agents." 408 U.S., at 51 (footnotes omitted). 
Similarly to allow C~ra to be subjected to questions 
derived from the illegal search of his office and seizure 
of his files is "to thwart the [Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendments' protection I of ... individual privacy ... 
and to entangle the courts in the illegal acts of Govern-
ment agents. " "And for a court. no petition of the 
executive department, to sentence a witness, who is 
[himselfl the victim of the illegal [search and seizure] 
to jail for refusal to participate in the exploitation of 
that [conduct in violation of the explicit command of 
the Fourth Amendmentj is to stand our whole system 
( 
of crimipal justice on its head." In re Evans, 452 F . 2d 
12:39. 1252 (1971) (Wright. J., concurring). 
It is no answer, as the Court sugges~s. that the grand 
jury witnesses' Fourth Amendment rights will be suffi-
ciently protected "by the inadmissibility of the illegally 
seized evidence in a subsequent criminal prosecutjon of 
the search victim." Ante, p.1:3. This. of course. is no alter-
native for Calandra. since he was granted tran~actional 
immunity and cannot be criminally prosecuted. But 
the fundamental flaw of the alternative is that to compel 
Calandra to testify in the first place under penalty of 
contempt necf'ssarily "thwarts" his Fourth Amendment 
protection aud "entangles the courts in the illegal acts. 
of Government agents,' '-consequf'nces that Silverthorne 
condemned as intolerable. 
To be surf', the exclusionary rule does not "provide 
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one for any purpose." Alderman v. U11ited States, 394 
U. S. 165. 175 ( 1969). But clearly there is a crucial 
distinction between withholding its cover from individ-
uals whose Fourth Amendment rights have not been 
violated- as has been done in the "standing" cases, 
Alderman Y. United States, 394 U. S. 165 ( Hl69), Jones 
v. United States, 362 U. S. 257 ( 1960 )-, and withdraw-
ing its cover from persons whose Fourth Amendment 
rights have in fact been abridged. 
Respondent does not seek vicariously to assert an-
other's Fourth Amendment rights. He has himself been 
the victim of an illegal search and desires "to mend 
no one's privacy [but his] own. " Gelbard v. United 
States, 408 U.S. 41. 63 (1972) (DovGLAS, J .. concurring) . 
Petitioner is told that he must look to damages to redress 
the concededly unconstitutional invasion of his privacy. 
In other words, officialdom may profit from its lawless-
11ess if it is willing to pay a price. - --
1n Mapp, the Court thought it had "closef d] the only 
courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by 
official lawlessness" in violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights. 367 l . S., at 654-655. Tho door is again ajar. 
' As a consequence, I am left with the uneasy feeling that 
today 's decision may signal that a majority of my col-
leagues have positioned themselves to reopen the door· 
still further and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule 
j 11 search and seizure cases; for surely they cannot be-
lieve that application of the exclusionary rule at trial 
furthers the goal of deterrence. but that its application 
in grand jury proceedings will not "significantly" do so. 
Unless \ve are to shut our eyes to the evidence that 
crosses our desks every day, we must concede that official 
lawlessness has not abated and that no empirical data 
distinguishes trials from grand jury proceedings. I 
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viction rested on illegally seized evidence, today's decision 
will be invoked to sustain the conclusion in that case 
also that "it is unrealistic to assume'' that application 
of the rule at trial would "siguificantly further" the goal 
of deterrence-though. if the police are presently un-
deterred, it is difficult to see how removal of the sanction 
of exclusion will induce more lawful official conduct. 
The exclusionary rule gave life to Madison 's prediction 
that "independent tribunals 'of justice ... will be nat-
urally led to resist every encroachment upon rights 
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the dec-
laration of rights. " We_ betray the trust upon which 
that prediction rested by today's long step toward aban-
donment of the exclusionary rule. The observations of 
, a recent commentator highlight the grievous error o.f 
the majority's retreat: 
"If constitutional rights are to be anything more 
than pious pronouncements, then some measurable 
consequence must be attached to their violation. 
It would be intolerable if the guarantee against 
unreasonable search and seizure could be violated 
without practical consequence. It is likewise im-
perative to have a practical procedure by which 
courts can review alleged violations of constitutional 
rights and articulate the meaning of those rights. 
The advantage of the exclusionary rule-entirely 
apart from any direct deterrent effect--is that it 
provides au occasion for judicial review, and it giveS' 
credibility to the constitutional guarantees. By 
demonstrating that society will attach serious con-
sequences to the violation of constitutional rights, 
the exclusionary rule invokes and magnifies the 
moral and educative force of the law. Over the long 
tenn this may integrate some fourth amendment 
12 
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ideals into the value system or norms of behavior 
of law enforcement agencies." Oaks, Studying the 
Exclusionary Rule in Seach and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 665, 756 (1970); see also Dellinger. Of 
Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, 
85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1562-1563 (1972). 
I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals. 
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rnitrd States. Pet1twner.j On Writ of Certiorari to the 
1'. l 'nited Htates Court of Ap-
.Joh n P. Calandra. 1wals for the Sixth Circuit. 
Ma. .fu::;TrCE PowELL delivPred the opinion of the 
('ourt. 
This case presents the question whether a witness 
summoned to appear aud testify bPfore a grand jury 
may refuse to answer questions ou the ground that they 
are based on evidence obtaiuecl from an unlawful search 
and seiwre. The issue is of considerable importance to 
the adutinistration of criminal 1 ustice. 
T 
On December 11, 1970, federal agents obtained a 
warrant authorizing a search of respondent John Calan-
dra's place of bus111ess. the Royal Machine and Tool 
Company il1 Cleveland. Ohw. The warrant was issued 
in connection with an extensiw investigation of sus-
pected illegal gambling operations. It specified that the 
object of the search was the discovery and seizure of 
bookmaking records and wagering paraphenalia. A 
master affidavit submitted iu support of the application 
for the warrant cont~:~oined information derived from state-
ments by confidential informants to the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (FBI) , from physical surveillance con~ 
. ' . 
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ducted by FBI agents. and from court~authorized elec• 
tronic surveillance.' 
The Royal Machine and Tool Company occupies a 
two~story buildiug. Tlw first floor consists of about 
13,000 square feet and houses industrial machinery and 
inventory. The second floor contams a general office 
area of about 1,500 square feet and a small office occupied 
by Calandra, president of the company, and his secretary. 
On December 15. 1970, federal agents executed the war~ 
rant directed at Calandra's place of business and con~ 
ducted a thorough. four~hour search of the premises. The 
record reveals that the agents spent more than three 
hours searching Calandra's offict-> and files. 
Although the agents found no gambling parapherua!ia, 
one discovered, among certaw promissory notes, a card 
mdicating that. Dr. Waltf't' Loveland had been making 
periodic paynwnts to Calandra. The agent stateq in an 
affidavit that he was aware that the United States Attor~ 
rwy's office for the Northern District of Ohio was inves~ 
tigating possible vwlations of 18 P. S. C. § § 892, 893, 
anc./894. cl<'alillg with extort.ionate credit transactions, and 
that Dr. Loveland had been the victim of a "loanshark~ 
ing'' enterprise then under investigation. The agent 
concluded that the card bearing Dr Loveland's name 
was a loansharking record and therefore had it seized 
along with various other items, wcluding books and 
records of the company, stock certificates. 11nd address 
books. 
On March 1. H)71, a special grand JUry was convened 
111 the Northern District of Ohio to mvestigate possible 
loansharkmg activities in VIOlation of federal laws. The 
1 On tlw hast.- of 1lw ~amt1 affidavit, J rdrnd agPnts al:;o obtained 
warrant, aut hortzing ~earehcs of Calandra·~ rrsidenc!:' and auto-
mobile. Tlw prr,;rnt ea~r mvolw~ onh tho ~rarch of the Royal 
Machuw and Tool Compan\ 
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graud jury subpoenaed Calandra in order to ask him 
questions based on the evidence seized during the search 
of his place of business on December 15, 1970. Calandra 
appeared before the grand jury on August 17, 19-71 , but 
refused to testify, invoking his Fifth Amendment privi-
leged against self-incrimination. The Government then 
requested the District Court to grant C11landra trans-
aetiona.l immunity pursuant to 18 U. S. C. § 2514. 
Calandra requested and received a postponement of the 
hearing on the Government's application for the immu-
nity order so that he could prepare a motion to suppress 
the evidence seized in the search. 
Calandra later moved pursuant to Rule 41 (e) of the 
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for suppression and 
return of the seized evidence 011 the grounds that the 
affidavit supporting the warrant was insufficient and that 
thE> search exceeded the scope of the warrant. On 
August '27, the District Court held a hearing at which 
Calandra stipulated that he would refuse to answer 
questions based on the seizeJ materials. On October 1, 
the District Court entered its judgment ordering the 
evidence suppressed and returned to Calandra and fur-
ther ordering that Calandra need not answer any of the 
grand jury's questions based on the suppressed evidence. 
In re Cala.ndra, 332 F. Hupp. 737 ( l971 ). The court held 
that "due process ... allows a witness to litigate the ques-
tion whether the evidence which c9nstitutes the basis for 
the questions asked of hun before the grand jury has been 
obtained in a way which violates the con~titutional pro-
tection agamst unlawful search and seizure." ld., at 
742. The court found that the search warrant had 
been 1ssuecl without probable cause and that the search 
had exceeded the SCO(W of th(' warrant. 
The Court of Appeals for the ~ixth Circuit affirmedl 
holding that the District Court had properly entertained 
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may bC' mvokeJ by a witness before the grand jury to 
bar quC'stiomng basPd on evidence obtained in an unlaw-
ful search and SCJZUI'f' . ~ l'nited States v. Calandra, 465 
F . 2d 121H (Hl7:l). Tlw offrr to grant Calandra immu-
mty was dPPnwd Irrel<>vant. /d., at 1221. 
\Ve granted the Govl:'rnm<>nt's petition for certiorari, 
- - F s - ( 1 ~17a) . w (' 110\\ r<'VPrSP 
H 
flw institUtiOn ot the grand JUry is deeply rooted in 
Anglo-AmPncan history. ' ln England, the grand jury 
RPrved for centunes both as a body of accusers sworn 
to discowr and presPnt for tnal persons suspected of 
crumnal wrongdomg and as a protector of citi~ens against 
arbitrary and oppressive gov<>nunental action. In this 
eountry the .Founders thought the grand jury so essential 
t.<J basw liberties that thPy provided in the Fifth Amend-
ment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only 
be mstituted by "a presentment or indictment of a grand 
jury.' Costello \. ( 'nited .States, 350 U. ~- 359, 361-362 
(195o). The graud JUry 's historic functions survive to 
thus day Its responsibilities continue to include both 
tlw determination whetlwr there is probable cause t<? 
! The Court of Appl'al" alfirnwd tlw Dt~trirt Court '~ findmg that 
.t.he ~mrrh of l'alandm ·~ bn~lllP~~ and ~etzurp of his property was 
tmlawfnl ..J.fi5 F. 2d, at I:Z2G. 11. 5. Although the Govl'rnment does 
not agrPP with tlw court'~ findmg, It ha>' not ~ought review of th,is1 
~~~llP In additiOn. t lw Covrrnuwnt ha.s not rhallrnged the District 
Court.\ ord<·r dm'rtmg r<:'tttrn ol t lw illegally seiz<'d propPrty to 
t"('~j)Olld('llf 
;j For a dt~<'ll~~wn of tlw lu~tory aud role of the grand jury, see 
Costello ' l 'nited ~tate.~. a50 ! '. S :~5~. J<ll-ao2 (195fl); Blair v. 
(hnted States, ·250 ll . S :!7:l . 279-:zs:~ (1919); Hnle v. Hmkel, 201 
{ ' ~ . 4:~ , 59 (190fl). 4 RlaebtonP C'omnwntari<'~ a01 et seq. ; G. Ed-
1\"l:trd~<. Thr Grand .Jmy I 44 { 19ot)) , l F Pollock and f. Maitland, 
Ht~tory of Englt~h Law 1.11 (:Zd <·d 1909) , l W Holdsworth, Histor>' 
(tf Ena:lii<h LH w !H:Z ; ~.:!_;{ ((t h n·v Prl. l91iH,J . 
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believe a crime has been committed and the protection 
of citizens against unfounded criminal prosecutions. 
Branzburg v. Ha.yes, 408 U. S. 665, 686-687 (1972). 
Traditionally the grand jury has been accorded wide 
latitude to inquire into violations of criminal law. No 
judge presides to monitor its proceedings. It deliberates 
i.J,l secret and may determine ~lone the course of its 
i1~quiry. The grand jury may compel the production of 
evidence or the testimony of witnesses as it considers 
appropriate, and its operation generally is unrestrained 
by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules govern-
ing the conduct of orimiual trialr;;. "It is a grand inquest, 
a body with powers of investigatio11 and inquisition, the 
scope of whosf• inquiry is not . to b~ limited by doubt~ 
whether any particular individual will be properly sub-
ject to an accusation of crime." Blair v. United States, 
250. U. S. 273, 282 ( 1919) . 
The scope of the grand jury's powers reflects its special 
role in insuring fair and effective law enforcement. A 
grand jury proceeding 1s uot an adversary hearing in 
w,hich the gmlt or mnocence of the accused is adjudi-
cated. Rather, his au e:t parte investigation to determine 
'Yhether a crime has been committed and whether 
nriminal proceedings should be mstituted against any 
person. The grand jury's mvestigative power must be 
broad if its public responsibility is adequately to be dis-
charged. Bra·nzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. H., at 700; Costello 
v. United States, 350 l' . S., at 364. 
. In Branzburg, the Court had occasion to reaffirm the 
Hnportance of the grand jury 's role 
" [T 1 he in vestigatioq of crime by a grand jury imple-
ments a fu11damental governmental role of secur-
ing the safety of the person and the property of the 
citizen .. " : 408 U. S., at 700. 
, "The role of the grand .iury as an important 
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includes an investigative function with respect to 
determining whether a crime has been committed 
and who committed 1t . . . 'When the grand jury 
is performing its investigatory function into a gen-
eral problem area . . . society's iuterest is best served 
by a thorough and extensive 111 vestigation. ~ Wood 
v Georgia, 370 U. 8. 375, 392 ( 1962). A grand 
jury investigation 'is not fully carried out until 
every available clue has been r·un down and all wit-
nesses examined in a proper way to find if a crime 
has been committed.' United States v. Stone, 429 
F. 2d 138, 140 (CA2 1970). Such an investigation 
may be triggered by tips, rumors, evidence proferred 
hy the prosecutor, or the persoual knowledge of the 
grand jurors. Costello v. United States, 350 U. S., 
at 36~. It is only after the grand jury ras examined 
the evidence that a determmation of whether the 
proceeding will result in an indictment can be 
made .. , :· ld., at 70L 
The grand jury's sources of mformatio11 are widely 
drawn, and the validity of an indictment is not affected 
by the character of the evidence considered. Thus, an 
.indictment valid on its face is not subject to challenge 
on the ground that the grand jury acted on the basis of 
inadequate or incompetent evidence, C'ostello v. United 
States, supra; Holt v. United States, 218 U. S. 245 
(1910), or even on the basis of information obtained in 
violation of a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-mcrimination. United States v. Lawn, 355 
n. s. 339 (1958) . 
The power of a federal court to compel persons to· 
appear· and testify before a grand jury is also firmly 
established. Kastigar \'. United States, 406 U. S. 441 
(1972) . The duty to testify has long been recognized 
~s. a basic obligatwn that fvery citizen owes his Govern-
··. 
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l'nent. Blackmer v. United States, 284 U . S. 421, 438 
( 1932); Cnited States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950). 
in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 V. S. , at 688, the Court 
·noted that " [ c] itizens generally are not immune from 
grand .1ury subpoenas . . .'' and that "the longstanding 
pnnc1ple that 'the public has a right to everyman's 
Pvideuce · is particularly applicable to grand jury 
prqceedings.' ' The duty to testify may on occasion be 
burdensome and even embarrassing. It may cause injury 
'to a witness' socJal and econonuc status. Yet the duty 
to testify has been regarded as "so necessary to the 
administration of justice' ' that the witness' personal 
mterest in privacy must yiel(J to the public's overriding 
interest in full disclosure. Blair v. Onited States, 250 
F. S., at 281. Furthermore. a witness may not interfere 
with the course of the gr11nd jury's inquiry. He "is not 
entitled to urge ob,1ec~ions of incompetency or irrelevancy, 
.such as a party might raise, for this is no concern of his." 
ld., at 282. Nor is he entitled "to challenge the author-
ity of the Court or the grand ,1ury '' or "to set limits to 
the mvestigation that the grand .1ury may conduct.:' 
!bid. 
Of course, the grand jury's subpoena power is not 
unlimited.4 It may consider incompetent evidence, b4t 
1t may pot itself violate a valid privilege, whether 
established by the Constitution, statutes, or the com-
mon law. Rra:nzb·urg v Hayes, supra; United States 
~ Tlw grand JHry 1:; ~nh.J crt to tlw <·ourt :s :supcrviswn in several 
rP.spect:-; . ~ee Brown r . l'mted States , :359 U. S. 41 , 49 (1959); 
HulP:s f1 and 17, FE'<.!. Hule Cmn. Pror , L. Orfield, Cnminal Pro-
cedure UndPr tlw Frderal Hule~. 475-477 ( 1966) . In particular, 
the grand JUry mu~t rPb' on the rourt to rompel production of 
booki<, pnp<'rH. docunwnt ... , and tlw H·~timony of Witn!'S:;es, and the 
court may quash or modify a ~ubpoena on motion 1f compliance 
would be '' unrPa :sonublf' or oppre,:,;r;tve" H.ulo 17 (c) , Fed . .l:Wde 
Gr.Vn.- Pro<'. 
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v. Bryan, supra; Blackmer v. United States, supra; 8' 
J. Wigmore. Evidence, ~~ 2200-2301 (McNaughton rev. 
ed. 1961). Although, for t>xample. an indictment based 
on evidence obtained in viOlation of a defendant 's 
Fifth Amendment privilegC' is nevertheless valid, United 
States , .. Lawn, supra, the grand Jury may not force 
a witness to answer questions In violation of that 
conf:ltitutional guarantee. Ratl1er. the grand jury may 
override a Fifth Amendment claim only if the wit-
ness is granted immunity co-ext0nsive with the privilege· 
against self-incrimination. Kastiyar \'. United States, 
supra. Similarly. a grand JUry may not compel a person 
to produce books and papers that would incriminate him. 
Boyd , .. Cnited States, 116 C. :::;. 610. 633-635 ( 1886) . 
Cf. Couch v. United States, 40~) U. S. 322 ( 1973) . The 
grand jury is also without power to invade a legitimate 
privacy interest protected by the Fourth Amendment. 
A grand jury's subpoena duces tecum will be disallowed 
if it is "far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as 
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Hale v. 
Henkel, 201 U. S. 43. 76 (1906). Judicial supervision is 
properly exercised m such cases to prevent the wrong 
before it OCCUlTS. 
III 
In the instant case, the Court of Appeals held that 
the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment limits 
the grand jury's power to compel a witness to answer 
questions based on evidence obtained from a prior· 
unlawful search and seizure. The exclusionary rule was 
adopted to effectuate the Fourth Amendment right of 
all citizens "to be secure in their houses, papers, and 
effects, agaiust unreasonable search<>s and seizures . .. . "· 
Under this rule. evidence. obtained in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment cannot be used i11 a criminal pro-
Qt:ecling ag&inst the victim of the ill~gal search and aei-
72-n4-<>PINION 
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t:ure. Weeks v. United States, 232 l -. R. 383 (1914); 
Mapp \'. Oh1·o, 867 l '. ~- 64:3 ( 1961) . This prohibition 
applies as well to the fruits of . the illegally seized evi-
dence. ·wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); 
HnverthoniP Lumber Co . \', United States. 251 U. S. 385 
( 1920) 
The pur·pose of the exrluswnary rule IS not to redress 
flw injury to the privacy of the search victim ; 
" [T ]lw ruptured pnvacy of the victims' homes a11d 
effects cannot be restored. Reparation comes too 
late." Lwkletter \' Walker, 3RI U. S. 618. 637 
( 1 ~)(),)) 
lnstead. tlw rule's prune purpose IS to deter future unlaw-) 
ful police eond uct and thereby effectuate the guarantee 
of the Fourth Anwndnwnt against unreasonable search 
and se1zures. 
"The rule ts calculated to prevent. not tQ repair. 
Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the 
eonstitutiona] guaranty m the only effeotively avail-
able way-by removing the incentive to disregard 
it.'' Elkws \ f'nited States, 3()4 ll . S. 206, 217 
( IDtiO) 
Accmd. /'.lapp v. Ohw, :367 l". S. 643, 656 ( 1961); Tehau 
\' ('nited States, e.r rei . Shot, 382 U. ~- 406, 416 (1966) ; 
Terry v. Ohio, 302 C ~ - 1, 29 ( HJ68) ln sum, the rule 
1s a .Judicially-created remedy designed to safeguard 
Fourth Anwndment rights generally through its deterrent 
effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the 
party aggriPwrl 
5 ThC'rr 1~ ~ome dt~agrN'IliPJtt a, to the practiCal efficacy of the 
t•xelu~wnary rul\', anrl a,., tlw Court notPd m Elhns v United States, 
:31)-! l' :-1 . 20fi . 211- ( HJHO J, n•lt•va11t ;, I<' Jmpimal statilstics are not 
}J.vailab!P... ('f Oak~ . ~tudnu~r thr Exeht~Jonary Rule tn Searcq 
,: 
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Despite its broad deterrent purvose, the excltisionary 
t't1le has never been interpreted to proscribe the use of 
illegally-seized evidence In all proceedings or against all 
persons. As with any remedial device, the application 
of the rule has been restnct0d to those areas where 
tts remedial obJectives are thought most efficaciously 
served. The balancing process implicit in this approach 
is expressed in thE> contours of the standing require-
ment. Thus. standing t.o invoke the exclusionary rule 
has been confined to situations where the Govern-
ment seeks to use such evidence to incriminate the 
victim of the unlawful search. Brown v. United States, 
411 L". S. 223 ( 1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 
F. S. 165 ( 1969); Wony Sun v. United States, supra; 
Jones v. United States, 362 C. ~. 257 ( H)60). This 
standing rule is premised on a recognition that the need 
for deterrence and hence the rationale for excluding the 
evidence are strongest where the Government's unlawful 
conduct would result in imposition of a criminal sanction 
on the victilll of the search " 
u.nd Setzurr, ;~i U. Chi. L. Hev. ti65 (i970) . We have no occasion 
iu tht~ prr:;ent ca:;c to ron~idrr thr rxtent of tlw rule'~ efficacy in 
enmmal trw!~ 
;; In holdmg that the respondem had :;tandmg to invoke the exclu-
:;wnary rule 111 a grand Jtll'Y proceedmg,.:. the Court of Appeals relied 
011 Rule 41 (e), Fed. Hule Crim. Proc. 4(i5 F . :.!d, at 1222-1224. Rule 
4;1 (e) provtdes, in relevant part' that .. raJ person aggneved by an 
unlawful search and seizun· mny movt• thr di::;trict court ... for 
return of the propert~· and to suppre.::s for u~e a:,; evidence anything 
so obtauwd ... · It further state~ that '' l tJhr motwn shall be 
made before trtal or hrarlng. . ." We ha vp recognized that Rule 
41 (e) 1::; '' no broader than the con:;tttutional rulr." Alderman v. 
United State&. :394 (1 ~ .. at 17:1 , n. f"i ; Jones , .. United States. 362 
C S. 25i (1960) . RuiP 41 (e) . thercforr. doc~ not ron~t1tut.e a :stattJ ... 
lor.y rxpanHion. of the Pxrht~lOIIHr'Y rql<' 
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ln decidmg whethE-r t<~ ext<>nd tlw exclusionary rule 
to grand jury proceedings, we must weigh the potential 
inJUry to thP historic role and functions of the grand 
.iury against thE' potentta.l benefits of the rule as ap-
plied m tlw; context. It is evident that this exten-
tJOtl of the Pxclusionary rule \vould seriously impede 
thE' gram1 .1 ury. Because the grand .1 ury does not 
finally ad.1 udicate guilt or innocence, it has tradi-
tiOnally hN•n allowf'd to pursue its investigative and 
accusatorial functJOtts unimpeded by the evidf'ntiary 
and JH'ocedural restrictwns applicable to a criminal 
trial. Pernutting witnesses to invoke the exclusion-
ary rul<' before a grand JUry would precipitate adjudi-
eation of ISSUE'S hitherto res~rve(l for thE' trial on 
the merits and would delay and disrupt grand Jury pro-
cec•dings. Supprrssion heanngs would halt the orderly 
progress of an investigation and might necessitate 
extended litigation of issues only tangentially related 
to the grand JUry's pnmary ob,ircti ve.7 The probable 
result would bE' "protracted interruptions of grand jury 
proceedwgs," Oelbard v. ( '11ited States, 408 P. S. 41, 70 
(1 H72) ( \\.'HIT!~ . .J .. roncurring). effrctively transforming 
them into preliminary trials on the merits. In some 
l'lw ( 'om1 of Apprab al~o found 1 hat t ht• Govrrnmen1't; off<>r of 
immunn~· ttndt•r 1~ 11 ~ (' § :Z51-t wa~ 1rn•lpvan1 to l'<'iSJlondrnt'~ 
r<tandm~ lo 111vuk<· tlw l'\t'lii~Jonar, rult' . 4ti.'i F 2d, at 1221. We 
llf.trl'e WJ1 h I hat t!Pt I' !'Ill lila t 1011 for 11H' r<>a~Oil~ ~I a tPd 111 Part~ II I' rv. 
;tnd \' of tin:< opm1on 
Till' for<·t · of t ht,. ar,.mtH·llt '"' w<'ll JlJu,.t ra1l'tl hy the iactl:' of 
tlw pre~Pilt t'Hl:'t' . A,. of th<• dat<> of tJu,. deeJt;JOll, morH than two 
and orw-halt ymr~ will hnvP l'lapHNI ~Ill<'!:' n•spondenl wn::; ~ummoned 
to ap(H'ar all(! t('~tlf~· hl'for<· the grand Jur~·. lf reHpond<'nl ·~ tr::;ti• 
mony wa;; vital to grand .JUry ·,- JllVt':<tJgatJon Ill August 1971 of 
extortwnat<• crl'cht iran:;aetJOll,., 11 1" po;;~iblr that tl11:< parttcul~r 
invel:ltlga t toll hak ht•<·n r•oJuplPt l'ly ffll::<t rat t'll 
·r 
\.. ~ . ,. 
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cases the delay might be fatal to the enforcement of the 
criminal law. Just last Term we reaffirmed our disin-
clination to allow litigious interference with grand jury 
proceedings · 
" Any holding that would saddle the grand JUry 
with mini-trials and preliminary showing would 
assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the 
public's interest i.n the fair and expeditious admin-
istration of the criminal law. '' United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 F. S. 1, 17 ( 1973) 
Cf. United Stales v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971); Cobble-
dick v. United States, 309 U. S. 323 ( 1940). In sum, 
we believe that allowing a grand jury witness to invoke 
the exclusionary rule would unduly interfere with the 
effective ami expeditious discharge of the grand jury's 
duties. 
Against this potential d~:puage to the role and func-· 
tions of the grand jury. we must weigh the benefits to 
he derived from this proposed extension of the exclu-
sionary rule. Suppressiop of the use of illegally-seized 
evidence against the search victim in a criminal trial 
IS thought to be an important method of effectuating 
the Fourth Amelldment. But it does not follow that the 
Fourth Amendment requires adoption of every proposal 
that might deter police misconduct. In Alderman v. 
United States, 394 U. S., at 174. for example, this Court 
declined to extend the excl usionary rule to one who was 
not thr victim of the unlawful seareh : 
" Th(~ deterrent values of preventiug the incrimi-
nation of those whose rights the police have violated 
have been considered sufficient to justify the sup-
pression of probative evidence even though the case 
against the defendant is weakened or destroyed. 
1\re adhef(~ to that .1 udgment. But we are not con-
,I ' 
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vi'nced that the additional benefits of extending the 
exclusionary rule to other defendants would justify 
further encroachment upon the public interest in 
prosecuting those accused of crime and having them 
acquitted or convicted on the bas1s of all the evi'"' 
dPnce which exposes thP truth ." 
\\re think this observation equally applicable in the 
present context. 
Any incremental dt>terrent effect which might be 
achieved by rxtencling the rule to grand jury proceed-
ings is uncertain at best. Whatever deterrence of police 
misconduct may result from thP exclusion of illegally-
seized evidence from crimmal triais. it is unrealistic to 
assumt> that application of the rule to grand jury prq-
ceedings would significantly further that goal. Such a,n 
extension would deter only police investigation con-
sciously directed toward the discovery of evidence solely 
for usp in a gralld JUry mvestigation. The incentive to 
disregard the requirement of the Fourth Amendment 
solely to obtam an mdictment from a grand jury is sub-
f4tantially negated by the inadmissibility of the illegally-
seized evulence in a subsequent criminal prosecution of 
the search victim. For the most part, a prosecutor would 
hP unlikely to request att indictment where a conviction 
could not be obtained. We therefore decline to embrace 
a v1ew that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedly 
minimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct 
at the expense of substantially impeding the role of the 
grand .1 ury · 
~ HPspondent re!Jp::; primarily on S!1Ve1'thorne Lumber Co. v. Umted I 
.State~;, :!51 l' . R. :~85 ( 1920) . wh1rh the d1s;;ri1t contends "plainly 
eoutrols tlu~ <'H~r. " Post, p. - . In that CH8e, frderal officers 
unlawfull~· ~Plzed ePrtam document~ brlongmg to thr Silverthornes· 
and the1r lurnbPr company and pre,;entrd tlwm to a grand jury that 
h11d aln·arl'y llldH'tr([ til<' SJ!vrr.thor.m.<·~ aud tlw rompauy. A d.istl!irt 
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Respondent also argues that each and every question 
basf'd on evidence obtained from an illegal search and 
se1zure constitutes a fresh and independent violation of 
cuu rt ordt•red t ht• rrt urn of t lw doclllnC'nt out tmpuundrd phuto-
~~:raph, and c•opiP~ of thP original:;. Lat<·r, thC' pro::;ecutor cau~C'd the 
grand Jllr~· to ~~~II<' ~ubpoc•nas duce; tectnm to tlw Sih·erthorne~ 
and tlw c·ompan~· to produrr tlw originab, and tlwir rrfusal to comply 
lc•d to a c·unt<'mpt cttatwtt. ln r<'Y<'r~ing tlw Judgment, the Court 
hdd that tlw Hubporna" WPI'<' mvalid becau;;p they wNr ba"ed 
oil knowlrdge ohtainrd from the· illt•gall~· srtzC'd rvid(·nc·C', citing 
Weeks ,. l 'nitf'd State!!, wpra. :\Ir .. Ju~ticP Holme::;, writing for the 
Court. :<tilted that thP .. r,.;seneP of the provt~wn forbidding the 
acqll!::;ttion of C'vtdt•ncP 111 a rt•rtnm way 1::; not mere]~· that the 
evtdrnee ~o acqlllred "hall not bt> used before tlw Court but that 
tt. "hall not ))(' ll"t>d at all." :!51 l'. 8., at a9~. 
Silverthorne i::; dt:<tmgmshahiP from the present case in ~<'vera! 
Hignifieant rp::;pert". Tht•n•, plaint\ff;;-ttt-Prror had previously been 
indictPd by the grand ,Jury and tlms could invoke the exclu~ionary 
ntlP 011 the bastt' of thetr Htatus a~ rrnnmal clc•fendauts. .\Joreover, 
1 he CovPrtJm('llt ·,_ tnt<'rC':;t Ill rPraptunng: t lw ongmal document~ wa;; 
foundPd on a belt<'f that the~· Iml-(ht h(• u~efulm the criminal prosecu-
tion already authonzt'd b~· tht• grand Jury. It did not appear that 
th<' gram! Jury nC'ed<'<l tlw documents to pprform tt;; mve::;ttgative or 
H<'CU:<atonal functtOll::>. Thu:;, tlw primar~· con~e(juence of the Court's 
dt·rt><JOn wa~ to C'X<'Iude thP Pviclenrr from thC' ~ubsequent criminal 
trw I. Fmally, pnor to the i:<~ltam<· of t lw grand jury subpoena~, 
tht'l'l' had been a judtctal dN<•rmutn t io11 that t lw ::;earrh and ~:;eizure 
wa;; Illt'gal. The claun of plainttff::;-HH'rror WH~:< not rai::;ed for the fin;t 
tmw 111 a. prc•-indictmPllt motHm to "'uppre::;s r<'quiring interruption 
of grand Jlll'Y prorePdingl:' . 
By c·ontra::>t , in 1 hC' instant ru::;e re;;pondent had not been indicted 
by the grand jury and wa~ not a criminal defendant. Under tradi-· 
twnal pnnrtplet', he had no standing to invoke the exclusionary rule·. 
The effect of the District Court'H order wa;; to deprive the grand 
,iury of tc;;tunony 11 ttt>(:'(led to conduct it~ investigation. Further-· 
more, rC'spondPnt ·~ motion to ::;uppress had not been previously made 
and rpqutrPd mterrupt10n of the grand Jlll'Y proceeding::;. In these· 
•c•rrumstancrs, Silve1·tborue t;; rertfUJ)I;r not controlling. To the 
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the witness' constitutional rights." Ordinarily, of course, 
a witness has no right of privacy before the grand jury. 
Absent some recognized privilege of confidentiality, every 
man owes his testimony. He may invoke his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimina-
tion , but he may not decline to answer on the grounds 
that his responses might prove embarrassing or result in 
an unwelcome disclosure of his personal affairs. Blair v. 
United States, supra. Respondent's claim must be, there-
fore. not merely that the grand jury's questions invade 
his privacy but that, because those questions are based on 
illegally-obtained evidence, they somehow constitute dis-
tinct violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. We 
disagree. 
The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent 
unreasonable governmental intrusions into the privacy 
of one's person, house, papers, or effects. The wrong 
condemned is the unjustified governmental invasion of 
these areas of an individual's life. That wrong, commit-
t>xtent that the Court'~ broad dicttim mtght bt> construed to ~:;uggest 
a diffrrent result in tlw prcst>nt ca~St>, we nott> that it has bern ~ub­
stantially undmnincd by Iuter cases. Ser Part~; III and IV of this 
opinion 
0 At oral argument. couusel for respondent stated the contention 
as follows : 
'' I ~:;ubmit to the Court that 0ach question asked of the Respond-
ent. befort> the grnnd jury, which question was only a~:;ked because 
of a pa:;t violation of tlw Fourth Amendment, [amounts to] a new, 
immediate vwlation of the Fourth Amendment . . . . [A] question 
deriwd from a past violation, a. question into the privacy of the 
witness amounts to another intrusion in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment ." Tr. of Oral Arg. 17. 
"[R]efuHing to anHwcr a que~;tion in which the question conceivably 
is derived from n. past violation of the Fourth Amendment, gives 
ri:;e to an additional or nt>w Fourth Amrndment right to resist 
answering that question because the question itself becomes iHl 
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ted m this case, is fully accomplished by the original 
search without probable cause. Grand jury questions 
based on evidence obtained thereby involve no independ-
ent governmental invasion of one's person. house, papers, 
or effects, but rather the usual abridgement of personal 
privacy common to all grand jury questioning. Ques-
tions based on illegally-obtained evidence are only a 
derivative use of the product of a past unlawful search 
and seizure. They work no new Fourth Amendment 
wrong. Whether such derivative use of illegally-obtained 
evidel1Ce by a grand jury should be proscribed presents a 
question not of rights but of remedies. 
In the usual context of a criminal trial, the defendant 
is entitled to suppress not only the fruits of an unlawful 
search and seizure but also any derivative use of that 
evidence. The prohibition of the exclusionary rule must 
reach such derivative use if it is to fulfill its function of 
deterring police misconduct. In the context of a grand 
jury proceeding, we pelieve that the damage to th~:~-t 
institution from the 'unprecedented extension of the 
exclusionary rule urged by respondent outweighs the 
benefit of any possible incremental deterrent effect. Our 
conclusion necessarily controls both the fruits of an 
unlawful search and seizure and any question or evidence 
derived therefrom. 1" The same cousiderations of logic 
10 It. ~houJd be noted that, ever1 absent the cxdu:siouary rule, a 
grand jury witness may haVf other remedie:s to redre&:; the injury to 
his privacy and to prevent It further invasion in the future. He mny 
be entitleq to maintain a cause of action for damage:; against the 
officers who conducted the unlawful Hearch . B'iveus v. Six U~tknown 
Named Agents of the Fede1'al Bur-eau of Investigation , 40:3 U.S. 388 
(1971) . He m:~y also Sf'(>k return of the illegally-seized property, 
a.nd exclu:sion of the propert)' 1q1d rts frmt~ from being used as evi-
dence against hrm in a criminal trw!. Go-Ba1't lrnpo1'ting Co. v. 
United States, 282 U. S. 344 (1931) . In tlw:;P crrcumstances, we 
cannot say tlurt such a witne:s:s is necessa rily left remedile:re in tbe 
face of an unl~,twful search al).cl seiz\trf;' 
. . . ~ 
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and policy apply to both the fruits of an unlawful search 
and seizure and derivative use of that evidence. and we 
do not distinguish between them." 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Reversed. 
11 The dis>~ent'· reliaucP 011 Gelbard v. United States. 408 P. S. 41 
(1972), is misplaced. There, the Court construed 18 U. S. § 2515, 
the evidentiary prohibition of Tit. III of the Ommbu~ Crime Control 
and 8afe Streets Act of Hl6H, 82 Stat. 211, ns amended, 1R P. S. C. 
§§ 2510--2520. It held that § 2515 could b<• invoked by a graud jur~· 
witness as a defe11~e to a routempt charge brought for refusal to 
answer 4ueb'tions based ou informatwu obtained from the witness' 
communications alleged to have been unlawfully intercepted through 
wiretapping nnd electronic surveillancr. The Court'::; holding rested 
exclusively on an mterpretation of § 2515 and Tit. III, which repre-
sented a rongressi01wl effort to afford sprrwl safeguards agamst the 
unique problm~s po~ed by llli~n,;e of win•tapping and electronic sur-
veillaucr. Therr was no indicatiOn. 111 either Gelbard or the legisla-
tive hi:>tory of Tit. Ill, that § 2215 wa::; regardf'd as a restatement 
of existmg law. A,; ~I R. ,) l':;TWE W H I'l'E notPd m Ius conrurrmg 
opinion in Gelba1'd, § :2515 "unquestionably works a change m the 
law with resprct to tht> rightH of ~~:ratid jur~· witnrssPs. . '' 408 U. S. 
69, 70. 
The disst>nt also voices coucern that today '~ decision will betray 
" thP imperative of judicial mtegrity," ''tmnction illegal government 
conduct," and rven "impenal the ver~· foundation of our peoples' 
trust in their Government.'' Post, p. --. There i~ no basis for 
this alarum. "Illegal conduct' ' IS hardly sanctwned, nor arP the 
foundation,; of thP Republi<· Imperiled,, b~· declimug to makt> nn 
unprecedented Pxtenswn of t hr pxclusionar~r rule to grand Jury 
proccPdings whcrP thr rule'~ ohJ!'CtlvP" would not bP effpctively 
SPrvcd and wherP othPr Important nnd historic values would hE~ 
unduly prejudiced. ComparP Alderman v. United States, S'Upra ,~ 
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR. JuSTICEl 
Dm rGLAS and Ma. JuSTICE MARSHALL join. dissenting. 
The Court holds that the exclusionary rule in search 
and seizure cases does not apply to grand jury proceed-
Ings because the principal objective of the rule is "to deter 
future unlawful polic<' conduct," ante, p. 9, and "it is 
unrealistic to assume that application of the rule to grand 
jury proceedings would significantly further that goal '' 
ld., 13. This downgrading of the exclusionary rul<' to a 
determination whether its application in a particular 
type of proceeding furthers deterrence of future police 
misconduct reflects a startling misconception, unless it 
is a purposeful rejection. of the historical objective and 
purpos<' of the rule. 
The commands of the Fourth Amendment are of course 
directed solely to public officials. Necessarily therefore 
only official violations of thos<' commands could have 
created the evil that threatened to make the Amend-
ment a dead letter . But curtailment of the evil, if a 
considrration at all. was at best only a hoped for effect 
of the exclusionary rule, not its ultimate objective. 
Indeed, there is no evidenc<' that the possible deterrent 
effect of the rule was given any attention by the judges 
chiefly responsible for its formulation. Their concern 
as guardians of the Bill of Rights was to fashion all 
enforcement tool to give content and meaning to the 
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James Madison 's prPdiction in his address to the First 
Congress on June 8. 17R9 : 
"If they fthc rights] are incorporated mto the 
Constitution. indepcnc!Pnt tribunals of justice will 
consider themsPlves in a peculiar manner the guar-
dian of those rights; thPy will be an impenetrab le 
bulwark against every assumption of power in the 
Legislative or RxPcutive; they will be naturally led 
to rc>sist every encroachment upon rights expressly 
stipulated for in thC' Constitution by the declaration 
of rights." I Annals of Cong. 439 ( 1834) . 
Smce. howrver. those .JUdges werC' without power to 
direct or control the conduct of law enforcement officers, 
the enforcenwnt tool had nPcessarily to be one capable 
of administration by judges. The exclusionary rule, if 
not perfect. accomplishC'd the twin goals of enabling thP 
JUdiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in official law-
lessness and of assuring the people- all potential victims 
of unlawful governmrnt conduct--that the government 
would not profit from its lawless behavior, thus minimiz-
mg the risk of sC'riously undermining popular trust in 
government. 
That these considerations. not the rulP's possible deter-
rent effect. were uppermost in the minds of th(' framers 
of the ruk clearly Pmrrges from the decision which 
fashioned it 
"The pffect of the Fourth Amendment is to put 
courts of the t ' nited States and FPderal officials, in 
the exercise of their power and authority, under 
limitations and restraints as to the exercisC' of such 
power and authority, and to forever secure the peo-
ple, their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
all umeasonable searches and seizures under the 
guisE' of law. The tt>ndency of those who exe-
cute the crimmal laws of the country to obtain 
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convivtion by means of unlawful seizures ... should 
find no sanction in the judgments of the courts 
which are charged at all times with the support of 
the Constitution and to which people of all condi-
tions have a right to appeal for the maintenance of 
such fundamental rights . . .. 
"This protection is eq ually extended to the action 
of the Government ami officers of the law acting 
under it. . To sanction such proceedings w~uld 
be to affirm by judicial decision a manifest neglect 
1j 11ot an open defiance of the prohibitions of the 
Constitution, intended for the protection of the peo-
ple against such unauthorized action." Weeks v. 
United States, 232 P . ~. 383. 392, 394 ( 1914) (em-
phasis added) . 
Mr. J ustic0 Brandeis and Mr. Justice Holmes addeu 
their enormous influence> to these precepts in their notable 
dissents in Olmstead v. United States, 277 P . fl. 438 
( Hl28). Mr. Justice Brandeis said 
'In a government of laws, existence of the govern-
ment will be imperilled if it fails to observe the 
law scrupulously Our Government is the potent, 
the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it 
teaches the whole people by its example. Crime 
ts contagious. If the Government becomes a law-
breaker. it breeds contempt for law ; it invites 
every man to become a law unto himself; it invites 
anarchy ·· 277 F . S .. at 485. 
And Mr. Justice Holmes said · 
'' [ W l e must consider the two objects of desire, both 
uf which we cannot have, and make up our minds 
which to choose. It is desirable that criminal should 
be detected, and to that. end that all availabl0 evi~ 
4 
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dence should be used. It also is desirable that the 
Government should uot itself foster and pay for 
other crimes, when they are the means by which 
the evidence is to be obtained . . . . We have to 
choose, and for my part. I think it is a less evil that 
some criminals should escape than that the Gov-
ernment should play an ignoble part. 
" If the existing code does not permit district 
attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it 
does not permit the judge to allow such iniquities 
to succeed." 277 F.~ .. at 470. 
The same principles were reiterated only five years ago. 
In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. ~. 1, 12-13 ( 1968), Chief Justice 
W arrcn said for the Court 
"The rule also serves another vital function-'the 
imperative of judicial integrity.' Elkins Y. United 
States, 3()4 F . S. 206, 222 ( 1960). Courts which 
sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be 
made party to lawless invasions of the constitu-
tional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered 
governmental usc of the fruits of such invasions." 
It is true that deterrence was a pro min en t consider-
ation in the cktermination whether Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U. ~. 643 ( Hl61). which applied the exclusionary rule 
to the States, should be givcn retrospective effect. Link-
letter v. ~Walker, 381 U. S. 618 ( 1965). But that lends 
no support to today's holding that the application of the 
exclusionary rule depends solely upon whether its in-
vocation in a particular type of proceeding will signifi-
cantly further the goal of deterrence. The emphasis 
upon deterrence in Linkletter must be understood in the 
light of the crucial fact that the States had justifiably 
relied from 1049 to 1961 upon Wolf v. ColoradJ, 338 
U. S. 25 (1949), and consequently, that application of 
Mapp would have required the wholesale release of in-
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numerable convicted prisoners. few of whom could have 
been successfully retried. In that circumstance, Link-
letter held not only that retrospective application of 
Mapp would not further the goal of deterrence but also 
that it would not further "the administration of justice 
and the integrity of the judicial process." 381 U. S., at 
637. Cf. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U. S. 217, 229 
(1969) 0 
Thus. the Court senously errs in describing the 
exclusionary rule as merely "a judicial-created remedy 
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights gener~ 
ally through its deterrent effect .... " Ante, p. 9. 
Rather, the exclusionary rule is "part and parcel of the 
Fourth Amendment's limitation upon lgovernmental] 
encroaclmwnt of individual privacy," Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U S., at 651. aile! "an essential part of both the Fourth 
and Fourteenth Amendments," id., at 657, that "gives 
to the individual no more than that which the Consti-
tution guarantees him. to the police officer no. less than 
that to which honest law· enforcement is entitled, and, 
to the courts. that judicial integrity so necessary in the 
true administration of justice." I d., at 660. 
This !VI app summation crystalizes the series of decisions 
that developed the rule, and with which toclay's holding 
lS plainly at \Var. For the first time , the Court today 
discounts to tlw point of extinction the vital function of 
the rule to insure that the JUdiciary avoids even the 
slightest appearance of sanctioning illegal government 
conduct. This rejection of "the imperative of judicial 
integrity." Elkins v. United States, supra, 364 U. S., at 
222. openly invites "I t l he conviction that all government 
is staffed by . . . hypocrites l, a conviction] easy to 
mstill and difficult to erase.'' Paulsen, The Exclusionary 
Rule and Miscomluct by the Police, 52 J. Crim. L. and 
P R. 255, 258 (1961). When judges appear to 
beconw "accomplices in the willful disobedience of a 
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Constitution that they are swor11 to uphold," Elkins v. 
United States, 364 C. S .. at 223, we imperil the very 
foundation of our peoples' trust in their Government on 
which our Demcoracy rests. Sec On Lee v. United 
States, 343 F. S. 747, 758-759 ( 1952) (Frankfurter, J .. 
dissenting). The cxcl usim1ary rule is needed to make 
the Fourth Amenclnwnt something real; a guarantee that 
does not carry with it the exclusion of evidence obtained 
by its violation is a chimera. Moreover. 
''I ij nsistence on observance by law officers of tradi-
tional fair procedural requirements is, from the long 
pow t of view. best calculated to contribute to that 
em!. However much in a particular case insistence 
upon such rules may appear as a technicality that 
Inures to tlH' benefit of a guilty person, the history 
of the criminal law proves that tolerance of short-
cut methods ill law enforcement impairs its endur-
ing effectiveness." Miller \' ( 'nited States, 357 
TT. S. 301,313 (1958) . 
The .JUdges who developed the exclusionary rule were 
well aware that it embodied a judgment that it is better 
for some guilty persons to go free than for the police 
to behave i11 forbidden fashion. A similar judgment led 
the Court to decide in Silverthorne Lumber Co., Inc. v. 
l'nil('d States, 251 l'. S. 385 (1020), that a grand jury 
must be denied access to plainly relevant but illegally 
seized papf'rs. In that case. after federal agents unlaw-
fully seized papers belonging to the t::lilverthornes and 
their corporation, and presented the documeuts to a 
grand jury which had previously indicted the Silver-
thornes. a district court ordered the documents returned 
and copies that had been prepared in the interim 
impounded. After returning the originals, the grand 
JUry attempted to recoup them by issuance of a subpoena 
d1-tce.s tecum. Compliance with the subpoena was 
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refused. ami contempt convictions followed. ln revers-
mg thE' judgment of conviction. the Court speaking 
through Mr. Justice Holmes held that the Government 
was barred from utilizing any fruits of its forbidden act, 
stating that "l tj he essence of a provision forbidding the 
acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely 
evidencE' so acquirE'd shall not be used before the court 
but that it shall not be used at all." 251 U. S .. at 392. 
Silverthorne plainly controls this case. Respondent, 
like plaintiffs-in-error in Silverthorne,' seeks to avoid 
furnishing the grand jury with evidence that he would 
not have been called upon to supply but for the unlawful 
search and seizure. The Court would distinguish Silver· 
thorne on tlw ground that there the plaintiffs-in-error 
had been indicted and could invoke the exclusionary rule 
"on the basis of their status as criminal defendants," since 
the Govl'rnment's effort to obtain the documents was 
founded on a belief that they might be useful in I 
the criminal prosecution already authorized by the 
grand Jury·· Ante, p. 14 n. 8. The effort was clearly 
uot found<.'d on any such belief. Overlooked is the ~ 
fact that the grand JUry's interest in again obtain-
ing the' documents in Silverthorne may well have been 
to secure information leading to further criminal charges, 
estwcially since indictments of three other individuals, 
as well as additional indictments of the Silverthornes, 
had been the consequence of initial submission of the 
documents to the grand jury. See Brief on Behalf of 
Plaintiffs-in-Error, at 4, 18-19." Only if Silverthorne is 
1 XrJther thl' 8Ilvrrthorne Lumber Co., lwrau::;t:' It wa~ a corpora-
twa, ~c·p //ale , .. Hrnkel. :201 U. S. 4:3 (1906) , nor respondent, 
h<·rau~r he wa~ granted tran::;actional immunity, could invokr the 
pnvilrgr agam:st ::<rlf-mcrimmatwn Tlw ~Ituation:s arr therefore 
complPtPiy romparab!P 
" The Court al~o argue':' that "It J h<· SIIvNthorne's chum wa::;· not 
nu~Pd for tlw fi r"t t im<• 1t1 a pn·-indict ment motion to ;;up press 
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overruled can its precedential force to compel affirmance 
here be drnied. 
Congressional concern with the Silverthorne holding 
was clearly evidenced in enactment of 18 U.S. C. ~ 2515, 
providing that " [ w I hen ever any wire or oral communi-
cation has been intercepted, no part of the contents of 
such communication and no evidence derived therefrom 
may be received in evidence in any proceeding in or 
before any grand jury ... if the disclosure of that 
mformation would be in violation of this chapter.'' 
(Emphasis added.) In Gelbard v. United States, 408 
U.S. 41 (1972), \Ve set aside the adjudication in criminal 
contempt of a grand jury witness who refused to comply 
with a court order to testify on the ground that interro-
gation was to be based upon information obtained from 
the witness' communications allegedly intercepted by 
federal agents by means of illegal wiretapping and elec-
tronic surveillance. Our reasons track the grounds 
advanced in Silverthorne 
"ThE> purposes of ~ 2515 and Title III as a whole 
would be subverted were the plain command of 
~ 2515 ignored when the victim of an illegal inter-
ception is called as a witness before a grand jury 
and asked questions based upon that interception. 
MoreovE-r, ~ 2.115 serves not only to protect the 
privacy of communications, but also to ensure that 
the courts do not become partners to illegal conduct; 
the E-videntiary prohibition was enacted also 'to pro-
tect the integrity of court and administrative pro-
requiring mterru]ltiOn of grnnd jury procrcding~," ante, p. 14 n. 8, 
and therC'fore pr'C'~umabl~· it:; a~sertion OC'Ca8ioned no drlay. How-
Pver, tl1C' District Court in Silverthorne had granted an earlier appli-
cation for rt>turn of thP :seiz<•d documents from the grand jury after 
determining that thC'y had been obtained in violation of tht' Fourth 
Amt'ndmrnt. Tlw Court made no intimation that the Di;;trict Court 
acted Improper!~· in con:sidering the initial application 
([\ 
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ceedings.' Consequently, to order a gra11d jury 
witness. on pain of imprisonment, to disclose evi-
dence that ~ 2515 bars in unequivocal terms is both 
to thwart the congressional objective of protecting 
mdivid ual privacy by excluding such evidence and 
to entangle the courts in the illegal acts of Govern-
ment agents." 408 U.S., at 51 (footnotes omitted) . 
Similarly to allow Calandra to be subjected to questions 
derived from thE> illegal search of his office and seizure 
of his files is "to thwart the [Fourth and Fourteenth 
Amendnwnts' protection! of ... individual privacy . 
and to entangle the courts in the illegal acts of Govern-
mrnt agents.·· "And for a court, no petition of the 
executiw department, to sentence a witness, who is 
[himself I the victim of the illegal [search and seizure] 
to .Jail for refusal to participate in the exploitation of 
that [conduct in violation of the explicit command of 
the Fourth AmenclmentJ is to stand our whole system 
of criminal justice on its head." In re Evans, 452 F . 2d 
1230. 12.52 (1071) (Wright, J., concurring) . 
It is no answer, as the Court suggests, that the grand 
.JUry witnesses ' Fourth Amendment rights will be suffi-
ciently protected "by the inadmissibility of the illegally 
seized eviclencp in a subsequent criminal prosecution of 
the search victim ·· Ante, p.l3. This, of course. is no alter-
native for ( 'alandra, since he was granted transactional 
immu11ity and cannot be criminally prosecuted. But 
the fundamental flaw of the alternative is that to compel 
Calandra to testify in the first place under penalty of 
contempt necessarily "thwarts" his Fourth Amendment 
protectio11 .and.. " ntanglcs the courts in the illegal acts 
of Govprnnwnt agpn "- consequencf's that Silverthorne 
condemned as intolerable 
To be sure , the exclusionary rule does not "provide 
that illegally seizPd <-'vidc>nce is i nadmissiblP against any-
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one for any purpose.'' Alder111a11 v. United States, 3!)4 
V. ~ 165, 17.S (1969). But clearly there is a crucial 
distinction between withholding its cover from individ-
uals whose Fourth Amendment rights have not been 
violated- as has been done iu the "standing" cases, 
Alderman v. United Stales, 394 1'. S. 165 ( 1969). Jones 
,. fTnited States, 362 C. S. 257 ( Hl60)-. and withdraw-
ing its cover from persons whose Fourth Amendment 
rights have in fact been abridged. 
Respondent docs not seck vicariously to assert an-
other 's Fourth Amendment rights. He has himself been 
the victim of an illegal search and desires "to mend 
no one's privacy [but hisj owt1." Gelbard v. United 
States, 40~ l T. :-->. 41. ()3 (197:2) (DOVGLAS, J., concurring) . 
Pctition0r is told that he must look to damages to redress 
the cotwrdPdly unconstitutional invasion of his privacy 
ln oth0r words. officialdom may profit from its lawless-
ness if it is willing to pay a price . 
In Mapp, the Court thought it had "closerdJ the only 
courtroom door remaining opeu to evidence secured by 
official lawlessness'' in violation of Fourth Amendment 
rights. 3()7 l '. S .. at 654-655. The door is again aJar. 
As a consequence. I am left with the uneasy feeling that 
today 's decision may signal that a majority of my col-
leagues have positioned themsclvrs to reopen the door 
still further and abandon altogether the exclusionary rule 
111 search and seizure cases; for surely they can not be-
licvf' that application of the exclusionary rule at trial 
furthers the goal of deterrence. but that its application 
111 grand jury proceedings will not "significantly" do so . 
Unless we are to shut our eyes to the evidence that 
crosses our desks every (lay, we must concede that official 
lawlessness has not abated and that 110 empirical data 
distinguishes trials from grand .1 ury proceedings. J 
thus fear that when next we confront a case of a con-
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viCtion rested on illegally seized evidence, today's decision 
will be invoked to sustain the conclusion in that case 
also that "it is unrealistic to assume" that application 
of the rule at trial would "significantly further" the goal 
of deterrence-though. if the police are presently un-
deterred. it is difficult to see how removal of the sanction 
of exclusion will induce more lawful official conduct. 
The exclusionary rule gave life to Madison's prediction 
that "independent tribunals of justice . .. will be nat~ 
urally led to resist every encroachment upon rights 
expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the dec· 
laration of rights. '' We betray the trust upon which 
that prediction rested by today's long step toward aban· 
donment of the exclusionary rule. The observations of 
a recent commentator highlight the grievous error of 
thr maJority's retreat 
"lf constitutional rights are to be anythmg more 
than pious pronouncements. then some measurable 
consequence must be attached to their violation 
It would be intolrrable if the guarantee against 
unreasonable search and seizure could br violated 
without practical consequence. It is likewise im-
peratlvr to have a practical procedure by which 
courts can rrview alleged violations of constitutional 
nghts and articulate the meaning of those rights. 
The advantage of the exclusionary rule-entirely 
apart from any direct deterrent effect--is that it 
provides an occasion for JUdicial rPview. and It gives 
credibility to thr constitutional guarantees. By 
demonstrating that society vvill attach serious con-
sequences to the violation of constitutio11al rights, 
the exclusionary rule invokes and magnifies the 
moral and euucative force of the law. Over tho long 
tern1 tlw; may integrate sollH' fourth amendment 
12 
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ideals into the value system or norms of behavior 
of law enforcement agencies." Oaks, Studying the 
Exclusionary Rule in Seach and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 665, 756 ( 1970) ; see also Dellinger. Of 
Rights and Remedies: The Constitution as a Sword, · 
85 Harv. L. Rev. 1532, 1562-1563 (1972). 
I dissent and would affirm the judgment of the Court 
of Appeals, 
,, 
'•. 
